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This PhD investigates how the British Labour Party and the Austrian Social Democratic Party (SPÖ) 
have changed their position on the issue of comprehensive schooling since the 1980s, motivated 
by a wider interest in how social-democratic parties have interpreted their goals and strategies 
in education policy after the ‘golden age’ of social-democratic educational reform in Europe in 
the 1960s and 1970s.  
Throughout the 20th century, the question of whether children should be sorted based 
on their academic ability into different educational tracks has been one of the most controversial 
issues in education policy in Western Europe. Since the 1960s and 1970s, when reform movements 
sought to widen educational opportunities by abolishing academic selection in secondary 
schooling, comprehensive schooling has remained a reference point in often-passionate political 
debates over the purpose of education. At their core, debates over comprehensive schooling 
have focused on the relationship between educational selection, opportunities and standards; 
however, this policy has also become an umbrella for various reform ambitions and aversions 
concerning the organisation, content and governance of public schooling. While these 
controversies tend to be portrayed as a conflict between conservative and progressive 
perspectives, the positions of political parties on comprehensive schooling have not always been 
clear-cut. Although officially supporters of comprehensive schooling, social democratic parties 
often struggled to balance more radical aspirations for educational change with pragmatic 
strategies to expand educational opportunities within existing educational structures. Changing 
discursive and electoral contexts since the 1980s have given rise to additional challenges for these 
parties and their attempts to develop a vision and strategy for education policy.  
This research aims to contribute to better understandings of: 1) the different meanings a 
shared policy aspiration can acquire in different contexts and at different points in time, and 2) 
how such meanings are constructed, in this case, through the processes in which collective 
attitudes and policy preferences are formed within political parties. Building on a dialectical 
conception of political parties, this study understood political parties both as political actors who 
try to navigate external political arenas as well as internally differentiated coalitions which aim to 
unite different demands and have over time created shared understandings and collective norms. 
This research argues that investigating the interplay of parties’ engagement with their external 
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environment and their internal dynamics can provide a more nuanced understanding of what 
parties want and do in education policy and why. In two in-depth case studies, this research 
traced processes of policy formation and contestation within the SPÖ and the Labour Party (with 
a focus on education policy in England) since the 1980s. Drawing on 41 interviews and a wide 
range of documentary sources, the empirical investigation paid particular attention to the actors 
involved in these processes, their ‘assumptive worlds’ and interactions in shaping policy. Based 
on the case study findings, this study then comparatively analysed on how shared concerns and 
dilemmas of social-democratic parties in the area of education policy have played out in different 
political and educational contexts.  
 The case studies revealed considerable variation in the policy preferences, ideas and 
processes through which the Labour Party and the Austrian Social Democrats have interpreted 
and reformulated their positions on comprehensive schooling over time. These findings indicate 
not only the variety and fluidity of meaning that a shared policy idea can assume across political 
contexts and over time, but also the interdependence between such meanings and the processes 
in which collective preferences are formed. Despite their symbolic attachment to comprehensive 
schooling, both parties displayed a considerable degree of ambivalence in their vision and 
strategy for educational reform, which sometimes made it difficult to even determine their 
‘official’ policy on comprehensive schooling. As such, this research indicates not only that political 
parties’ policy preferences are shaped by struggles at different ‘sites’ within the party where policy 
is created, contested and reinterpreted. The tensions between these different sites and demands 
also provide important insights into the nature of political parties as complex political 
organisations which a have their own identities and internal lives and whose policies are shaped 
by both their specific pasts and their ongoing attempts to make sense of themselves in their 
particular context. The historical and comparative perspective of this research further indicated 
that the institutional context (particularly political institutions and the ‘feedback effects’ of 
previous education policy) exerted considerable influence over actors’ perceptions of what is 
‘possible’ and ‘desirable’ in educational reform in England and Austria. Highlighting the role of 
institutions, this study at the same time showed that the particular trajectory of the two parties’ 
struggles over comprehensive schooling cannot be understood without recognising the agency 
of a handful of key individuals, whose personal beliefs and various attempts to mobilise and 
construct opportunities for (and constraints on) change have left clear marks on the two parties’ 
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This PhD thesis investigates how social-democratic parties have positioned themselves in relation 
to the issue of comprehensive schooling in Austria and England1, in particular in the three decades 
between 1980 and 2010. The research aims to broaden our understanding of the meanings that 
the issue of comprehensive schooling has assumed in political debates across time and contexts, 
as well as the processes through which parties have formed their attitudes and preferences 
regarding education policy. This chapter introduces the aim and rationale of the research and 
provides an outline of the thesis.  
The idea of comprehensive schooling emerged in the early 20th century as a response to 
the selective nature of traditional European systems of secondary schooling, which sorted 
children as young as 10 or 11 into different hierarchical educational tracks to prepare them for 
different occupational pathways (Ringer, 1987). The idea of comprehensive, or non-selective, 
schooling rested on the belief that selecting children on the basis of their measured academic 
ability was not only unreliable but also contributed to the reproduction of social inequalities. In 
the 1960s and 1970s, the demand for comprehensive schooling gained political momentum within 
wider egalitarian educational and social reform projects. Debates on comprehensive schooling, 
or a ‘common school for all’, tended to include not only the demand for abolishing or postponing 
academic selection but also a range of ambitions for organisational, curricular and pedagogical 
reforms. Across Europe, these ambitions were accompanied by fierce political debates on the 
nature of schooling and its contribution to equality and social order. Although political front lines 
were not always clear-cut, the defence of traditional, selective school systems tended to be 
mounted from the political Right, while social-democratic parties were key (if at times ambivalent) 
advocates of non-selective or comprehensive schooling (Schnell, 1993; Wiborg, 2009; McCulloch, 
2015). 
The reform movements of the 1960s and 1970s resulted in successfully abolishing or 
postponing academic selection in most countries across Europe. From the 1980s on, however, the 
                                                     
1 This research focuses on the Labour Party’s policy for schools in England. It excludes the party’s involvement 
in education policy in other countries of the United Kingdom (Scotland, Wales and Northern Ireland), where 
education policy is devolved to those countries’ administrations. 
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idea and practice of comprehensive schooling started to face renewed opposition from emerging 
political discourses and education policy agendas, which emphasised principles such as parental 
choice, school diversity and competition; questioned post-war understandings of the dominant 
role and mechanism of the state in public service provision; and thereby also questioned the aim 
of a ‘common school for all’ and the principles it rested on (Griffiths, 2014; Gewirtz et al., 1995). A 
further challenge emerged from changing social attitudes and an increasing heterogeneity of 
values and educational demands with the potential to weaken popular support for a common 
educational experience for all (Derouet et al., 2015). Since the 1980s, the nature and social role of 
the school have re-entered political debates in many countries. While the issue of comprehensive 
schooling remains a reference point in national education policy debates – even in countries like 
Austria, which never succeeded in implementing this policy – the boundaries of these debates 
are blurred and comprehensive schooling frequently served as an umbrella for various policy 
aims and measures. While this challenges neat categorisations of cross-national policy trajectories 
it also makes comprehensive schooling a rich site for the study of changing political aspirations 
as well as controversies about the purpose, nature and organisation of schooling across countries. 
This PhD uses the debate about comprehensive schooling as a lens to investigate the 
formation of attitudes and positions on education policy in social democratic parties. In the 1960s 
and 1970s, comprehensive schooling had become a centrepiece in educational reform projects 
of many social democratic parties across Europe, who subsequently were key drivers in abolishing 
or postponing of academic selection in secondary schooling in most European countries. 
However, although the aim of comprehensive schooling has come to assume a considerable 
symbolic dimension for these parties, they often struggled to agree on a clear position on 
educational reform. While social-democratic parties frequently provided a forum for radical 
aspirations for educational change, the parties’ policy strategies usually focused on more 
pragmatic and less ambitious attempts to expanding opportunities within existing educational 
structures. This reflected not only a diversity of ideological strands on the purpose of educational 
reform within parties but also the parties’ electoral considerations and perception of political 
constraints for education policy-making. These tensions became of particular importance in the 
period since the early 1980s, when social-democratic parties had to find responses to changing 
political, discursive and electoral contexts. Much research exists on the resulting transformations 
in these parties’ approaches to social and labour market policy (Bonoli and Powell, 2004; Keman, 
2017). However, less is known about their changing positions on education policy in general and 
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comprehensive schooling in particular, as well as the internal party processes through which they 
have adapted long-standing policy positions to new conditions. 
At the heart of this thesis is how social-democratic parties developed their particular 
approaches to education policy, focusing on two parties with very different trajectories. 
Epitomising the wider ideological transformation European social democracy in the 1990s, the 
British Labour Party also appeared to abandon its traditional commitment to comprehensive 
schooling, which it had helped to introduce in 1965. During the fundamental overhaul of the 
party’s ideological profile and electoral strategies in the mid-1990s, leading Labour figures 
criticised comprehensive schooling for its alleged uniformity, lack of choice and failure to achieve 
educational standards. Although the party remained officially opposed to selection by ability, 
Labour governments between 1997 and 2010 set out to ‘modernise’ comprehensive schooling by 
increasing parental choice, diversity and competition between schools, while marginalising the 
power of local authorities and the autonomy of teachers. For many observers, this shift 
constituted an attack on the values the comprehensive schooling project stood for, and the 
particular practice of comprehensive schooling that had developed in England since the 1960s 
(Haydn, 2004; Phillips, 2003; Walford, 2001). However, as this thesis will show, the common 
distinction between ‘Old’ and ‘New Labour’ education policy masks the multitude of ideas, 
motives and struggles that shaped Labour’s education policy before and after Tony Blair’s 
election as party leader in 1994. 
While the issue of comprehensive schooling has become a key party battlefield over the 
Labour Party’s strategy and identity, the Austrian Social Democratic Party (SPÖ) appears to 
remain wedded to its traditional commitment to comprehensive schooling. However, having 
failed to abolish early selection in secondary schooling in the 1970s, the SPÖ’s demand for 
comprehensive schooling has largely disappeared from its agenda during the 1980s and 1990s. It 
was only rediscovered in the early 2000s when Austria’s comparatively unfavourable results in the 
Programme for International Student Assessment (PISA), which had been conducted by the OECD 
since 1999, triggered a wider debate about the quality of the Austrian education system (Bauer 
et al., 2005). However, the SPÖ’s suffered a renewed failure to introduce comprehensive 
schooling after 2007. The general failure to introduce comprehensive schooling in Austria has 
been attributed to the extent of political and social opposition to comprehensive schooling. 
However, the SPÖ has also been criticised for the gap between its traditional programmatic 
commitment to comprehensive schooling and its highly pragmatic political strategy and 
willingness to compromise on this issue (Dermutz, 1983a; Gruber, 2015).  
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This research has therefore sets out to analyse how these two parties, which share similar 
ideological roots and social bases, have developed rather different attitudes and preferences 
regarding comprehensive schooling. It intends to bridge various strands of research literature 
whose insights have informed the investigation. Firstly, from the history of education and 
education policy literature (e.g. Glöckel and Achs, 1985; Husén et al., 1992; Pring and Walford, 
1997; Benn and Chitty, 1997; Wiborg, 2009), this research has taken the insight that 
‘comprehensive schooling’ has served as an umbrella for wider political debates about the goal, 
content and organisation of schooling. The issue of comprehensive schooling has therefore 
extended beyond the question of selection and differentiation and has come to embody very 
particular meanings in different contexts. These meanings have been shaped by not only 
educational practice but also wider political debates and struggles over the meanings of equality, 
fairness and the ‘good society’ in different political settings. Rather than seeking a parsimonious 
definition of this policy, this research has chosen to take the fluidity of the debate over 
comprehensive schooling as a starting point for its empirical analysis. Secondly, while political 
parties (and individual politicians and intellectuals within them) have been protagonists in 
educational and ideological debates about the goal and means of educational change, they have 
also had to navigate real-world political and policy-making arenas that frequently constrained 
their ability to act on their goals. This research therefore also builds on insights from the various 
strands of literature on political parties and political institutions (e.g. March and Olsen, 1984; 
Charlot, 1989; Polletta and Jasper, 2001; Ansell, 2010; Busemeyer, 2015) to gain a better 
understanding of how parties interpret their policy goals as well as on the opportunities and 
constraints for political action within the particular contexts in which they find themselves.  
This research is guided by the following research questions: 
 How did the British Labour Party (in England) and the Austrian Social Democratic Party 
position themselves in relation to the issue of comprehensive schooling between 1980 
and 2010?  
 How were attitudes and policies regarding comprehensive schooling formed within the 
two parties?  
This research therefore aims to uncover (1) the particular meaning of comprehensive 
schooling in political debates, in different contexts and at different points in time, by (2) 
investigating the internal debates and processes through which two political parties have formed 
their policy on this issue, contributing to a more organic understanding of how political parties 
form their policy preferences.  
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This study adopted a constructivist-institutionalist perspective (Hay, 2008), paying 
particular attention to the role of institutions (understood in a broad sense as ranging from formal 
rules to social norms) and a variety of policy feedback effects that contribute to shaping political 
processes and actors’ policy preferences. Institutions can influence the power balance between 
political actors and provide certain opportunities and constraints for political action, yet they are 
here not understood as objective realities but as ‘meaningful social constructs’ (Parsons, 2010: 
81). Thereby, institutions also act as constructs internal to actors, which influence actors’ beliefs 
and interpretations of what constitutes a desirable course of action (Moses and Knutsen, 2012: 
148; Schmidt, 2008). Given the contingent and ultimately unpredictable nature of the political 
process, this research aims to empirically explore the dynamic and open-ended interplay between 
actors and institutions in the processes of preference formation in the two political parties studied.  
The analysis followed a two-staged approach, starting with within-case analysis followed 
by a comparative analysis. In two in-depth case studies, the shifting meanings of comprehensive 
schooling and the processes through which policy has been formed and contested within each 
party were traced over time. These case studies identified the long periods of gradual change as 
well as the tipping points and critical junctures at which party policy shifted into new avenues. 
Drawing on 41 personal interviews with actors in and around the two parties, as well as a wide 
range of document sources and newspaper coverage, the empirical investigation paid particular 
attention to different groups and individuals; their ‘assumptive worlds’ (Marshall et al., 1985; 
McPherson and Raab, 1988); that is, their beliefs, motivations and perceptions of ‘desirable’ and 
‘possible’ policy avenues at particular points in time; and their interactions in these processes of 
collective preference formation at different ‘sites’ in which party policy was created. The aim of 
the case studies was to uncover situated, context-specific explanations by interpreting actors’ 
motives from the accounts they provided (Flyvbjerg, 2006: 222; Moses and Knutsen, 2012: 222; 
Parsons, 2010: 93). While conducting the two empirical case studies already contributed to an 
implicit comparison, a comparison as ‘encounter’ (Freeman and Mangez, 2013), in which 
observations from one case acted as prompts to interrogate the other case, in the second step 
of the analysis, the meanings and processes uncovered in the case studies were then compared 
more systematically. The aim here was to enable reflection on the more general phenomenon of 
how social-democratic parties have responded to a changing political and discursive climate since 
the 1980s, and how shared concerns and dilemmas in education policy have played out differently 
in particular contexts.  
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The argument this thesis puts forward aims to bridge insights from the educational and 
the political science literature. Literature on educational reforms has highlighted the politicised 
nature of educational debates and the important role of political parties in shaping such debates. 
However, political parties’ motives in their engagement with education policy have rarely been 
subject to a more systematic study. Literature on political parties and their policy preferences, on 
the other hand, has only recently started to pay attention to education policy. It has highlighted 
that the redistributive implications of education policy are rarely clear-cut to provide parties a 
clear orientation regarding the popular support for reforms within the electorate but depend on 
the particular educational context (Ansell, 2010). This thesis aims to go further by arguing that 
political struggles over education policy should not only pay attention to the material (or 
distributive) conflicts but also the value conflicts educational reforms spark, an issue that has 
received very little attention in party research. In real-world political debates on education, 
concerns over the distributive implications of education policy are often intertwined with 
normative political questions of the ‘good society’ and how education should contribute to it. 
Debates over comprehensive schooling within social democratic parties have often resembled a 
microcosm of social-democratic education policy, wherein past political battles resonated, 
symbolic attachments were formed and questioned, and future aspirations were channelled. Such 
debates have revealed considerable ambiguity and fluidity in the goals and means of educational 
change within social-democratic parties. They have therefore provided a rich field through which 
to study common goals, as well as dilemmas, for social-democratic parties in education policy. 
Such shared ambitions and concerns have evolved very differently across countries. The 
historical and comparative perspective in this research highlights how educational ideas have 
developed in different contexts to acquire unique meanings and understandings. These policy 
meanings are not fixed but subject to shifting interpretations, which, in turn, provide further 
insight into the processes by which political actors form their preferences. This research therefore 
argues for a more organic understanding of political parties and their policy preferences. Parties 
are neither just containers of a political ideology nor coalitions of different interests; neither just 
transmission belts for societal interests nor vote-maximising electoral machines. While parties can 
be all of these things, they are also political organisations with their own identities and internal 
struggles, informed by their particular pasts and ongoing attempts to make sense of themselves. 
As a heuristic tool, this research used a dualistic understanding of political parties (Charlot, 1989), 
understanding parties as both actors trying to navigate the external political arena and internally 
differentiated coalitions with their own ‘internal lives’. How a party positions itself on a policy 
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problem is then shaped by a continuous struggle to respond to various external and internal 
demands, in particular the interplay of (1) the party’s engagement with other political actors and 
the electorate in its attempt to get elected, participate in government and realise its policy 
ambitions; and (2) the party’s ‘internal’ dimension: its ideological legacies, shared attitudes, 
collective identity and internal party lobbies. This research therefore argues that a party’s 
positioning on a particular issue is not a fixed entity but should be understood as a continuing 
process where at different sites within the party policy is being created, contested and 
reinterpreted.  
Finally, both the case studies and the comparative analysis undertaken for this thesis 
highlight the importance of political institutions and the general discursive climate in affecting 
actors’ perceptions of what is ‘possible’ and ‘desirable’. In addition, shared norms and practices 
within the two parties, as well as policy legacies and feedback effects of previous education policy 
have contributed to creating widely held attachments; group identities and vested interests 
(within and outside the parties); as well as societal expectation and prevalent interpretations of 
the ‘good school’. However, the complexity and unpredictability of these contexts have provided 
much room for the agency for actors. Individual actors’ beliefs, motivations, strategies of 
mobilising, and constructions of opportunities and constraint for reform had considerable 
influence on the direction and nature of change in both parties’ policy.  
This thesis is structured as follows. Chapter 1 provides the historical context for this study 
and the first part of the literature review. It starts with an overview of the evolution of debates 
around comprehensive schooling in Europe, highlighting the reform ambitions and political 
debates in the 1960s and 1970s, the spread of ‘New Right’ agendas promoting the introduction 
of quasi-markets in education from the 1980s, and the diffusion of new ideas about school 
governance through the activities of international actors since the 1990s. The second part of the 
chapter provides the educational and political context for comprehensive schooling debates and 
reforms in England and Austria, and discusses the main gaps and questions arising from the 
existing literature on the two cases. 
Chapter 2 reviews the literature on political parties and education policy and presents the 
analytical framework for studying policy-formation processes. It begins by reviewing the literature 
on parties’ policy preferences and the political economy of education reforms, which highlights 
the link between parties’ policy preferences and the material interests of the social groups they 
aim to represent or whose votes they wish to attract, focusing on the redistributive implications 
of education policy. Second, the chapter reviews the literature on the recent ideological-
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programmatic transformations among social-democratic parties, highlighting the change in 
dominant conceptions of the role of the state in the provision of welfare and governing of public 
services, and potential implications for the issue of comprehensive schooling. Third, the chapter 
reviews the literature on party organisation and intra-party policies, highlighting potential 
tensions between different goals, motivations and factions within parties and the implications 
such tensions could have in shaping parties’ policy preferences. After discussing strengths and 
weaknesses in this literature, an alternative analytical framework is presented that enables the 
process of policy formation within parties to be studied as a dialectical process – one that involves 
an interplay between parties’ engagement with their external environment and their internal 
dynamics. The chapter concludes by discussing the key aspects of each dimension and the 
theoretical assumptions about the relationship between actors and institutions underlying this 
approach.  
Chapter 3 outlines the research design. It details the methodological decisions guiding 
the study; provides the rationales for the choice of a case-study design combined with a 
comparative discussion, and for the selection of the two cases. It presents the strategies employed 
for data collection; and delineates the sources of evidence used for empirical analysis. The second 
part of this chapter discusses how the case studies were analysed, the principles informing the 
comparative discussion, and the methodological challenges involved in studying party attitudes 
and policy processes across countries.  
Chapters 4 and 5 present the findings of the two case studies and highlight the key 
features of each party’s approach to school policy and the specific processes through which these 
policies came about. The two chapters focus in particular on party-internal dynamics, the 
motivations and strategies of important factions or groups of actors within the two parties, and 
how these processes played out within the particular political, socioeconomic and cultural 
context.  
Chapter 4 traces changes in the Labour Party’s approach to comprehensive schooling, 
starting with Labour’s time in opposition from 1979 to 1997 during which Conservative 
governments under Margaret Thatcher fundamentally transformed the policy landscape and 
discursive climate in relation to education. The chapter documents Labour’s struggle to respond 
to these changes, and Labour’s increasing adoption of parts of Conservative rhetoric around 
educational standards and accountability during the late 1980s. The main focus of the analysis is 
Labour’s programmatic reorientation as ‘New Labour’ under leader Tony Blair in the mid-1990s, 
which resulted in the modification of its traditional school policy program as well as considerable 
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internal party struggles over the goals and means of educational reform. After tracing the key 
events in the first part of the chapter, the second part assesses the nature of changes to the 
party’s agenda for comprehensive schooling and the interplay between the party’s external and 
internal dimensions, in particular the role of electoral considerations, and wider struggles over 
the party’s project and identity in which comprehensive schooling became entangled.  
Chapter 5 then traces the SPÖ’s policy on comprehensive schooling in Austria, from its 
failure to introduce this policy in the 1970s to its most recent attempt (and failure) between 2007 
and 2012. It discusses the gap between the SPÖ’s continuous programmatic and rhetoric 
commitment to comprehensive schooling and its highly pragmatic and cautious political 
strategies. The analysis reveals how comprehensive schooling advocates in and around the party 
tried to overcome political resistance and mobilise electoral support for comprehensive 
schooling, in particular by using burgeoning debates around the OECD’s PISA studies in the 
2000s. Their ultimate failure reveals not only the highly constrained context for educational 
reforms in but also the party’s strong office-seeking orientation of party leaders, their doubts 
about the extent of public support for comprehensive schooling and a lack of internal party 
mobilisation on this issue, which nonetheless remains nominally at the core of SPÖ education 
policy.  
Chapter 6 undertakes a comparative discussion of the findings of the two cases. It 
discusses the common aspirations regarding, and different meanings attributed to, 
comprehensive schooling in the debates of the two parties and then contrasts the process of 
policy formation within the parties. It highlights the different meanings that a common aspiration 
for a ‘common school for all’ have come to develop for the two parties and how they have 
changed along different lines over the course of the three decades from the 1980s to the 2010s 
and how they have been influenced by particular educational traditions and past political 
struggles. Comparing the party-internal processes in which education policy and attitudes have 
been formed, a dialectical understanding of political parties uncovers the similarities and 
differences in the influences on parties’ policies. Looking at the internal dimension, the chapter 
examines how programmatic legacies and educational practice have shaped attitudes and 
traditional policy commitments, how ideas have become embodied in parties’ identities and 
shared understandings, and how new ideas and understandings of education and the goal of 
social reform have changed or challenged traditional understandings. However, parties’ policy 
commitments and strategic choices were also shaped by the parties’ need to gain popular 
support and the political constraints involved in policy-making. Looking at the external 
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dimension, the chapter highlights how the Labour Party and the SPÖ faced different conditions 
in their quests to gain popular support, to participate in government and to bring about 
educational change, and which strategies they developed in response to these.  
Finally, Chapter 7 concludes the thesis by summarising and reviewing the findings in light 
of the questions underpinning this research, reflecting on the interplay of actors and institutions 
in these processes policy formation within political parties and discussing the implications for the 
literature and.   
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Chapter 1. Historical and conceptual background:  
Comprehensive schooling in the 20th century 
Like a few other educational reforms, comprehensive schooling is a political issue that has inspired 
both aspirations for, and aversions to, social change. In the 1960s and 1970s, a reform movement 
aimed at creating a ‘common school for all’ spread across Europe and triggered, in most 
countries, an end to the previously widespread practice of sorting young children into different 
school tracks based on their academic ability. This was underpinned by the hope that educating 
children of all abilities in the same school would break the link between social background and 
educational opportunity, allowing all learners to develop their educational potential. Postponing 
educational selection and integrating different secondary school tracks into one comprehensive 
school track was often accompanied by changes to school-internal differentiation practices, the 
curriculum and pedagogical approaches. In many countries, these reforms triggered considerable 
political contestation. For some, comprehensive schooling symbolised the aspiration for a more 
egalitarian education system and social change, for others it stood for a loss of tradition, 
educational standards and social order. Since the 1980s, the idea of comprehensive schooling has 
come under renewed pressure from policy discourses and agendas stressing the need for more 
choice and diversity in public service provision, which questioned many of the traditional aims 
behind a ‘common school for all’. This research explores these debates through the lens of social-
democratic parties, which have been among the key (if often ambivalent) supporters of 
comprehensive schooling.  
This chapter provides the conceptual and historical background for the study, highlighting 
how educational debates and political struggles have shaped the issue of comprehensive 
schooling and moved it beyond the narrow question of academic selection and tracking. It will 
begin by discussing the main issues involved in the debate in the 20th century, before providing 
an overview of debates and trajectories in England and Austria, highlighting the insights from, 




1.1 Comprehensive schooling and aspirations for social change 
1.1.1 Reform ambitions and political struggles until the 1970s 
The idea of comprehensive schooling emerged in the early 20th century as a critique of the 
differentiated or tracked nature of secondary school systems, which had developed in Western 
Europe in the late 19th century and had become consolidated in the middle of the 20th century 
(Müller et al., 1987). Underpinning these systems was the principle of sorting children early on 
into different educational pathways to prepare them for different occupational and social roles. 
Academic tracks, such as grammar schools in England and the Gymnasium in Germany and 
Austria, selected a minority of students based on their academic ability (as measured by 
intelligence tests or primary school grades) and aimed to prepare them for higher education and 
the professions through a curriculum dominated by the classics and the humanities. In contrast, 
the majority of children were educated in lower-tier school tracks, which provided more basic 
post-elementary education to prepare their pupils for the labour market or further vocational 
training. These school tracks were generally of lower prestige and provided fewer opportunities 
for educational and social advancement than selective school tracks (McCulloch, 2008; Baldi, 2012; 
Wiborg, 2009). 
Selective school systems rested on the belief that children’s abilities and aptitudes reveal 
themselves early on in children’s lives, that these can be relatively accurately measured and that 
these different talents can and should be catered for through sorting children into different 
educational institutions which follow different curricula. This view became increasingly criticised 
first in the 1920s and 1930s on educational and political grounds, including (but not only) by left-
wing parties and educators (Barker, 1972; Glöckel and Achs, 1985; Husén et al., 1992: 47). Demands 
to abolish selection gained political momentum in the 1950s and 1960s within a broader reform 
agenda of educational expansion and widening opportunities across Europe (Kerckhoff, 1996: 1). 
The reliability of measuring children’s ability at an early age was cast into doubt by the social 
composition of the student population in selective school systems. Although academic selection 
was nominally based on children’s innate ability and intelligence, children with more advantaged 
family backgrounds dominated grammar schools and Gymnasiums, while working-class children 
were overrepresented in lower-tier school tracks (Kerckhoff, 1996). The argument of a social bias 
in testing and sorting was furthered by research in child development, which questioned the 
extent of children’s innate and fixed abilities and the usefulness of classifying them into ‘academic’ 
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or ‘practical’ types of mind (for a discussion of this research, see e.g. Benn and Chitty, 1997: 8). 
Since the 1950s, mounting research evidence indicated that the younger children are when they 
are sorted into different educational routes, the stronger the influence of their social background 
on their educational pathways (see, for example, Horn, 2009). These insights informed ‘a new 
faith in human educability’ (Simon, 1997: 26), which rejected the idea that intelligence was innate 
and fixed and instead argued that all children possess the capacity to learn and benefit from 
higher education. The principal justification for many advocates of comprehensive schooling was 
therefore to allow the full development of a child’s personality and diverse talents irrespective of 
a child’s family background and context of upbringing (Benn and Simon, 1970; Husén et al., 1992).  
However, reform ambitions for comprehensive schooling generally combined 
educational arguments with political aims. A key tenet in much left-wing thinking in the early 
decades of the 20th century had been the aim to break the ‘bourgeois’ monopoly over education 
and to provide everyone – including groups previously marginalised in educational provision, 
such as working-class children or girls – with access to the ‘knowledge of mankind’ and thereby 
contribute to individual and collective emancipation (Glöckel and Achs, 1985). Selective practices 
were seen as reproducing social class divisions and comprehensive schooling was therefore 
hoped to not only equalise educational opportunities for all children but also tear down class 
barriers in education and society in a wider sense. The mixing of children of all backgrounds in 
schools was also hoped to contribute to the development of democratic social values, social 
harmony, solidarity, and a common culture and national identity. Finally, particularly since the 
1960s, economic arguments for postponing selection have become influential, which focused on 
the need to unearth and use all talent in society, regardless of social background, for reasons of 
human capital development and national economic efficiency (for a discussion of different 
ambitions in these debates see e.g. Levin, 1978; Glöckel and Achs, 1985; Husén et al., 1992; 
Kerckhoff, 1996; Benn and Chitty, 1997; Paterson, 1997; Walford and Pring, 1997; Paterson, 2003a; 
Phillips, 2003; Oftedal Telhaug et al., 2006: 252; Baldi, 2012; Blossing et al., 2014a; Triventi et al., 
2016: 5).  
However, under the banner of a ‘common school for all’, a variety of policy measures 
have been advocated, with different emphasis across national contexts and actors. At the core of 
comprehensive schooling ambitions has been to reduce the degree of external differentiation in 
schooling by postponing educational selection and integrating different school tracks into a 
unified comprehensive schooling where children of all backgrounds and abilities were educated 
together and decisions over educational pathways were postponed until later on in the 
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educational trajectory (Triventi et al., 2016: 5). Linked to such demands for reducing differentiation 
between schools was the question of internal differentiation, or the practices through which 
children were sorted by ability within schools. While comprehensive schooling supporters 
generally opposed the parallel existence of academic and non-academic school tracks under the 
same roof (streaming), opinions have varied regarding whether children ought to be 
differentiated by their ability in particular subjects (setting and grouping) or to be taught in 
heterogeneous groups (mixed-ability teaching). Another frequent debate arose over the question 
of what content (curriculum) these ‘common schools for all’ should teach. The differentiated 
nature of traditional school systems had rested on the idea of providing a different kind of 
education to different ‘kinds’ of minds; school tracks were therefore generally divided along an 
academic/vocational binary. Some proponents of comprehensive schools instead advocated a 
‘common curriculum’ to meaningfully educate all learners (Lawton, 1980; Simon, 1997). However, 
supporters of comprehensive schooling were often torn between the goal of expanding working-
class children’s access to existing cultural traditions and forms of knowledge or the need for novel 
approaches to the curriculum (Glöckel and Achs, 1985; Paterson, 2015). Apart from organisational 
and curricular questions, left-wing educators’ ambitions for comprehensive schooling were often 
informed by demands for more progressive and child-centred teaching methods, as well as 
ambitions to create a more democratic and collegial ethos in schools, which was hoped to 
overcome an often authoritarian school climate and ‘humanize’ pupil–teacher relations (Glöckel 
and Achs, 1985; Oftedal Telhaug et al., 2006: 254; Simon, 1997: 26). Despite or because of the 
nature of comprehensive schooling as an umbrella for various aspirations for educational change, 
it allowed varying reform coalitions across European countries in the 1960s, often made up of 
teachers’ circles, left-wing but also often liberal or even conservative political groups, and also 
enjoyed the support by international actors engaged in education policy, such as the 
Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD), despite their often 
heterogeneous views on particular policy measures included in comprehensive schooling.  
What contributed to making comprehensive schooling in many national contexts, 
particularly in England and Austria, one of the most controversial issues in education policy in the 
20th century (Phillips, 2003; Schnell, 1993; Engelbrecht, 2014), were however not just these 
particular measures as such. Debates about educational selection and the opportunities of 
different social groups often became a focal point at which more fundamental values and beliefs 
about the purpose of education and its links with social stratification and social order, crystallised 
and collided. The nature of these political debates, the relative strength of the supporters and 
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opponents, and the cultural, political and educational settings in which these struggles played 
out lastingly shaped the nature and extent of comprehensive schooling reforms in the 1960s and 
1970s (for an overview of national reform trajectories, see e.g. Heidenheimer, 1974; Leschinsky 
and Mayer, 1999; Ertl and Phillips, 2000; Phillips, 2003; Herrlitz et al., 2003; Clarke, 2010; Blossing 
et al., 2014b; Sass, 2015; Henkens, 2004; Kerckhoff, 1996; Greveling et al., 2015; Baldi, 2012). Despite 
the European-wide trend towards a more comprehensive system of secondary schooling in the 
second half of the 20th century, no single model of such schooling emerged. A rather 
encompassing vision of comprehensive schooling became realised in Scandinavian countries 
which resulted not only in abolishing selection in secondary schooling, but also in integrating 
both primary and secondary schooling into an ‘all-through unselective, public school system with 
mixed-ability classes covering the entire compulsory school age’ (Wiborg, 2009: 4). In many other 
European countries, the introduction of comprehensive schooling resulted in abolishing or 
postponed selection until 14, 16 or even 18 accompanied by more- or less-encompassing internal 
school reforms. In a few countries, such as Austria and Germany, comprehensive schooling has 
failed to be introduced and differentiated or tracked systems of secondary schooling have 
survived to this day.  
Across Europe, social-democratic parties were, not the only but frequently, key political 
drivers of comprehensive schooling. However, both their ambitions for school reform and the 
practical strategies they have employed to achieve these ambitions were also frequently 
ambivalent. This ambivalence often reflected a more general dilemma for progressive education 
reform between ‘equality’ and ‘meritocracy’ (Husén, 1986: 103; see also: Barker, 1972: 43; Halpin, 
1997). The aim of expanding educational opportunities, particularly for working-class children, 
raised the fundamental question of whether this should be achieved by opening up access to the 
most prestigious (and generally selective) educational institutions by making sorting criteria 
‘fairer’, and these institutions thereby more democratic (whilst also reproducing hierarchies 
between educational pathways and curricula), or whether to aim for a more radical transformation 
of educational systems which would overcome educational selection and hierarchies. In other 
words, social democratic educational reform ambitions faced what Paterson calls the ‘conundrum 
of all mass systems of education’ (2003a: 5); that is:  
how to reconcile democracy with the necessity of selection, both selection of culture 
in the maintenance of excellence, and selection of people, allocating individuals to 
differentiated occupations while also preparing them for life as equal citizens in the 
common culture of the community. (Ibid.) 
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Social-democratic parties often provided a forum for advocates for more radical egalitarian or 
progressive reforms regarding the structure or schooling, the curriculum and pedagogy, whose 
debates often left an imprint on these parties’ programmatic orientation. However, the degree of 
support for more radical measures to create a ‘common school for all’ has also varied among 
social-democratic parties whose strategic choices in education reform processes have often 
reflected more cautious or pragmatic approaches to educational change (Heidenheimer, 1974; 
Lawton, 2005; Wiborg, 2009).  
However, despite this fundamental ambiguity in social democratic parties’ position on 
educational change, by the 1980s the principle of comprehensive schooling had become a 
centrepiece within the educational programmes of social-democratic parties in Europe, and often 
figured as a key ideological marker differentiating Social Democratic parties’ education policy 
from Conservative and Christian Democratic parties’ policies. Yet, in the 1980s, this principle 
started to become challenged again.  
1.1.2 Changing education reform agendas since the 1980s 
In the late 1970s, the general optimism about the potential of educational and social 
reform to change structural inequalities in capitalist societies started to become questioned. On 
the political Left, doubts grew over the potential of gradual reform for educational and social 
change within capitalist systems (Levin, 1978; Husén, 1986). Even more consequential for 
contemporary educational debates was a new line of critique of comprehensive schooling from 
the political Right, which emerged in the late 1960s and early 1970s. This new right-wing critique, 
which drew on the arguments of Friedrich A. Hayek (Hayek, 1944/1994) and Milton Friedman 
(Friedman, 1962/2002), was embedded in a wider ideological critique of Keynesian economic 
policy and post-war welfare-state provision and attacked the dominant role of the state on both 
epistemic and normative grounds. The belief in the state’s capacity to efficiently coordinate and 
provide welfare and public services was questioned while the market, as the aggregation of 
individual choices, was propagated as a superior mechanism to efficiently meet demands. The 
role of the state and its bureaucracy in welfare provision was also criticised from a normative 
standpoint as it was believed to be fundamentally restricting individual freedoms. In this context, 
the authority and assumed benevolence of governing elites and bureaucratic experts to make 
decisions on behalf of society, which had underpinned the vision of societal progress and 
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efficiency creating the post-war welfare state, was criticised as being not only inefficient but also 
constraining the fundamental individual right to choose how to live one’s life (Griffiths, 2014: 124).  
This ideological strand became particularly influential in the educational thinking of the 
Conservative governments in England in the 1980s (Knight, 1990; Lawton, 1992). Here, a radical 
critique of the goals and governance of post-war welfare states and educational provision 
combined with the traditional Conservative scepticism over educational expansion and 
progressive teaching methods. Comprehensive schools were criticised as part of a uniform, 
inefficient and paternalistic bureaucratic system of public services that denied choice to parents, 
prevented innovation and reduced standards (Cox and Dyson, 1969a; 1969b). The aim for 
introducing ‘quasi-markets’ in education (Glennerster, 1991) was accompanied by a discursive 
attack on comprehensive schooling and progressive pedagogy, which was blamed for a decline 
in educational standards, knowledge and traditional values (Lawton, 1992). Gaining currency 
among Conservative circles in the 1980s and early 1990s, market mechanisms such as parental 
choice and incentives for competition between schools have since been introduced in the 
provision and governance of public education across Europe (Whitty and Power, 2000).  
Although this new critique has been particularly influential on the Right, social-
democratic parties have since endorsed to some degree tenets of this thinking (Gingrich, 2011; 
Chitty, 2013; Volckmar and Wiborg, 2014; Hicks, 2015). As discussed later in the thesis, aside from 
the efficiency argument, it was in particular the normative argument about the market enabling 
freedom which gained considerable influence over, for example, the Labour Party’s thinking 
(Griffiths, 2014). As Chapter 4 will show, in the mid-1990s, Labour politicians started to argue that 
vested interests in local authorities and an organised public sector workforce had made public 
service provision not only inefficient but also oppressive, particularly for the most disadvantaged 
groups (Le Grand, 1997). 
Not everywhere in Europe has the introduction of market mechanisms in education and 
the outright political attack of the comprehensive schooling project been as explicit as in England. 
However, since the 1990s and (in particular) the 2000s, less ideologically-charged and more 
technically-framed versions of similar arguments, often called New Public Management, have 
become endorsed by many supra- and international actors such as the OECD and have 
increasingly informed national reform agendas and education policy (Hall et al., 2015). This 
changing approach to governing public services tends to include a shift in emphasis from ‘input’ 
to ‘output’ control; the setting of standardised performance indicators and targets (examination, 
testing, inspection data and league tables); the shift of responsibilities to the lower level (e.g. 
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school autonomy over budgets and staffing); a tighter management of professionals (e.g. 
performance reviews and other accountability processes); and stimulating greater competition 
within the public sector (e.g. through funding mechanisms where resources follow pupils/parental 
choice) (Gunter and Fitzgerald, 2013). In general, New Public Management-informed agendas for 
school governance do not tend to involve a particular support for academic selection as such; 
the OECD, for example, has remained a key supporter of postponing educational selection 
(OECD, 2011). Similarly, not all measures to improve the accountability of schools or create more 
minimum standards in the curriculum are fundamentally opposed to the traditional concern of 
comprehensive schooling for securing equal entitlements for children across schools. However, 
many observers have highlighted the potential challenge of these new agendas to public service 
provision to the ideals that had underpinned comprehensive schooling aspirations in the past 
(Gewirtz et al., 1995). Many highlight a shift in prevalent conceptions of education, for example 
from education as a public good and a human right to conceptions of education as a private and 
an investment good; from prioritising social equality to prioritising social inclusion; from 
solidaristic understandings of equality of opportunity as a collective responsibility towards more 
competitive understandings of individual opportunity and responsibility (Husén et al., 1992: 53–
4; Ozga and Lingard, 2006: 70; Wiborg, 2009: 1; Derouet et al., 2015: 195). In addition, to potentially 
posing a threat to the more fundamental ‘comprehensive values’ in general (Gewirtz et al., 1995), 
recent shifts in school governance approaches have also challenged particular manifestations of 
comprehensive schooling in different national contexts. Several observers have highlighted how 
historically evolved interpretations of educational goals, pedagogical practices and relationships 
between different actors involved in public schooling provision have become questioned or 
transformed since the 1990s (Antikainen, 2006; Oftedal Telhaug et al., 2006; Aasen, 2007; Imsen 
et al., 2016).  
However, national educational debates have differed in their exposure to new reform 
agendas and the ways in which international discourses have interacted with local contexts and 
meanings (Ozga and Lingard, 2006; Hall et al., 2015). And while contemporary challenges to 
comprehensive schooling policy are unlikely to result in an outright reintroduction of selection 
by academic ability and differentiated systems, changes, as Derouet et al. (2015: 197) likely 
manifest themselves ‘through slippages, shifts of meaning’ and a ‘degree of blurring’ in the 
concept of comprehensive schooling and the goals it has come to stand for.  
This research aims to uncover shifts in the meaning of comprehensive schooling by focusing on 
two national education debates and, in particular, by focusing on the attitudes to school policy 
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within social-democratic parties which have traditionally been associated with demands for 
comprehensive schooling. The following sections provide the historical and political context for 
debates and trajectories of comprehensive schooling in England and Austria and discuss the 
insights and gaps in the literature, which will be addressed in the empirical research undertaken 
in this study (presented particularly in Chapter 4 and 5). Diagrams depicting the structure of the 
English and Austrian education (as of 2015) can be found in Appendix A and B. 
 
1.2 The evolution of comprehensive schooling policy in England 
1.2.1 Towards comprehensive schooling 
Compared to other European parties on the Left, which started to endorse comprehensive 
schooling in the early decades of the 20th century, the Labour Party only officially endorsed 
comprehensive schooling in 1951. Before that, several streams of thinking existed in the Labour 
Party in parallel (for an overview, see Barker, 1972). Support for comprehensive or ‘multilateral’ 
schools had grown in the 1920s and 1930s especially among the National Union of Labour 
Teachers and some local authorities (Kerckhoff, 1996: 16; Simon, 1992: 357). However, other 
influential voices, for example Sidney Webb (the founder of the Fabian Society) supported 
educational selection as a means to uncover talent among the working class and believed that 
through grammar school scholarships, the selective system was a key contribution to social 
mobility and economic efficiency (Lawton, 2005: 11). The closest Labour came to a shared view of 
secondary education in the first part of the 20th century was RH Tawney’s report, Secondary 
Education for All (Tawney, 1922), which called for the introduction of a universal system of 
secondary education, which however did not necessarily imply the same kind of (comprehensive) 
school for all (for a discussion of Tawney’s views on this matter see Ku, 2016). 
In 1944, later than in most Western European countries, universal and public system of 
secondary education free of charge was created in England. Emerging from the Education Act 
(‘Butler Act’) was a differentiated – or tripartite – system of grammar school, secondary-modern 
school and technical school tracks, which was modelled on prevalent conceptions of the existence 
of three ‘types of minds’ among children (McCulloch, 2006). Admission to the academic grammar 
schools was based on passing an intelligence test, the so-called ‘11-plus’ examination. Labour’s 
post-war education ministers, Ellen Wilkinson (1945–47) and George Tomlinson (1947–51), 
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supported this universal-but-differentiated system of secondary schooling. Their views seem to 
have reflected broader attitudes within the party and its constituencies, where selection based on 
‘scientific’ measures of children’s academic ability was perceived as fairer and more efficient than 
traditional forms of educational selection largely by means of parental wealth. many observers 
have since highlighted how grammar schools have during this period gained powerful, and 
lasting, image as a ‘ladder of opportunity’ for the bright working-class child (Barker, 1972; 
Kerckhoff, 1996: 18; Francis, 2006).  
However, attitudes towards selection in the Labour Party and the wider public soon 
started to shift and grassroots support to abolish the 11-plus grew among teachers, local 
policymakers and parents in the 1950s (Kerckhoff, 1996: 18). Empirical research not only started 
to cast doubt on the reliability of detecting academic ability in young children but also indicated 
a social bias in selection procedures which tended to discriminated against working-class children 
(for a discussion, see Simon, 1997: 22–4; Heath, 1999). Discontent over selection also grew among 
the middle classes, whose aspirations for a place in a grammar school were often challenged 
when their children failed the 11-plus and in general by the existing caps on grammar school 
places (Kerckhoff, 1996: 260). At the same time, first experiments with multilateral schools in some 
local authorities provided the first experiences of how to organise comprehensive forms of 
schooling. In 1951, strongly driven by teacher groups, the Labour Party officially adopted the 
demand for comprehensive schooling (The Labour Party, 1951). 
When the Labour Party was elected into government in 1964, its education minister Anthony 
Crosland requested local authorities to submit plans for reorganising secondary schooling along 
comprehensive lines (Circular 10/65) (DES, 1965). This Circular did not prescribe any national 
framework for comprehensive schooling, such as a common organisational model (with specified 
age groups), or any guidelines for a common curriculum or examination system. This ‘hands-off’ 
approach appeared to have reflected a widespread consensus across the political spectrum on 
the school governance model which had been established in the 1944 Education Act. In this 
‘national system, locally administered’ the governance of public education rested on a 
‘partnership’ between the Ministry of Education, local education authorities (LEAs) (which were 
responsible for maintaining schools, regulating school admissions, hiring staff, etc.) and teachers 
(who enjoyed a high degree of autonomy in the day-to-day delivery of education and, in 
particular, over the curriculum) (McCulloch, 2015: 244). Although many LEAs subsequently 
introduced ‘all-through’ comprehensive schools from ages 11 to 18, a variety of other more-or-
less comprehensive schools types emerged, which varied in terms of ‘age-range, size, intake, 
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character and coexistence with other kinds of schools’ (Halpin, 1989: 342). The freedom of schools 
and teachers in shaping the curriculum and the internal practices of differentiation allowed much 
experimentation with new curricular and pedagogical approaches. Nevertheless, the distinction 
between schools and their curricular and differentiation practices, reflecting their previous status 
as grammars or secondary moderns, also survived the introduction of comprehensive schooling 
(Kerckhoff, 1996: 163; Gray, 1999). Although there were some debates over creating a common 
‘entitlement curriculum’ within the Labour Party in the 1970s, no concrete initiatives followed 
(Lawton, 1993: 112).  
The 1970s were marked by the alteration of government power between the 
Conservative Party (1970-74) and the Labour Party (1974-79). During this period, the 
reorganisation of comprehensive schooling gained much dynamic, driven by considerable 
political and popular consensus. Overall, comprehensives proved popular with parents and LEAs 
(Simon, 1997) gradually culminating in a majority (90 per cent by 1982) of English children 
attending comprehensive secondary schools (Bolton, 2016). However, during the height of the 
popularity of comprehensive schooling, the seeds of critique against this policy took root which 
came to shape educational debates and subsequent policy approaches during the Conservative 
governments of the 1980s.  
1.2.2 The retreat from comprehensive schooling 
In the later 1970s, the overall political and discursive climate had started to shift with the 
end of the post-war economic boom and rising youth unemployment, and the previous (tenuous) 
bipartisan consensus over educational expansion and reform gave way to increasingly 
controversial debates between Labour and the Conservatives over education (Kerckhoff, 1996: 38; 
Batteson, 1997). Doubts over educational standards and accountability were key features of these 
debates, as well as a critique of the alleged ‘permissiveness’ of 1960s culture and the performance 
of public services’ (Mandler, 2014: 21–1). In addition, a series of media stories and scandals about 
‘out of control’ schools in ‘loony left authorities’ challenged comprehensive schooling in the 
public arena (Kerckhoff, 1996: 40; Davis, 2002). Critiques of comprehensive schooling were 
reinforced by the circulation of a series of highly influential pamphlets on the political Right – the 
Black Papers – which were published between 1969 and 1977 (Cox and Dyson, 1969b; 1969a). The 
Black Papers combined several strands of critique; some of their authors were openly in favour 
of returning to selection, while others called for a return to traditional teaching methods. In 
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addition to these more traditional Conservative arguments, the Black Papers also included a 
novel, highly influential strand of critique directed at public services governance and the welfare 
state in general (Mandler, 2014: 21), as discussed earlier in this chapter. The Black Papers became 
a crucial influence on New Right educational thinking in the Conservative Party (Knight, 1990; Ball, 
1990b).  
Doubts over the direction of educational reform also seeped into attitudes within Labour. 
On the Left, some highlighted the survival of selective practices in many comprehensive schools 
and the persistence of educational segregation within the system and demanded a more 
encompassing educational vision and steering from the Party (see for a discussion e.g. Lawton, 
2005: 80). More radical ideas for progressive reform through the curriculum and teaching 
methods had in the meantime flourished among left-wing teacher groups. However, at the same 
time, doubts over the ability of comprehensive schools to ensure educational standards became 
more visible in the attitudes of the Labour leadership when in government from 1974-79 
(Kerckhoff, 1996: 40). For many, prime minister Jim Callaghan’s ‘Ruskin speech’ in 1976 signified a 
turning point in Labour’s optimism over the ability of educational expansion and reform, and its 
trust in the professionalism of the teachers, to deliver educational standards. Yet despite 
Callaghans’ announcement of a ‘Great Debate’ on education, the topic slipped from the Labour 
government’s agenda in the late 1970s. In a context of pressures for austerity, economic struggles 
and industrial unrest, the political Right gained hold of the education debate (Batteson, 1997; 
Lawton, 2005: 96; Chitty, 2013: 52).  
When the Conservative Party won the general elections in 1979, 164 selective grammar 
schools had survived the reorganisation of English secondary schooling. Under Prime Minister 
Margaret Thatcher, the process of reorganising secondary schooling along comprehensive 
officially came to an end by repealing the duty for local authorities to put forward plans for 
reorganising secondary schooling and allowing local authorities to reintroduce selection. 
However, only a few local authorities attempted to reintroduce academic selection and after 
considerable protest from parents and teachers these attempts were generally abandoned 
(Kerckhoff, 1996: 42). Other measures introduced in its first years of government were aimed at 
increasing parental choice in the public-school sector and the introduction of subsidies for low-
income pupils to attend private schools (the Assisted Places Scheme) (Edwards et al. 1989). 
Abandoning a full-fledged return to academic selection and a tripartite system, Conservative 
education reforms shifted towards encouraging subtler forms of selection, specialisation and 
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differentiation, while fundamentally transforming the organisation and governance of English 
education (Ball, 1990a). 
The most seminal change in English education since 1944 came with the 1988 Education 
Act, which broke with the traditional ‘partnership’ approach to school governance. The power of 
local governments in secondary schooling was drastically reduced, by both increasing the 
influence of central government in terms of what is taught and tested in schools (in particular 
through introducing a National Curriculum and standardised testing) and by decentralising 
responsibilities over budgets and day-to-day running to individual schools (‘Local Management 
for Schools’). Apart from curtailing the influence of local authorities, the 1988 Act was also a 
decisive step towards creating quasi-markets in the school sector (Gewirtz et al., 1995). Initiatives 
as open enrolment, parental choice and a new funding formula that linked the allocation of school 
budgets to pupil numbers aimed to induce competition among schools, which was further 
encouraged through the publication of school performance data in 1992 (‘school league tables’).  
Within the educational community, the Act was widely seen as an outright attack on the 
goals of comprehensive schooling. Its market-oriented elements were feared to exacerbate 
existing hierarchies between schools, to increase the ‘selection of children for unequal provision’ 
(Walford, 1997: 56), as well as undermining the principles of local control over education (for a 
discussion, see Simon, 1992; Edwards et al., 2002; Tomlinson, 2005). Interestingly, the reforms also 
contained homogenising measures, particularly the introduction of a National Curriculum and a 
unified examination system at the end of compulsory schooling (aged 16), which resonated with 
previous demands for a comprehensive curriculum. However, the increase in central government 
control over the curriculum and the system of national testing and the discourse of suspicion 
about teachers’ commitment to educational standards in which it was embedded was criticised 
by many comprehensive schooling advocates as undermining the principle of teacher autonomy 
and professionalism (Paterson, 2003b: 167; Lawton, 2005; Mandler, 2014).  
1.2.3 Perspectives on New Labour’s position on comprehensive schooling 
When in 1997, after almost 18 years in political opposition, the Labour Party returned to 
government in 1997, it had fundamentally transformed its programmatic orientation (see also 
chapter 4).  Already before its election, leading Labour politicians had declared the need to 
‘modernise’ comprehensive schooling, referring both to the educational practice in English 
comprehensive schools and to Labour’s traditional understanding of the means and goals of 
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educational reform. While Labour remained officially opposed to selection and the 11-plus, the 
party’s long-standing electoral pledge of abolishing the remaining grammar schools was 
dropped. During its three terms in government from 1997-2010 Labour aimed to further expand 
parental choice and the diversity in the school system, in particular through the introduction of 
new school types, such as specialist schools and academies – state-funded schools independent 
from the local authority and run by non-profit private-sector actors. Despite fears of increasing 
overt and covert selection in schooling, the authority of individual schools over their admissions 
was expanded (West and Pennell, 2002) 
There has been much debate in the literature over the nature of this change in Labour’s 
educational discourse and policy, which are frequently seen as broadly continuing previous 
Conservative education policy around the principles of ‘choice and competition’, ‘autonomy and 
performativity’ and ‘centralisation and prescription’ (Ball, 1999: 196). For many observers, New 
Labour’s agenda of ‘modernising’ comprehensive schooling signified a considerable break with 
the way in which such schooling had hitherto been understood in England and which the Labour 
Party had previously endorsed (Power and Whitty, 1999; Walford, 2001; Phillips and Furlong, 2001; 
Demaine, 2002; Walford and Pring, 1997; Demaine, 2002). New Labour’s policies are generally 
seen to have undermined this ‘comprehensive ideal’ through a ‘greater fragmentation into 
different types of school, greater selection according to a range of different criteria and greater 
inequity in what schools offer’ (Walford, 2001: 55). The weakening of the comprehensive principle 
was also seen in the increased the role of the private sector in education, especially in the 
academies policy (West and Pennell, 2002) and the general ‘ideological support given to the 
private sector’ through New Labour’s enthusiasm for market-oriented governance in the public 
sector (Walford, 2001: 53). To many, the biggest break in Labour’s approach to schooling was 
visible in the marginalisation of local authorities in school provision (particularly regarding school 
admissions) and its lack of trust in teachers, which were previously key ‘ingredients’ in Labour’s 
understanding of comprehensive schooling (Phillips, 2003; Haydn, 2004).  
As Chapter 4 will show, such a break between ‘Old’ and ‘New’ Labour thinking on 
education was also deliberately portrayed in New Labour’s discourse, first and foremost Tony 
Blair himself. However, this black-and-white view needs qualification. As highlighted in several 
historical analyses and commentary discussed above and further investigated in Chapter 4, ‘Old’ 
Labour itself had been rather ambivalent towards comprehensive schooling, both regarding the 
particular goals and means involved in comprehensive schooling and the potential electoral 
consequences in pushing such a policy (Marsden, 1971; Halpin, 1989; Lawton, 2005). A further 
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need to qualify the argument that the Labour Party had ‘abandoned’ comprehensive schooling 
in the 1990s and 2000s arises from the considerable internal divisions and struggles that 
accompanied New Labour’s modernisation of its educational agenda. Both in the early years 
(around the mid-1990s) and towards the end of Tony Blair’s time as party leader (in the mid-
2000s), these contestations and rebellions indicate a more complex evolution of Labour’s 
education policy where both new ideas gained salience while old commitments continued to rally 
support. Although several studies (Ball and Exley, 2010; Exley, 2012) highlight the drive of 
individuals on New Labour’s education agenda after 1995, the struggles this caused within the 
party itself are occasionally mentioned (e.g. Phillips, 2003; Chitty, 2013), but the dynamics in which 
New Labour’s education policy was created and contested have not been systematically studied. 
This question will be taken up again in chapter 4.  
1.3 The evolution of comprehensive schooling policy in Austria 
Among European social democratic parties, the SPÖ stands out for its early commitment to 
comprehensive schooling, dating back to the 1920s, and its seemingly unwavering support for 
this policy until today. And yet, despite having been one of the most successful social democratic 
parties in the 20th century (measured by its electoral fortunes and government participation), the 
SPÖ has been one of the least successful parties in bringing about this educational change. To 
this day, the Austrian school system remains selective and tracked, sorting children at the age in 
either the Hauptschule (general secondary school) or the Gymnasium (academic secondary 
school). Overall, the SPÖ has made three attempts to introduce comprehensive schooling: in the 
1920s, the 1970s and after 2007. The ‘Viennese school reform’ of the 1920s and the school 
experiments of the 1970s remain key reference points for contemporary education debates in the 
SPÖ and Austrian politics in general and are therefore briefly discussed in the next sections.   
1.3.1 From inter-war visions for educational change to the post-war 
educational settlement (1920s–1960s) 
Comprehensive schooling first reached the centre of educational and political debates in Austria 
in the 1920s. Following the introduction of democracy in Austria in 1918, the SPÖ had gained 
political dominance in Vienna, where it embarked on a broad social and educational reform 
agenda. Social democratic school reforms, developed by a group of educators around Otto 
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Glöckel, centred on the concept of a ‘Common Middle School’ (Allgemeine Mittelschule) (Glöckel 
and Achs, 1985), which aimed to integrate the various existing school tracks at the lower-
secondary level (ages 10–14) and to overcome the differentiation in qualifications and status of 
teachers of different school tracks. Such organisational reforms aimed at equalising educational 
opportunities were linked to curricular and pedagogical reform ambitions, which aimed for 
realising a more democratic and ‘human’ culture in schools. Together with egalitarian ambitions, 
the ‘Viennese school reform’ (influenced by various streams of reform pedagogy and the 
Viennese ‘School of individual psychology’ of Alfred Adler and Carl Furtmüller Achs, 1985: 12–3; 
Achs, 2015a) also placed a strong emphasis on aligning teaching and learning practices to the 
individual child. After the introduction of experiments on the ‘Common Middle School’ in Vienna, 
the SPÖ adopted this concept as an official policy demand (SDAP, 1926).  
By the late 1920s, education policy – particularly the issue of comprehensive schooling 
and the role of the Catholic Church in education – had become a political battlefield between the 
Social Democratic Party and the Christian Democrats. A compromise on comprehensive 
schooling was found in 1927, introducing a new school track for the ages 10-14, the Hauptschule 
which aimed to provide general secondary schooling for the majority of children. This school was 
internally streamed with the first stream to follow the same curriculum as the selective 
Gymnasium. At age 14, the best-performing pupils (from the upper stream) of the Hauptschule 
could transfer to the Gymnasium without examination. Although the curricular alisnment was not 
fully realised in practice within the politically turbulent 1930s, it continued to provide a blueprint 
for compromises between the two parties throughout the 20th century. In the late 1920s, however, 
school debates became entangled within an increasingly conflictive and violent polarisation 
between the two political camps. In 1934 an authoritarian Catholic regime was installed and the 
Social Democratic Party was banned. four years later, Austria became part of Nazi Germany and 
the school compromise of 1927 was officially repealed as Austrian schools became part of the 
German education system (Glöckel and Achs, 1985; Achs, 2015a). 
In 1945, the traditional Austrian school system with its dual structure and selection age of 
10 years, was reinstalled. However, in contrast to the conflictive nature of the political climate in 
the interwar period, the relationship between the two main parties, the SPÖ and ÖVP in the post-
war decades became highly consensus-oriented. Governing in a grand coalition until 1960, the 
two parties built an elaborate system of power-sharing in major areas of social administration, 
which included the proportional appointment of leaderships in schools and school administration 
based on party membership (Ucakar, 1983). Within this climate of elite consensus the need for a 
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statutory basis of school provision after the war and continuing unresolved constitutional issues 
over responsibilities in the federal system again sparked long-standing conflicts on the question 
of school organisation and the role of the Church in education (Achs, 2015a: 213). While individual 
SPÖ parliamentarians continued to advocate for comprehensive lower-secondary school along 
the lines of the 1920s ‘Viennese school reform’ vision, much of the intellectual and pedagogical 
legacy of those reforms had been lost within the SPÖ (Achs, 2015a: 216). In addition, the party 
leadership now adopted a more pragmatic political position towards educational reform, 
focusing on opening up the Gymnasium to working-class children (Achs, 2015b: 105).  
In 1962, after a reconciliation between the social democrats and the Catholic Church on 
the question of subsidies for Catholic private schools and religious instruction in public schools, 
a compromise between ÖVP and SPÖ was found, which continues to shape Austrian education 
politics today. The 1962 School Organisation Act (Schulorganisationsgesetz) generally improved 
quality of non-Gymnasium school tracks and the qualifications of non-Gymnasium teachers, and 
opened up new opportunities for students to transfer between school tracks. However, the two-
tiered nature of secondary schooling, with selection at the age of ten and differentiation in 
teacher training and status, remained (Eder and Thonhauser, 2015: 43). To safeguard this historical 
compromise between the two political camps, the Act was granted constitutional status, which 
means that any future changes to school structure and most other school matters require a two-
thirds parliamentary majority. By making both parties de facto veto players in any school reform, 
this provision remains a key barrier to comprehensive schooling. With legislative changes to 
school provision so constrained, school experiments have since been the main vehicle for 
introducing educational change in Austria. 
1.3.2 A second wave of social-democratic school reforms (1970s) 
The 1962 School Organisation Act quickly came under pressure from growing popular demand 
for educational opportunities and discontent over an education system which has remained 
under-resourced since the War. Within this broader public mood for educational and social 
reforms, education policy rose up the SPÖ party agenda towards the late 1960s. A pragmatic 
generation of school policymakers in the SPÖ, which had aimed to settle educational disputes in 
1962, was succeeded by individuals who had rediscovered the social-democratic educational 
thinking of the 1920s (Schnell, 1993). Developing the first encompassing education policy 
programme since the 1920s (SPÖ, 1969) these ‘school reformers’ placed the demand for 
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comprehensive schooling at the core of their ambitions. After the SPÖ won n absolute 
parliamentary majority in 1971, the SPÖ government under Bruno Kreisky announced a broad 
education reform programme to modernise the Austrian school system to increase equality of 
opportunity and economic development. Experiments with comprehensive schooling were 
started in the hope that their evaluation would dispel concerns over educational standards in 
non-selective schools (Ucakar, 1983: 40). Other important education reforms included the 
introduction of coeducation across public schooling; a large increase in educational allowances 
and other subsidies and a general increase in investment in schooling infrastructure; and 
abolishing selective university admissions and tuition fees for higher education (Wollansky, 1983). 
While the comprehensive schooling experiments were running, the number of Gymnasium school 
places and upper-secondary vocational colleges was also increased to expand educational 
opportunities, especially in rural areas and for girls (Schnell, 1993).  
Despite a generally favourable evaluation of the comprehensive schooling experiments 
in terms of equality and educational standards in the late 1970s (Petri, 1979), resistance from 
Conservative groups had flared up again (Schnell, 1993: 265). Following protracted inter-party 
negotiations, a compromise between ÖVP and SPÖ was found in 1982 (7. 
Schulorganisationsgesetz-Novelle). Following the pattern of previous compromises, selection at 
the age of ten into different school tracks continued, but the quality of the Hauptschule was 
improved by introducing many of the innovations piloted in the comprehensive school 
experiments (in particular with less rigid forms of internal differentiation) to the Hauptschule. 
Through aligning the curriculum between the Hauptschule and Gymnasium, graduates of the 
former were given more opportunity to transfer at age 14 into the upper level of the Gymnasium.  
1.3.3 Perspectives on SPÖ school policy since the 1980s 
As Chapter 5 will demonstrate, comprehensive schooling largely slipped from the SPÖ’s policy 
agenda after 1982. It was only in the early 2000s that the issue made a comeback within the wider 
public debate over Austria’s results in the PISA studies (Bauer et al., 2005). In 2007, the coalition 
government between SPÖ and ÖVP agreed to a new round of school experiments for non-
selective ‘New Middle Schools’ (NMS) (Neue Mittelschule), which the SPÖ envisaged as a first step 
towards the introduction of comprehensive schooling (Altrichter et al., 2015). However, after years 
of political contestation over the extent of these experiments and the future of the Gymnasium, 
a familiar political compromise was found between the coalition partners SPÖ and ÖVP. In 2011, 
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it was announced that all Hauptschulen were to be converted into Neue Mittelschulen, while 
selection at the age of 10 (and the status of the Gymnasium) was to remain (Gruber, 2015).  
Education policy-making in Austria since the 1980s in general and on SPÖ education 
policy (let alone internal party struggles) in particular has attracted limited attention from political 
analysts. Previous assessments of school policy up until the early 1980s have identified key barriers 
to introducing comprehensive schooling: the existence of the two-thirds majority requirement, 
the continuing opposition of the ÖVP to comprehensive schooling, a highly organised 
Gymnasium teacher union and public scepticism towards comprehensive schooling (Glowka, 
1975; Budzinski, 1986; Gruber, 2006). The literature has also highlighted the intensity of political 
controversies between SPÖ and ÖVP, which constitute a clash between two world views and offer 
limited scope for persuasion through empirical research (Gruber 2015). By political observers, the 
SPÖ is generally portrayed as the key supporter and driver behind comprehensive schooling in 
Austria. However, during its long hold over the school ministry between  1970 and 1995, the party 
was also responsible for a pragmatic and structurally conservative expansion of secondary 
education (Graf et al., 2011; Lassnigg, 2011) which has likely consolidated the tracked nature of 
this system. Together with its frequent backing down over its demand for comprehensive 
schooling, this has led many observers to question to extent of the party’s support for 
comprehensive schooling (Dermutz, 1983a; Dermutz, 1983b; Pelinka, 1985).  
From an analytical perspective, it is crucial to investigate not only why the party has 
displayed so much caution and pragmatism in educational reform but also why, in light of 
considerable barriers to educational reform in Austria, it has rediscovered its traditional policy 
demand in the early 2000s. The research undertaken in this study and presented in chapter 5 
therefore aims to trace particular evolution SPÖ education policy within the political context since 
the 1980s and analyses the party-internal dynamics and struggles which has given rise to it.   
1.4 Conclusion 
Across Europe, demands for comprehensive schooling to overcome the selective nature of 
traditional school systems reached their peak during the 1960s and 1970s. Debates and national 
reform trajectories not only centred around postponing or abolishing the selection of children by 
academic ability into different school tracks but also included a range of ‘internal’ school reforms 
aimed at creating a ‘common school’ for all learners. Reform ambitions often combined 
pedagogical and social goals as well as political and economic considerations. Thereby, debates 
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over comprehensive schooling have frequently caused heated political controversies. While the 
political trenches were frequently not clear-cut, they generally ran between the political Left and 
the Right. By the 1980s, support for comprehensive schooling had become a centrepiece in 
educational programs of many social-democratic parties. However, as the history of the two 
parties under investigation here indicates, views on what this vision for comprehensive schooling 
entails and the political will of parties to bring this change about have often been ambiguous. 
Furthermore, their responses to changing educational debates driven by the political Right in the 
1980s have varied (Volckmar and Wiborg, 2014).  
This study has aims for a more nuanced and empirically grounded study of the dynamics 
which shaped changing party positions on comprehensive schooling. It aims to uncover the 
particular meanings of this policy across time and contexts to the ways in which these meanings 
and policies have been formed within political parties. For this, the nature of political parties and 
their involvement in political process requires more attention. The next chapter therefore reviews 
the literature on political parties and their policy preferences and presents the analytical 
framework, which guided (and emerged from) the empirical and comparative analysis in this 




Chapter 2. Literature review: Political parties and 
education policy 
What do (social-democratic) parties want in education policy and why? Historical case studies 
and comparative studies of the evolution of comprehensive schooling, discussed in the previous 
chapter, have highlighted the often politicised nature of this policy within European educational 
reform processes in the 20th century (for a discussion, see also e.g. Wiborg, 2009; Sass, 2015). 
Such research generally indicates a party-political divide between left-wing and conservative 
parties on this issue, but sometimes also suggests a considerable degree of ambivalence 
underpinning social-democratic support for comprehensive schooling. Other research reviewed 
has studied more recent shifts in education policy discourses and reform trajectories towards 
forms of ‘marketisation’ of public education (Whitty and Power, 2000), and the challenges this 
poses to the comprehensive schooling principle (Blossing et al., 2014b; Imsen et al., 2016; Edwards 
et al., 2002). It has indicated that, although the first impulses in this direction have come from the 
political Right, some social-democratic parties have also adopted elements of this reform agenda 
– and therefore potentially changed their attitudes to comprehensive schooling (Volckmar and 
Wiborg, 2014).  
This chapter reviews a different body of research, mainly stemming from comparative 
political science and party research, in particular on the foundations of parties’ policy preferences, 
the transformation of social-democratic parties and the role of intra-party politics in the process 
of preference formation. After discussing the insights and gaps in this literature for the purpose 
of this study, the second part of the chapter then presents the analytical framework. Underpinned 
by a constructivist-institutionalist perspective and a dialectical understanding of parties, this 
framework has been considerably influenced by the empirical investigation of internal party policy 




2.2 Comparative party research and policy preferences 
Despite the frequently politicised nature of school reforms, political science research has until 
recently largely ignored education policy (for a discussion, see Jakobi et al., 2010; Busemeyer and 
Trampusch, 2011a), but recently started to pay more attention in particular to two areas of 
education policy: the political economy of vocational education (Iversen and Stephens, 2008; 
Busemeyer and Trampusch, 2011b) and the increasing role of international actors, educational 
governance and cross-border policy transfer (Martens et al., 2007; Martens et al., 2014). School 
policy as such has only just started to spark the interest of political science research. Two related 
research strands have emerged: one focuses on expanding insights from cross-national 
(quantitative) research on social policy preferences of political parties to educational expansion 
and spending, the other involving qualitative comparative research investigating the role of 
political parties particularly in recent school governance reforms.  
2.2.1 Political parties and policy preferences 
In the literatures on political parties and comparative social policy, parties’ policy preferences are 
generally perceived as relating to the interests of their traditional constituencies, as well as 
particular voter segments they try to attract in an increasingly fluid nature of electoral competition 
(Häusermann et al., 2013). Research on the transformation of European social-democratic parties 
since the 1990s highlights that these changes did not only involve increased efforts in electoral 
strategies to attract middle-class votes but also more fundamental ideological-programmatic 
changes (Keman, 2017), with possible implications for parties’ attitudes to school policies. 
Research into the partisan foundations of European welfare states has conceptualised 
social policy primarily as a distributive conflict between different social groups (or classes) in 
society (Korpi, 1983; Hibbs and Dennis, 1988; Hibbs, 1992). In classical works on the emergence of 
political parties from the social cleavages that arose in late-19th-century European societies (Lipset 
and Rokkan, 1967), parties are conceptualised as the political representation of particular social 
groups, with the primary function of competing for public office so as to translate the political 
interests and social demands of their core constituencies into policy (Mair, 2006: 373). Parties’ 
social policy preferences therefore emerge from the material interests and political values of the 
major social groups they represent, and are embedded in wider ideological frameworks that have 
developed in this quest for social change (Schmidt, 2010). Parties belonging to the same ‘party 
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family’, such as Social Democracy, are generally assumed to hold similar policy preferences, which 
are embedded in relatively stable ideological projects (Schmidt, 2010; Keman, 2017). As ‘agents 
of the working class’, social-democratic parties have traditionally been expected to prefer a larger 
share of public ownership of the means of production; a strong government role in economic 
planning; more support for income redistribution; the expansion of the welfare state with 
generous social benefits; and labour-market regulation (Castles, 1982; Korpi, 1983; Esping-
Andersen, 1990; Huber et al., 1993; Schmidt, 1996). 
Education policy, which was long-neglected in research on the partisan politics of social 
policy, has recently received more attention (Ansell, 2008; Ansell, 2010; Busemeyer, 2007; Iversen 
and Stephens, 2008; Busemeyer, 2009). Parties on the political Left are generally expected to 
emphasise educational expansion (with an emphasis on public rather than private spending), a 
reduction in stratification in secondary schooling and scepticism towards private-sector 
involvement in educational governance. While these expectations are broadly in line with the 
partisan theory developed in welfare-state research, research on the politics of education policy 
highlights potential dilemmas for social-democratic parties. Compared to more direct forms of 
income redistribution such as social transfers, which, in principle, aim for ‘equality of outcome’, 
educational expansion is a means of expanding ‘equality of opportunity’ (Busemeyer and Nikolai, 
2010: 495–6). Education policy is therefore an instrument of ‘targeted redistribution’, the effects 
of which may actually be regressive if it mainly benefits privileged social groups (Ansell, 2008; 
Ansell, 2010). Social-democratic parties are therefore expected to be more supportive of 
increasing public spending for universal school policies (e.g. primary and secondary schooling) 
with clear benefits for lower income groups, rather than expanding higher education, which tends 
to benefit more privileged social groups which tend to enjoy disproportionally more access to 
these stages of education (Ansell, 2010).  
However, in response to socio-structural changes and weakening links between parties 
and their traditional constituencies, social-democratic parties increasingly have to cater for 
groups outside their traditional core clienteles (Pierson, 2001; Green-Pedersen and van 
Kersbergen, 2002; Clasen, 2002). Drawing on economic theories of party competition (Downs, 
1957), much recent research on parties and their policy preferences has focused on the dynamics 
of electoral competition in shaping party policy. Parties are seen as becoming more flexible in 
their programmatic commitments and more strategic in using policy platforms to cater for various 
voter groups in order to secure electoral majorities (Häusermann et al., 2013: 231; Gingrich and 
Häusermann, 2015). Research of this type indicates that although education policy still involves 
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redistributive conflicts, parties can use policies of educational expansion (e.g. increasing 
spending) as a means to forge cross-class coalitions, catering for both the education-savvy 
middle classes and the rising educational aspirations of traditional working-class constituencies 
(Busemeyer, 2009: 107; Potrafke, 2011). However, while general educational expansion and 
investment has become popular among the public (Busemeyer et al., 2017), particular school 
policies – for example, on school admissions – have the potential to create redistributive conflicts, 
dividing constituencies of social-democratic parties (Gingrich and Ansell, 2014).  
The particular nature of electoral competition between parties over education is also 
influenced by policy legacies. Busemeyer et al (2013: 525–6) indicate that the nature of previous 
education policy shapes partisan conflict and who ‘owns’ education policy; that is, who the public 
positively associates with the issue or perceives as ‘credibly’ concerned with the issue. Issue 
ownership can help to mobilise broad electoral support by transcending more specific 
distributional conflicts involved in particular policy issues. In Scandinavian countries, for example, 
the comprehensive ‘Nordic Model of Education’ (Oftedal Telhaug et al., 2006) has become 
associated with the political Left, which has however been pushed into a defensive position after 
the political Right has challenged this ‘leftist consensus’ and started to ‘own’ recent political 
debates over education policy by appearing credibly concerned over educational standards. In 
contrast, in countries like Austria or Germany where policy legacies reflect the strong Christian 
Democratic influence on education (in particular regarding the issue of early tracking), the 
political Left ‘owns’ or is credibly associated with the demand for expanding educational 
opportunities (Busemeyer et al., 2013: 525–6). Political parties ‘owning’ a policy issue can therefore 
be expected to pay more attention to this issue in their electoral strategies, while the other parties 
can be expected to downplay these issues.  
Overall, the research on the partisan politics of education policy indicates that education 
policy is not a straightforward case of party preferences and electoral competition between Left 
and Right; rather, parties’ electoral strategies are influenced by policy legacies and respond to 
electorates’ changing composition and demands.  
Much of this research is of quantitative nature, studying the association of different 
variables across a large number of countries and is therefore restricted to easily operationalised 
issues, such as educational spending. However, several ‘small-n’ qualitative comparative studies 
have recently investigated partisan politics in educational governance, particularly policies that 
increase parental choice, school diversity and competition (Gingrich, 2011). While this research 
generally shows that left-wing parties remain more reluctant than right-wing parties to introduce 
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quasi-markets (Gingrich, 2011; Zehavi, 2011), there has been some support among social-
democratic parties for marketisation policies. Particularly in Scandinavia, this has been explained 
as social democratic parties’ responses to a perceived loss in public trust in public services. To 
maintain popular support for public services and the welfare state – the key power resource for 
social-democratic parties – these parties have endorsed some forms of marketization, such as 
expanding user choice. The risk of greater social stratification due to increased choice and 
competition has been accepted as a means to prevent the loss of the legitimacy of the universal 
welfare state (Klitgaard, 2007; Volckmar and Wiborg, 2014; Wiborg, 2015). Some research 
indicates that the overall level of social inequality plays an important role in the perceived risk of 
marketisation policies; social-democratic parties in more egalitarian Scandinavian societies are 
therefore less concerned about the redistributive implications of school choice, as Hicks (2015) 
argues. West and Nikolai (2017) indicate that left-wing parties have used privatisation policies, 
such as the introduction of ‘government-dependent private schools’, for a variety of reasons, 
such as to address existing inequalities (in the case of the Labour Party’s academies) or to ‘catch 
up’ with educational realities in other regions in federal systems (in the case of left-wing parties 
in Berlin and Brandenburg). Overall, there appears to be significant variety in responses to this 
issue among left-wing parties.  
In addition to responding to changing electoral contexts and pressures on particular 
policy positions such as education policy, many social-democratic parties have undergone a 
deeper ideological-programmatic transformation since the 1990s (Keman, 2011; Griffiths, 2014). 
Increasing doubts over the sustainability and legitimacy of Keynesian economic strategies and 
expansive welfare states, which were at the core of the social-democratic project in the second 
half of the 20th century, have triggered a programmatic ‘renewal’ in many European social-
democratic parties (Bonoli and Powell, 2004; Seeleib-Kaiser et al., 2005; Callaghan et al., 2009; 
Keman, 2008). In the mid-1990s, debates emerged around the need for a ‘Third Way’ (Giddens, 
1998; Bastow et al., 2002), which would achieve economic progress and social inclusion – beyond 
the division between post-war social democracy and neoliberalism. This was sparked by changing 
perceptions among intellectuals and politicians on the Left, which started to challenge post-war 
conceptions of the role of the state. Rather than shielding individuals from market risks or 
compensating them through expansive social protection schemes, a new ‘activating’ state was 
championed which ought to enable and incentivise individuals to participate in the market 
(Green-Pedersen and van Kersbergen, 2002: 508). While the literature on the transformation of 
social-democratic parties has shown limited interest in education policy (exemplified by Bonoli, 
48 
 
2004 or Keman, 2017), within the aforementioned shifts in understandings of the state, education 
policy appears to have regained significance in social-democratic parties’ policy since he late 
1990s. Increased educational investments and opportunities are seen as an important part of 
‘social investment and a key to increase economic competitiveness and promote social inclusion 
(and compensate for the retreat from redistributive and de-commodifying social policies)’ 
(Potrafke, 2011).  
However, while education as a tool for social reform has potentially received renewed 
attention among social-democratic parties, approaches to education policy have since been 
marked by debates over how to provide public services such as education have changed. As 
discussed in this chapter as well as in section 1.1., building on arguments previously made on the 
political Right and going back to thinkers such as Hayek and Friedman, scepticism of ‘statist’ and 
‘paternalist’ versions of socialism spread among social-democratic policymakers from the mid-
1990s This was particularly visible in debates within the British Labour Party in which since the 
mid-1990 both the epistemic argument against state planning as being inefficient and the 
normative argument of it restricting individual freedom has gained much salience (Griffiths, 2014). 
While this represented an early and radical example of ideological transformation among 
European social-democratic parties, the general shift of these parties from their traditional 
emphasis on a state monopoly of public service provision towards an acceptance of New Public 
Management approaches has potential implications for traditional conceptions of comprehensive 
schooling, which require further investigation. 
2.2.2 Intra-party politics 
The research reviewed so far has conceptualised political parties as responsive to changing 
electoral and discursive contexts and thereby as actors within an external political arena. But how 
are these responses formed, and what happens when changing electoral strategies or 
programmatic reorientation challenges a party’s longer-standing policy commitments? The 
lliterature on party organisation highlights that parties are not unitary but collective actors whose 
audience are not only its constituencies among the electorate but also the various groups and 
factions within the party with potentially diverging interests and ideas about a particular policy 
(Katz and Mair, 1993). Apart from disagreements over policy as such (the wider goals, specific 
measures and desirable strategies), intra-party politics also often involves tensions between 
different party goals and priorities, such as between policy-, vote- and office-seeking (Katz and 
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Mair, 1993; Helboe Pedersen, 2012; Harmel and Janda, 1994; Müller and Strøm, 1999). While these 
aims are to some degree mutually compatible and interdependent, they can come in conflict; for 
example, when traditional policy commitments are deemed unpopular with marginal voter 
groups or stand in the way of forming government coalitions. Political parties therefore frequently 
face ‘hard choices’ in balancing various goals (Pierson, 2001), which can affect their policy 
commitments. 
Although changes in parties’ policy positions can be triggered by exogenous changes 
(e.g. shifts in public opinion, electoral defeats, other crises) they are mediated by intra-party 
politics, particularly the internal balance of power, and especially between leaders and activists 
(Harmel and Janda, 1994; Budge et al., 2010). A common distinction in party factions has been 
between the ‘party in public office’ and ‘the party on the ground’, which are expected to differ in 
their primary motivations regarding the pursuit of policy goals (Katz and Mair, 1993). The ‘party 
in public office’ (the party leadership and elected officials) is conceptualised as primarily being 
motivated by vote-maximising and office-seeking strategies, as being more responsive to 
‘environmental incentives’ (such as the economy or public opinion) and as being more aware of 
constraints on policy-making and the necessity to strike compromises – including, if necessary, 
at the expense of traditional policy commitments. Conversely, the ‘party on the ground’ (the 
party’s rank-and-file and policy activists) is seen as largely motivated by ‘policy seeking’, and 
therefore more willing to sacrifice short-run electoral gains to uphold long-standing 
programmatic positions (Katz and Mair, 1993). Research on social-democratic parties generally 
expects parties’ activists to be more left-wing and committed to egalitarian principles, and to 
have more radically redistributive preferences, than the party leadership. Social-democratic 
parties’ endorsement of neoliberal policies therefore depends on not only the strength of 
environmental factors (e.g. electoral defeat) but also the internal party power balance between 
activists and leadership (Helboe Pedersen, 2012; Marx and Schumacher, 2013; Schumacher, 2012; 
Schumacher, 2014).  
While this conceptualisation is useful for understanding different motivations of actors or 
factions involved in intra-party politics, and regarding the general tensions that might arise from 
the pursuit of different party goals, few studies comprehensively investigate the particular internal 
processes through which party policy is developed, deliberated and contested. Gauja (2013) 
indicates that, in practice, these policy processes rarely reflect the formal rules and procedures 
laid down in party constitutions. Such constitutions generally dictate that policy proposals, which 
might be developed in local party branches, commissions or working groups, with more or less 
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input from think tanks and party members, are put to vote and adopted by the party conference 
– the highest decision-making body in political parties. These collectively endorsed demands 
from the ‘party on the ground’ then ought to guide the political choices of the ‘party in public 
office’ in parliament and government politics. This ‘archetypal model’ of policy-making, however, 
rarely mirrors the actual processes of policy-making within political parties, which tend to be 
much more centralised (Gauja, 2013: 118; Scarrow et al., 2002: 145). Policy proposals are more 
likely to be developed by a small group of actors within very informal settings and with the 
endorsement of the party leadership, before being formally adopted by the party conference. In 
addition, the ‘party in public office’ tends to have considerable leeway in translating more general 
agreed policy commitments into particular legislative and executive decisions (or non-decisions) 
(Gauja, 2013). However, practices are also likely to vary across parties and policy areas, suggesting 
the need for more empirical research.  
2.2.3 Insights and gaps in the party literature 
So far, this chapter has reviewed different strands of research on political parties and their policy 
preferences, the recent transformation of social-democratic parties and the roles of party 
organisation and intra-party politics. While only a few of these studies attend to education policy, 
they nonetheless offer several insights for the study of parties’ education policies and attitudes. 
Research on parties’ education policy preferences indicates that parties are generally responsive 
to changing electoral contexts, and that using education policy to cater for different 
constituencies (particularly lower and middle income groups) involves opportunities as well as 
electoral dilemmas for this type of political party. Research has also indicated that recent 
programmatic transformations among social-democratic parties have gone beyond tactical and 
short-term changes in electoral strategies, but potentially include more fundamental changes in 
parties’ shared assumptions about the role of the state and interpretations of equality and fairness 
with potential implications for parties’ positions on education policy.  
 However, there are certain limitations of this research regarding the insights it can 
provide for the purposes of this study. Much research on party preferences consists of 
quantitative, large-n studies of ‘party effects’ – the correlation of parties’ government 
participation with the output of such a government (such as spending levels) – which involves 
operationalising education policy preferences into easily quantifiable variables (such as 
educational spending). Although research on social-democratic parties’ programmatic 
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transformation has paid more attention to policy preferences as such, as expressed in party 
manifestos, it tended to focus either on shifts in parties’ general positioning (on a Left–Right scale) 
or on their labour-market and social policies, and has generally paid limited attention to 
education policy issues. In addition, much research on political parties’ policy preferences, voting 
behaviour and party competition, is underpinned by strong assumptions of rationality which has 
been criticised on ontological as well as methodological grounds (see e.g. Hay, 2002: 8; Mulé, 
2009: 34; Budge et al., 2010). An additional limitations stems from the fact that education policy 
is primarily understood as a redistributive issue, which neglects both the relevance of value 
conflicts party competition over education as well as the role of discursive framing, which are 
likely to play a role in the case of comprehensive schooling (as Busemeyer et al., 2013, indicate in 
their discussion of issue ownership).  
Qualitative comparative studies of educational reform processes have provided more 
insights into less-easily quantifiable dimensions, such as policies related to school choice and 
marketisation. They have also indicated that the reasons for social-democratic parties adopting 
such policies, and the particular form they take, vary across different contexts (Hicks, 2015; 
Gingrich, 2011; Klitgaard, 2007). Most importantly, scholars have highlighted cross-national 
differences in the meaning of particular policies, the policy goals and ideals that underpin them, 
and their influence on parties’ strategic choices in educational reform processes (West and 
Nikolai, 2017).  
Research on intra-party politics indicates that changes in parties’ electoral strategies or 
programmatic positions are rarely smooth processes; rather, they tend to involve intra-party 
struggles between factions motivated by different goals. For social-democratic parties, these 
struggles tend to be between more left-wing, policy-seeking activists and more ideologically 
moderate, vote- and office-seeking leaders. However, very little research exists on the particular 
processes of policy development and contestation within parties, or how the struggles between 
and motives of different factions play out in shaping parties’ policy aspirations and strategic 
choices. 
2.3 Analytical framework  
The analytical framework discussed in this section developed iteratively during the process of 
empirical investigation and analysis. Rather than aiming for generalisations across cases, the main 
purpose of this framework was to help make sense of the interplay of actors and motivations 
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within each of the two parties studied, as well as to facilitate joint discussion of the findings from 
both cases.  
First, the framework builds on the insights from the historical literature on education 
reform in Europe which highlights that comprehensive schooling frequently served as an umbrella 
for wider reform ambitions and controversies. Rather than starting from a narrow and technical 
definition of comprehensive schooling as the absence of selection or tracking, it is the explicit 
aim of this research to explore the particular meanings that the idea of comprehensive schooling 
has come to embody within political debates in the two parties over time. While abolishing 
selection of children by ability is at the core of comprehensive schooling definitions, it is in its 
other policy dimensions and overall goals where changes in policy and political struggles over 
these have frequently occurred. Rather than operationalising comprehensive schooling in a 
narrow sense, this research aims to make a virtue of the ambiguity and intricacy of this policy in 
political debates, so as to investigate the struggles over the goals and means of education policy 
within political parties. 
Second, this research draws several insights from the political science and political 
sociology literature to develop a more holistic understanding of political parties and their policy 
preferences. Although parties are (to some degree) political manifestations of wider ideologies 
with particular conceptions of the ‘good society’, they are also political actors that have to 
navigate real-world political arenas, which constrains their ability to realise their goal of creating 
such a ‘good society’. While much of the literature on parties conceptualises them as unitary 
actors navigating political arenas, this research will empirically investigate the ‘black box’ of policy 
formation within political parties: how attitudes on schooling have evolved and how policy has 
been developed, contested and decided while the party navigates the political process in 
changing conditions. As discussed in the next section, the analytical framework underpinning this 
research builds on a dialectical understanding of political parties in which party policy is shaped 
by the interplay of various (and often conflicting) external and internal demands. These demands 
include the party’s engagement with other political actors and the electorate in its attempt to get 
elected, participate in government and realise its policy ambitions, as well as the party’s 
ideological legacies, the shared attitudes and collective identity among its followers, and the 
potentially conflicting interests of internal party groups and lobbies (as discussed in the next 
section). Policy formation is therefore not only a potentially complex and contested process but 
also takes place at different ‘sites’ within the party, making a clear-cut determination of party 
‘policy’ or ‘preference’ difficult (as further discussed in Chapter 3).  
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Third, this analytical framework has drawn insights from the neo-institutionalist literature 
frequently employed to study welfare-state change from a historical perspective. This literature 
has highlighted not only the role of formal political rules and social norms in constraining political 
action but also the various feedback effects through which past policy can influence actors’ 
perceptions of ‘possible’ and ‘desirable’ political action (as discussed below). The analytical 
framework presented here is informed by a constructivist and open-ended perspective on 
education policy-making and party politics. While political parties and the actors therein interact 
with their environment, their policy preferences cannot simply be deduced from the political and 
educational context in which they act. The aim of this empirical investigation is to explore how 
key actors within parties came to hold their attitudes to education policy, how they perceived the 
constraints and opportunities for education policy in their particular context, and how this 
influenced their behaviour.  
2.3.1 A dialectical understanding of parties and their policies 
In the party literature, parties’ policy preferences have been operationalised in different ways. 
One dominant strand of research focuses on what parties say they want to do, i.e. their 
positioning through the goals and measures they set out in party and election manifestos. 
Another strand focuses on what parties actually do when in political office, i.e. their policy 
preferences as manifested in the strategic choices they undertake to influence policy (or refrain 
from it), which is most commonly indirectly measured as ‘partisan effects’ in quantitative research 
or studied through process tracing in qualitative research. However, parties are not just ‘an 
instrument for acquiring and using power’ but also have a life of their own (Drucker, 1979: vii); 
similar observations have been made in the literature on party organisation, most famously Katz 
and Mair’s ‘three faces of party organisation’ (1993). For studying the dynamic processes of policy 
formation and contestation, Charlot’s (1989) conceptualisation of the ‘dual party’ seems 
particularly conducive.  
Every party is a dual party to the extent that it exists in itself and for itself (its leaders, 
its members) and that it can never attain its objectives (political power, the 
achievement of political projects) except by interacting with other agencies of power 
in a constraining environment, by mobilizing support (notably electoral support) 
which is always limited and transforming its environment (if possible and never 
completely). Internal analysis neglects the external constraints on the party. Analysing 
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the linkages or exchanges between the party and its environment neglects the 
internal constraints. To come as close as possible to reality, the party must be 
analysed in its fundamental duality. (Charlot, 1989: 361) 
This understanding seems more open to studying the various (and often overlapping) 
motivations of actors as they move between the internal and external dimensions of party life in 
their quest to shape the party’s policy. From this perspective, parties are characterised by a 
constant balancing act between their ‘public face turned towards the media, the voters and the 
rest of the world, and an inward-looking face’ (Charlot, 1989: 361). Parties themselves can be seen 
as ‘institutionalised coalitions’ that have ‘adopted rules, norms, procedures’ (Aldrich, 1995: 9).  
The analytical framework presented here builds on this dialectical understanding of 
political parties as both strategic actors navigating the political arena and collective actors or 
political organisations shaped by their own internal dynamics. A party’s policy preferences arise 
from the tensions and deliberations between these different dimensions. Understanding party 
policy processes, as shaped by this dialectic, also draws attention to the constraints for policy 
arising from both dimensions: ‘the multiplicity of expectations and individual actions of party 
members is doubly regulated; inside the group by the unequal distribution of decision-making 
power, outside it by competition from other parties and the rules of the political, economic and 
social game’ (Charlot, 1989: 361).  
This division between ‘internal’ and ‘external’ dimensions of party life should be seen as 
a heuristic device facilitating the analysis rather than an exact depiction of political processes, in 
which the boundaries between the dimensions are less clear-cut (as will become evident in the 
two case studies). The following section discusses important features of these dimensions, which 
have both been highlighted in the literature and emerged from the empirical research during this 
study.  
2.3.1.1 The party’s interaction with its external environment  
Competing in elections for public office and participating in government to influence policy are 
at the core of most political science definitions of what (mainstream) parties are and do (White, 
2006: 6). The main activities in this dimension – deciding on policy priorities for electoral 
campaigns or government agendas, steering electoral campaigns and policy discourses, 
bargaining and coalition-formation with other political parties – are usually driven by ‘the party 
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in public office’ (Katz and Mair, 1993): the party’s leadership, elected representatives (especially 
in national legislatures), ministers and policy advisers.  
The party’s relationship with its external environment, particularly voters, other parties 
and other political actors, can constrain the pursuit of particular policy commitments. Formal 
political institutions (such as constitutional rules), as well as informal conventions underpinning 
political processes and policy-making, can have a profound effect on not only what parties can 
do to bring about educational change but also their likely policy and political strategies (such as 
consensus-seeking) (Bonoli, 2001). In addition, informal conventions, dominant practices and the 
general political culture can play a similar role in creating shared expectations and behaviour for 
the members of a polity, which can have a considerable effect on parties’ perception of desirable 
and possible political action (Peters, 2012: 144). 
Parties’ policy preferences are frequently influenced by the constraints and opportunities 
these actors perceive in the electoral arena and in the process of forming coalition governments 
and policy-making. Particularly in countries with proportional electoral systems, winning elections 
generally does not lead to absolute majorities and thereby the freedom to shape the government 
agenda. Here, it might be even more necessary for the party to succeed in ‘winning’ the formation 
of government coalitions than to win an electoral majority. Coalition agreements with another 
party can constrain a party’s choices in realising its policy commitments, or otherwise risk it being 
unable to participate in government. Further constraints on a party’s policy can arise within the 
policy-making process. Political systems differ in the extent to which they concentrate 
government power and allow other actors (e.g. opposition parties, different levels of government, 
other social interests) to influence, or even veto, government policy (Bonoli, 2001: 239). Veto 
players can also arise from education policy legacies themselves, such as the influential 
Gymnasium teacher union in Austria. By providing beneficiaries with particular privileges and a 
common identity, particular policies can create powerful vested interests over time that oppose 
changes to the status quo (Campbell, 2012).  
As indicated in much of the literature on political parties, parties’ policy is likely affected 
by their overall electoral considerations and strategies, within which education policy proposals 
can be considered either a risk or a potential asset. Expansive education policy can be useful to 
create cross-class coalitions of electoral support but particular policies, such as on school 
admissions, can also involve distributive conflicts that cut across social-democratic parties’ 
constituencies. However, the redistributive implications of education policy and their effect on 
popular support for policy are not straightforward. Who benefits and who loses out as a result of 
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particular policies can depend on the structure of the education system overall, e.g. the nature of 
educational transitions and alternative pathways that affect dominant patterns of educational 
demand and competition over school places (Busemeyer, 2015). Feedback effects on public 
expectations and educational strategies can also arise from past policies, such as policies 
expanding school choice or publishing school league tables, which influence residential patterns 
(Gingrich and Ansell, 2014).  
Past policies can also have ‘ideational’, or interpretive, feedback effects on societal 
attitudes (Béland, 2010; Jordan, 2009). Selective schools, such as the Gymnasium or the grammar 
schools, can be expected to raise resistance among parents directly affected by a proposed 
closure of such selective school. However, selective schools can also have a longer-term and 
broader influence on popular images about what constitutes ‘proper’ education and ‘natural’ 
hierarchies between different types of education and curricula (Halpin, 1989). Such images can 
be an obstacle to creating support for comprehensive schooling reforms, which aim to provide 
not only non-selective schooling but also a different form of education. As societal attitudes are 
often ambiguous, opposition to educational selection can coexist with the popular image of 
selective schools. 
Despite the proliferation of opinion polls, political parties operate under much 
uncertainty about popular support for different education policies (Budge et al., 2010). Although 
public attitudes can provide a challenge to parties’ policy proposals, they do not determine 
parties’ responses. If a policy is deemed unpopular it could be dropped, but it could also be kept 
and merely downplayed while other, more popular policies are foregrounded. Parties’ discursive 
strategies could attempt to increase the legitimacy of the policy and convince the public of its 
merit. Public attitudes and voter interests are also influenced by the discursive battle between 
political parties mobilising shared images and symbols. The role of national educational traditions 
and policy legacies in party policy is therefore not deterministic in creating societal demands but 
should rather be seen as ‘repositories of ideologies’ (Paterson, 2003a: 5) that actors can mobilise 
to create legitimacy for their proposals within the wider electorate. This empirical investigation 
must therefore study perceptions of and beliefs about popular support for different policies 
within political parties, the strategies they undertake to respond to these and what this implies 
for parties’ policy preferences.  
In sum, the characteristics of the political and educational systems do not determine a 
party’s policy preferences, but they can create particular opportunities and constraints that affect 
the party’s ability to further its policy aims, and may therefore influence the strategies it adopts, 
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including for bargaining and compromise-seeking. In addition, anticipation of these barriers can 
lead to the pre-moderation of a party’s policy aspirations. Finally, political constraints for 
introducing a policy can also provide a justification for party inaction. 
2.3.1.2 Internal party dynamics 
While a key characteristic of mainstream political parties is their aim to compete for participation 
in public office, they also share characteristics with social movements or organised social interests 
in uniting their members with a common purpose and providing them with a source of 
identification. Parties’ education policy preferences can originate from the interests of particular 
groups as well as wider party ideology or paradigms (Hall, 1993) relating to the goals and means 
for social reform. Legacies of different ideological streams and inherited ideas, the influence of 
educational theory and vested interests of particular groups can become consolidated and part 
of the party’s organisational culture, thereby relating to not only what the party does but also 
what it is (Mair and Mudde, 1998: 220; Peters, 2012: 145). In organisational literature, collective 
identity is understood as the characteristics ‘that members perceive as ostensibly central, 
enduring, and distinctive in character that contributes to how they define the organisation and 
their identification with it’ (Gioia and Thomas, 1996: 372). Political ideologies, policy statements 
and other symbols are important means for creating a collective identity.  
A party’s ideology is shaped by not only its intellectual traditions and doctrine but also 
its ‘ethos’, or its ‘traditions, beliefs, characteristic procedures and feelings which help to animate 
the members of the party’ (Drucker, 1979: 1). According to Drucker, ethos acts as a kind of 
‘ideological glue’ and solidarity to hold the party together, giving a sense of a common past and 
a common future project (ibid, p. 35): 
Collections of half-remembered, often repeated and occasionally embellished tales 
of a specific past of a specific people … (which) serve to bind that specific group of 
people together. A past, in this sense, is a force making for group identity. This past 
defines 'us'. (Drucker, 1979: 31) 
Collective identities are often fluid and overlapping. They are actively produced and reproduced 
through political activity and strategic framing (or ‘identity work’), which is important to sustain 
internal solidarity and commitment within the community, using ‘nostalgia and other elements 
of collective memory to construct a past for a group’ (Polletta and Jasper, 2001: 290, 299).  
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Parties can therefore reproduce values, interpretations and norms and develop their own 
‘logic of appropriateness’ (March and Olsen, 2006; Peters, 2012: 145), or ‘ethos’ (Drucker, 1979), 
in which particular policy goals or ideas – such as comprehensive schooling – become embedded. 
This, in turn, creates and reproduces attachments to policies beyond the group directly affected 
by them as they become a source of identification for the wider party. Such identification does 
not necessarily involve an in-depth understanding of the more technical aspects of a particular 
policy, and can even cover up underlying tensions or disagreements over policy among different 
actors or groups within the party. A degree of ambiguity over the meaning of a policy can even 
be helpful in uniting a coalition with potentially diverging understandings and interests. Such 
diffuse but shared attachments do not necessarily lead to any policy action, but they can be 
mobilised by actors seeking to commit the party to policy action (e.g. in the legislative arena) to 
make the policy a priority on the party’s agenda and gain legitimacy for their policy proposals. In 
turn, such a ‘logic of appropriateness’ or ‘party ethos’ can pose constraints for actors wishing to 
change party policy in a different direction. 
Challenges to entrenched policy commitments within parties can come from vote- or 
office-seeking strategies when policy demands are moderated or dropped to account for 
perceived shifts in public opinion or to form coalitions with other political parties. Long-standing 
policy commitments and understandings can also be challenged by growing doubts over the 
working of the policy in practice, and/or the exposure to new ideas and educational and political 
discourses. This can lead to a more gradual process of adapting shared understandings about 
policy to changing conditions and integrating new ideas. But such a vulnerability can also be 
exploited by ‘policy entrepreneurs’ who aim for a more radical change of the party’s policy (as 
discussed below). And finally, policy commitments entrenched within wider ideological projects 
can also become challenged when the wider ideological project is transformed in processes of 
broader programmatic change within a party.  
2.3.2 Actors and institutions 
Parties do not act in a vacuum but in particular political, discursive and educational contexts. This 
research examines the way in which the context is largely structured through institutions – 
institutions underpinning the political system in which parties operate (as well as their own 
internal structures) and arising from the education system towards which parties’ policies are 
oriented. Institutions in this sense encompass both the ‘formal or informal procedures, routines, 
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norms and conventions embedded in the organizational structure of the polity’ (Hall and Taylor, 
1996: 938), as well as the legacies and feedback effects arising from previous education policies 
and the wider education regime. Institutions create an ‘opportunity structure’ that parties actors 
reflect on to devise their strategies, but institutions also affect parties’ internal life and create a 
‘logic of appropriateness’ (March and Olsen, 1984; 2006). As such, institutions contain both 
normative and cognitive dimensions, which affect how actors are socialised into particular roles 
and norms of behaviour and provide them cognitive scripts and models for action (Campbell, 
1998). Institutions in this sense can ‘affect the very identities, self-images and preferences of 
actors’ (Hall and Taylor, 1996: 939). Apart from the formal and informal institutions underpinning 
national political systems and the rule and shared practices within political parties, past education 
policies can themselves act like institutions, affecting both policy attitudes and opportunities and 
constraints for policy change (Pierson, 1993; Pierson, 2006; Béland, 2010; Jordan, 2013). Institutions 
can affect not only which policy goals and strategies political actors see as possible but also those 
they see as desirable.  
However, actors’ perceptions and the strategies they develop from them are not determined; 
rather, the inherent complexity and unpredictability of political systems leave much room for 
agency (Hay, 2002: 14). Actors can therefore also mobilise constraints and opportunities in 
different ways – and, through their actions, contribute to their construction: 
Actors are strategic, seeking to realize certain complex, contingent, and constantly 
changing goals. They do so in a context which favours certain strategies over others 
and must rely upon perceptions of that context which are at best incomplete and 
which may very often prove to have been inaccurate after the event. Moreover, ideas 
in the form of perceptions ‘matter’ in a second sense—for actors are oriented 
normatively towards their environment. Their desires, preferences, and motivations 
are not a contextually given fact—a reflection of material or even social 
circumstance—but are irredeemably ideational, reflecting a normative (indeed 
moral, ethical, and political) orientation towards the context in which they will have 
to be realized. (Hay, 2008: 63) 
This research explores the evolution of parties’ attitudes and policies on comprehensive schooling 
as they emerged from the interplay between the parties’ internal and external dimensions. It 
focuses on individual actors in parties located within (and moving across) these dimensions, and 
their ideas about school policy and the educational and social goals it should contribute to. Actors 
might disagree about not only the substance of their party’s education policy but also whether 
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that policy is a potential risk in the pursuit of other party priorities, such as gaining electoral 
support, forming political coalitions and exercising government power. Party actors are here 
conceptualised as being neither pure instrumentalists driven by the pursuit of power, nor pure 
idealists, solely driven by their ambition for societal change. The political and educational contexts 
in which they engage affects their opportunities and constraints for realising policy aspirations 
and, to some degree, already their attitudes towards and ideas about education in the first place. 
Rather than deducing the effects of the aforementioned institutions on parties’ attitudes and 
policies, this research studies their effects through actors’ ‘assumptive worlds’, their ‘subjective 
understandings of the environment in which they operate’, comprising ‘several intermingled 
elements of belief, perception, evaluation, and intention as responses to the reality “out there”’ 
(Young, 1977: 2–3). The empirical investigation focuses on how the two dimensions, and the 
motivations therein, interacted in particular processes in which policy was developed, deliberated 
and contested within the parties. In these processes a crucial role is played by actors who aim to 
create change and steer policy ideas through these different contexts. These actors – often called 
‘policy entrepreneurs’ or ‘change agents’ (Kingdon, 1995; Béland, 2005: 10; Mintrom and Norman, 
2009) – may have a variety of motivations but can be characterised by their ‘effort to promote 
significant policy change’ (Mintrom and Norman, 2009: 651). As such, they invest significant time 
and effort in pushing their conceptions of problems and policy proposals in order to ‘soften up 
the system’ for policy change. They are strategic actors looking out for windows of opportunities 
where they can ‘hook solutions to problems, proposals to political momentum, and political 
events to policy problems’ (Kingdon, 1995: 182).  
To recognise and seize opportunities, policy entrepreneurs need to have a high degree 
of perceptiveness or social acuity, and to understand ‘the ideas, motives, and concerns of others 
in their local policy context and [respond] effectively’ (Mintrom and Norman, 2009: 652). In 
political parties they need to understand the dynamics of both the party’s external environment 
and its inner life in order to mobilise support and mediate between contending interests. A key 
quality of successful policy entrepreneurs is rhetorical or ‘framing’ power to define policy 
problems, and the need to reform, effectively. Policy change can require changing the dominant 
narrative and meaning of a policy in parties’ discursive practices; this can be achieved through 
strategic and creative use of language to (re)define problems, mobilising support and building 
coalitions (Finlayson, 2004; Béland and Cox, 2016: 429). Policy entrepreneurs ‘advocate not only 
for specific proposals but for conceptual understandings of policy issues and problems that 
legitimate and build support for their proposals’ (Béland and Cox, 2016: 441). These have to be 
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framed within culturally sensitive ways, building on popular imagery and existing ideological 
repertoires (Béland, 2005: 2–3); in the case of education policy, these understandings are likely to 
reflect particular national educational traditions, the symbols and ‘myths’ around them (as 
discussed above), or linking to themes emerging from international education discourses to 
increase the legitimacy of policy proposals among both the party and the wider public. These 
actors therefore not only strategically evaluate the shared understandings, opportunities and 
constraints for policy but also try to mobilise – and even construct – these to further their policy 
aims. 
Policy entrepreneurs, or change agents, are usually seen as external actors who gain 
privileged access to policymakers in the government (or party leadership); for example, as policy 
advisers. However, the notion of ‘change agent’ can also be used to analyse the actions of actors 
located within parties (Little, 2017); for example, policy spokespeople, actors in ministerial 
positions or parliamentary committees, or other actors mobilising for policy change. However, 
not all actors who pay regular attention to policy (such as ministers) are necessarily policy 
entrepreneurs (Little, 2017). Change agents or policy entrepreneurs might not always be present 
in the party, and actors who desire change might not always be as successful or influential as the 
ideal-typical image presented above. For long periods, a party’s policy preferences might remain 
stable, or they might evolve incrementally through the interplay of its internal demands and 
external constraints. But change actors, and their ability (or failure) to steer policy by navigating 
the intricacies of a party’s internal and external dimensions, can provide an important insight into 
more radical periods of change in party policy (or their absence).  
2.4 Conclusion 
This chapter has reviewed the insights gleaned from comparative research on political parties 
and their policy preferences into social-democratic parties’ comprehensive schooling policy. By 
adopting a dialectical understanding of political parties and a constructivist-institutionalist 
perspective, the chapter presented the analytical framework that underpins the empirical 
investigation of the nature of, and changes in, such policy. This framework is intended not as a 
tool for testing theory but as a heuristic guide. It is thus intended to help disentangle and make 
sense of the interplay between various actors and motivations within internal party processes of 
policy formulation, contestation and decision-making. As such, the study aims to shed more light 
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on the interaction between actors, ideas and institution, in the complex, contingent, real-world 
political processes of policy-making.  
The next chapter outlines the research design underpinning the empirical investigation 




Chapter 3. Research design 
This chapter presents the research design chosen for this study and the key decisions that shaped 
the empirical investigation. It starts by discussing the rationale behind the choice of combining a 
case-study design with a comparative analysis. It then justifies the case selection, gives an 
overview of the main sources for the empirical analysis and discusses data collection and analysis 
strategies employed. The chapter concludes with a discussion of methodological challenges 
involved in this research.  
3.1 Case-study design and comparative analysis 
The investigation of how social-democratic parties have positioned themselves on the issue of 
comprehensive schooling had two objectives: to capture the shifting meanings of comprehensive 
schooling in two contexts over time, and to investigate the internal party processes in which policy 
had been formed. Although the research was initially conceptualised as a comparative study of 
the trajectory of party policy in the two cases, it soon became clear that more flexibility and 
openness was necessary to investigate the intricacies of these processes in each case. This led to 
a two-staged research strategy: first, two parallel case studies were conducted allowing an in-
depth ‘within-case’ analysis by tracing the political processes within particular historical, political 
and cultural context; second, the findings of the case studies were then discussed comparatively 
to tease out commonalities and differences between the two cases.  
As discussed in section 2.2., conceptualising a party’s policy is not always straightforward. 
This research therefore started not with a narrow definition of ‘policy preferences’ but with the 
aim of discovering the relationship between different manifestations (‘sites’) of party policy. 
Generally, parties’ education policy is understood here as comprising both the goals and 
aspirations the policy aims to achieve and the concrete means or instruments proposed to 
achieve them (Howlett and Cashore, 2014: 19). A party’s ‘official’ policy, or its ‘party line’, primarily 
manifests as the party’s collectively adopted programmes and manifestos that specify the goals 
and means for policy action. However, policy is also ‘the exercise of political power and the 
language that is used to legitimate that process’ (Codd, 1988: 235); that is, the strategic choices 
the party’s elected officials make (or refrain from making) to achieve these goals in the political 
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arena, and the discourses they use construct. As the case of the SPÖ indicates, there can be 
considerable gaps between programmatic aspiration and strategic choices. Both can therefore 
be understood as particular ‘sites’ of the party’s policy, and their relationship then needs to be 
assessed empirically. In addition, particular group interests or widely shared attitudes and 
attachments within the wider party can give rise to particular demands in parties’ programmes 
or set limits to the policy of the ‘party in public office’. Such attitudes could be considered a factor 
influencing the parties’ ‘official’ policy – or, in the case of widely shared attachments (in the sense 
of Ducker’s party ‘ethos’), even a unique ‘site’ of party policy themselves, which can outlive the 
particular policy actions of elected officials. As discussed earlier, the meaning of comprehensive 
schooling and the parties’ positioning on this issue were difficult to define a priori.  
This research therefore adopts a broad perspective on party policy in order to study the 
interplay between different sites of party policy (and the actors behind them) and between shared 
attachments or specific interests within the party, the party’s manifestos, and the strategic choices 
and discourses of its elected officials. Accepting the fundamentally blurred nature of 
comprehensive schooling and ‘party policy’ allowed exploration of the shifting meanings of, and 
interactions between, different manifestations (‘sites’) of party policy and debate. This, in turn, 
resulted in greater understanding of how different actors have formed party policy, and those 
actors’ interactions and struggles. The two case studies therefore focus on ‘policy’ as emerging 
from the interplay of a party’s engagement with its ‘external’ environment, as well as from its 
‘internal’ dimension and the wider attitudes and interests in the party (Drucker, 1979; Charlot, 
1989; Harmel et al., 2018).  
While case studies are particularly useful to investigate a ‘contemporary phenomenon 
within its real-life context, especially when the boundaries between phenomenon and context are 
not clearly given’ (Yin, 2003: 13), this research was also motivated by a comparative interest in 
social-democratic education policy. The choice of two cases rather than one case was made to 
broaden the empirical terrain for exploring different ways in which parties interact with education 
policy and respond to new challenges within particular political and educational contexts. 
Although the two case studies were designed to allow sensitivity to case-specific policy meanings 
and the political dynamics involved, both studies were informed by similar methodological 
procedures and analytical objectives, which were refined during the parallel conduct of the two 
empirical investigations. In contrast to the classical approach to comparative research in political 
science (Lijphart, 1971; Hopkin, 2002), the aim here was not to isolate explanatory variables and 
contribute to a generalisation of causal factors shaping party policy. However, as the empirical 
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and analytical work in the two case studies were conducted in parallel, they have iteratively 
‘spoken’ to each other, raised new questions for each other and helped to uncover tacit 
assumptions, working as a ‘springboard for theoretical reflections about contrasting findings’ 
(Bryman, 2012: 75). The concluding comparative discussion of findings from both cases (as 
presented in chapter 6) allowed for reflection on the unique features of education debates and 
policy formation in different political and cultural contexts, as well as the ‘dilemmas and questions 
that straddle both cultures and time’ (Moses and Knutsen, 2012: 253) and the changing 
relationship between social-democratic parties and education policy across contexts. More detail 
on this form of comparison as ‘dialogue’ is given in section 3.3. 
3.2 Case selection  
3.2.1 Social-democratic parties2 
Social-democratic parties have historically been key actors in comprehensive schooling reforms. 
Studying changing attitudes to education policy among these parties can therefore improve our 
understanding of the possibilities of, as well as limits to, bringing about educational change. While 
social-democratic parties have often been influenced by aspirations for more radical educational 
and social change, as key actors in political and policy-making processes their policy aspirations 
have frequently been constrained in these processes. Social-democratic parties have, since their 
foundation in the late 19th and early 20th centuries, fluctuated between more revolutionary 
ambitions and reformist strategies of using democratic means to bring about social change 
(Sassoon, 2010; Jackson, 2013).  
Apart from the constraints of the democratic political process, a reformist approach to 
social and educational change also involved more ideological or programmatic dilemmas. While 
social-democratic reform strategies tended to focus on improving working conditions and 
                                                     
2 The label ‘social democratic’ does not always correspond to parties’ self-designation. In particular, in the case 
of the Labour Party, the term ‘social democratic’ has frequently referred more to one of several factions within 
the party (which, until the mid-1990s, were on the party’s right wing), as well as to a party faction that broke 
away in 1981 to form a separate Social Democratic Party. In Austria, the SPÖ held various names over the 
course of the 20th century, from Social Democratic Workers’ Party to Socialist Party in 1945 and, from 1991, 
the Social Democratic Party. Nevertheless, this research uses the label ‘social democratic’ rather than the 
broader label of ‘centre-left’ parties, because the latter is frequently used in comparative party research to 
depict parties’ positioning on a left–right dimension, thereby often including green or liberal parties.  
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redistributing social wealth through labour-market, social and economic policies (Seeleib-Kaiser 
et al., 2005), education policy had an important role in the goal of providing an opportunity for 
social advancement for children of the working classes. However, this often posed difficult 
questions as to whether the opening up of opportunities for disadvantaged groups should take 
place within established educational hierarchies or should involve a more fundamental 
restructuring.  
While both parties in the focus of this research, and perhaps European social-democratic 
parties more generally, can be characterised as political parties with generally long-standing 
ideological and programmatic legacies, throughout their history they have gone through waves 
of ‘revisionism’ and ‘renewal’, in which the role of education policy has been reconsidered. School 
reforms remain a focus for more utopian aspirations about social change and the future. With 
the lessening of linkages between social-democratic parties and their traditional constituencies, 
the dynamics of electoral competition are expected to become more important to social-
democratic parties than their ideological foundations. Comprehensive schooling encapsulates 
many of the tensions social-democratic parties face in education policy. In the two parties studied, 
it seems to live on in parties’ ideological legacies as a symbol for past reform ambitions, and to 
occasionally become mobilised as well as reinterpreted. However, as a policy and goal for 
educational reform, it has blurred meanings rather than straightforward redistributive 
implications. Debates over comprehensive schooling have involved both distributional questions 
and value conflicts over the nature of change or the preservation of educational traditions and 
practices. The decision not to impose a narrow definition for comprehensive schooling (e.g. as 
selective school admissions) in this study therefore allows for the use of policy debates on 
comprehensive schooling, which are a rich field for studying how social-democratic parties’ 
thinking and action on education policy has evolved, and the dilemmas parties have perceived in 
different contexts.  
3.2.2 The British Labour Party3 and the Austrian Social Democratic Party (SPÖ) 
The choice of the two parties for this research was made for both intrinsic reasons (motivated by 
an interest in the particular path policy evolution has taken in each country) and instrumental 
                                                     
3 The focus of this research is on the Labour Party’s school policy in England, given the degree of autonomy 
education policy and politics enjoy in Scotland, Northern Ireland (and to a lesser degree) Wales and the long-
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reasons (to provide a wider empirical terrain for studying how social-democratic parties have 
responded to changing educational and political landscapes, opportunities and challenges since 
the 1980s in contrasting contexts). 
The intrinsic interest in how these two parties engaged with school policy in particular 
political and historical contexts resides first in their unique features – in all their ‘particularity and 
ordinariness’ (Stake, 2000: 437). Both parties have previously pushed for the introduction of 
comprehensive schooling, yet even then both parties displayed considerable ambiguity regarding 
interpretation of the policy, its goals and policy dimensions, and the political strategies through 
which to bring it about. However, each party has displayed a particular dynamic in its engagement 
with education policy: the Labour Party has struggled over the goals and means of education 
policy, and the SPÖ over the tension between programmatic aspiration and pragmatic (in)action. 
The aim of the case studies is to explore these particular dynamics and the conditions and 
processes that gave rise to them. 
The different dynamics underpinning both cases do not easily lend themselves to 
comparison. However, both cases hold insights from a more instrumental rationale (Stake, 2000: 
437). Both are cases of a larger phenomenon of how European social-democratic parties 
responded to, and constructed, changing educational and political climates since the 1980s. 
Investigating the commonalities and particularities of the two cases can increase our 
understanding of common concerns and dilemmas for social-democratic education policy at the 
beginning of the 21st century, as well as the diversity in the policy meanings and processes 
involved. The two case studies proved particularly useful because comprehensive schooling has 
recently featured in internal debates in both the Labour Party and the SPÖ. This provided rich 
empirical material for studying not only internal party policy debates and processes but also the 
taken-for-granted beliefs and tacit assumptions that revealed themselves when challenged by 
contending ideas and political struggles. The aim was to investigate how a common 
phenomenon, played out in different contexts, can broaden our theoretical insights into a 
diversity of meanings and processes involved in different real-world contexts through the analysis 
of the dynamic interplay between actors and their interpretations of these contexts. The research 
                                                     
standing divergence of policies in secondary schooling (see also Raffe et al., 1999). Two interviews were 
conducted with Scottish Labour education policy-makers. These and other interviewees indicated a limited 
flow of ideas on education policy from Scotland to England within the Labour Party.  
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therefore emphasised within-case analysis because it can ‘stimulate the imagination’ regarding 
possible theoretical implications (Eckstein, 2000).  
Finally, this case selection also involved more pragmatic rationales. My language skills 
and background knowledge gained from having lived and studied in both countries proved 
particularly useful in exploring different meanings of policy and the wider historical and cultural 
contexts in which they emerged in these two cases.  
3.3 Data collection  
The key aims of the empirical analysis were: 1) to explore the interplay of actors and their 
interpretations and motives for education policy, and 2) to reconstruct internal party policy 
processes within wider political and educational contexts. As discussed in section 3.1, this 
extended beyond studying policy preferences as expressed in party manifestos, or the policy 
reforms introduced by the parties when in government. Case studies allow for complementing 
and contrasting a variety of evidence (Yin, 2003: 8) to gain a holistic, in-depth picture of political 
processes. While the data collection strategy was broadly similar in both cases, the in-depth 
immersion in each case allowed flexibility and ‘soaking and poking’ (Bennett and Checkel, 2015: 
18) in each case and its particularities.  
A variety of complementary data sources were used for this research. Secondary literature 
and newspaper coverage provided the initial information for reconstructing political processes 
and identifying the key events and actors involved. A range of party documents evidenced the 
nature of, and changes to, party thinking and policy on comprehensive schooling. Finally, 
interviews with key actors were the key source of information on their assumptive worlds and 
more in-depth internal party processes of policy formation. These types of sources are discussed 
in the following sections. 
3.3.1 Documentary sources  
3.3.1.1 Secondary literature and media coverage 
As a first step, existing secondary literature and media coverage helped to reconstruct the longer-
term political and education policy processes in which the parties have engaged. With the aid of 
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electronic newspaper archives (Factiva database), education policy debates were followed within 
quality newspapers in both countries (in particular Der Standard and Die Presse for Austria; The 
Guardian, The Times and Times Educational Supplement for England), with varying availability 
from the early 1980s to 2010 in England and (due to the restricted availability of online archives) 
from the early 1990s to 2013 in Austria. 
As with any other source, media coverage is not an ‘objective’ source of evidence; issues 
of potential bias, as well as selectivity in attention paid to particular issues and voices at certain 
points in time, must be taken into account by triangulating and contrasting information with other 
sources. Nevertheless, newspaper coverage proved a highly useful information source for the 
initial reconstruction of political processes and debates in both countries, as well as the general 
discursive climate and wider spectrum of political opinions at particular times. Newspaper sources 
were particularly relevant for reconstructing political processes and identifying key events in 
Austria, where secondary literature on education policy and politics is scarce. Media sources were 
also helpful in providing some initial information on internal party debates and the actors involved 
therein. Even for England, where secondary literature is more prevalent than for Austria, 
newspaper coverage provided important information on particular moments of internal party 
debates and struggles that have been only cursorily commented on in the secondary literature. 
Sifting through newspaper coverage also uncovered a range of primary sources in the form of 
commentaries by, or interviews with, key protagonists in these processes. Finally, information 
from newspaper coverage provided an additional perspective on the ‘remembered’ history of 
political actors, serving as prompts during the interviews and triangulation in the analysis.  
3.3.1.2 Documents 
The primary documentary sources for assessing policy goals and preferences of political parties 
as a whole were party programmes, election manifestos and other education policy documents 
and position papers (including white papers and bills). Policy documents served as the main 
source of information on the parties’ ‘expressed preferences’, their understandings of 
comprehensive schooling (both in its wider aspirations and justifications and in concrete policy 
domains) and its change over time. Policy documents, such as party manifestos, were evidence 
of not only dominant problem perceptions and policy aspirations but also their use in various 
coordination and communication processes – both within the party and with voters, interest 
groups and other parties (Daubler, 2012: 51) – and were followed up in many interviews. Selection 
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criteria were inclusive; I reviewed all official national party documents dealing with education 
policy that I could find. In England, these involved party and election manifestos (in particular: 
The Labour Party, 1979; 1982; 1983; 1987; 1992; 1997; 2001; 2005), several education policy 
documents when the party was in opposition (in particular: The Labour Party, 1985; 1991; 1994; 
1995a; 1995b); and white papers and other documents from the Department of Education when 
Labour was in government (in particular: DES, 1965; DfEE, 1997; 2001; DfES, 2001; 2003; 2004; 
2005). In Austria, I reviewed all party and election manifestos ((SPÖ, 1979; 1983; 1986; 1990; 1994; 
1995; 1998; 1999c; 2002; 2006; 2008; 2013) as well as the three education policy programmes the 
party has written since 1945 (SPÖ, 1969; 1999b; 2004). A more detailed discussion of how 
documents were analysed is provided in section 3.3. below.  
In addition to official party documents, policy pamphlets and other publications authored 
by key individuals were important sources for this research (for the Labour Party: Crosland, 1956; 
Radice, 1986; Kinnock, 1985; Kinnock, 1986; Radice, 1992; Blair, 1994; Barber, 1996; Adonis and 
Pollard, 1997; for the SPÖ: Schnell, 1980; Matzenauer et al., 1985; Matzenauer, 1990; Cap and 
Duffek, 1999; Duffek, 2001; Gusenbauer, 2002; Niederwieser, 2009; Niederwieser, 2006; Duffek, 
2008; Niederwieser, 2008; Schmied, 2012), as well as a variety of speeches and further 
commentary by key actors (usually uncovered via media research, as discussed above). A 
particularly useful source for studying the assumptive worlds were memoirs by key actors who 
have had an important influence on parties’ school policy, particularly in England (Blunkett, 2006; 
Barber, 2007; Blair, 2010; Adonis, 2012). In Austria memoirs are less common, but secondary 
literature, authored by previous SPÖ education spokespeople, on the history of education policy 
(Schnell, 1993; Achs and Sretenovic, 1999; Seel and Scheipl, 2004) provided some insights into 
their assumptive worlds and the party’s internal policy processes. As Batteson and Ball (1995) 
highlight, memoirs are particularly useful sources to reveal individuals’ attitudes and justifications 
for their actions.  
These sources reflect the opinions and assumptive worlds of individual actors who have 
been important in representing, as well as shaping, wider party attitudes and policy. However, at 
times these actors’ opinions have been in conflict with more widely held assumptions in the two 
parties, and the research also aimed to gain insights into conflicting views within the two parties. 
For the Labour party, evidence on internal party opposition could be found in publications of the 
Labour-led Parliamentary Education Committee (House of Commons Education and Skills 
Committee, 2004; 2005; 2006) and the 2004 Alternative White Paper authored by party 
backbenchers (Compass, 2005), while voices from the wider educational community at the 
71 
 
margins of the party were found in magazines such as FORUM for promoting comprehensive 
schooling and the website of the Socialist Educational Association. For the SPÖ, some evidence 
about critical voices both within and at the margin of the party was found in journals such as Freie 
Lehrerstimme and Schulheft as well as the party’s discussion journal Zukunft (albeit with limited 
coverage of education policy since the mid-1980s). Section 3.3. discusses in more detail how this 
research approached the relationship between individual and collective attitudes in the two 
parties.  
Other documentary sources, such as parliamentary debates, were only selectively drawn 
on for this research. Given the high degree of party discipline in the SPÖ (and, to a lesser extent, 
the Labour Party), parliamentary debates provided less information on internal party 
disagreements than the sources discussed above. However, debates in Austria around political 
compromises over comprehensive schooling in 1982 and 2011, and the legitimation strategies 
school ministers adopted, gave some insight into internal party critics of these compromises. In 
England, parliamentary debates around the 2005 white paper and 2006 Education and 
Inspections Act provided some insight into different motivations among Labour backbenchers. 
Finally, although initially envisaged, this research did not involve archival research on the 
documentation of party conferences or internal meetings. In Austria, this was due to the non-
existence of a contemporary party archive and the generally limited insights from the official party 
conference documentation for this research (conference reports for the past 15 years have been 
examined). In England, given the abundance of other primary data, a pragmatic decision was 
taken not to undertake an originally planned visit to the Labour Party archive in Manchester. 
In balancing the desire for a systematic analysis of data sources with the limitations 
inherent to a historical-comparative analysis, the focus (especially in the documentary analysis) 
was using the most crucial moments and documents to piece together a rich understanding of 
key interactions and processes, with sensitivity to alternative accounts or opposing views. 
However, while the wider spectrum of opinion and attitudes in the parties were explored, more 
weight was given to the attitudes and activities of key groups influential in policy formulation and 
contestation. 
3.3.2 Interviews 
While media coverage and documents allowed a general reconstruction of policy meanings and 
processes, personal interviews with policy actors have long been considered a key source for 
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gaining in-depth insights into policy-making processes (McPherson and Raab, 1988; Walford, 
1994; Grek, 2011). The purpose of conducting interviews was twofold. First, interviews allowed 
exploration of the ‘assumptive worlds’ of key actors involved in developing (or contesting) party 
policy, particularly their interpretations, beliefs and motives underpinning their engagement with 
education policy and party politics (Marshall et al., 1985; McPherson and Raab, 1988; Selwyn, 
2013). The interviews allowed for clarification of the different meanings of, and attachments to, 
comprehensive schooling policy within the parties, as well as actors’ perceptions of opportunities 
and constraints in the political process. Second, interviews provided crucial information on the 
processes through which parties’ policy preferences were constructed and contested (Hay, 2002: 
82). Based on the preliminary information gleaned from newspaper coverage and documentary 
sources regarding internal party struggles over policy, the interviews were invaluable in 
uncovering the nature of these micro-political processes, the identities and motivations of 
different actors, and informal processes of bargaining and decision-making.  
3.3.2.1 Selection, logistics and consent 
The selection of interview partners aimed to cover a broad range of actors or groups involved in 
the party over the past 30 years. For analytical and practical reasons, the samples leaned more 
heavily towards actors at the centre of the parties’ education policy processes and actors involved 
relatively recently (in the 1990s and 2000s). Forty-one interviews were conducted. Given the 
limited availability of secondary literature for the Austrian case, the analysis of SPÖ policy 
processes depended on interviews more heavily than the English case. I therefore interviewed 26 
people in Austria: a broad range of actors within and outside the party. Due to the much more 
comprehensive availability of written sources in England – including those authored by core 
actors themselves – the 15 interviews conducted in England were less immediately necessary to 
reconstruct policy processes; but have provided important insights into the nuances of internal 
party processes and their protagonists’ assumptive worlds. 
Interviews were conducted with three main groups of interview partners. The core group 
consisted of individuals at the centre of party education policy, such as education secretaries, 
ministers and their political staff (advisers and civil servants); parliamentary spokespeople; and 
members of party think tanks. The second group consisted of a wider group of actors who had 
been involved in or tried to influence internal party debates on education policy, such as teacher 
representatives, education policy activists and representatives of other affiliated societies or 
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organisations around the party. The third (and most heterogeneous) group was selected for 
additional insight into national education policy debates and the role of the parties therein. In 
Austria, this group included representatives of the two other parties (ÖVP and the Green Party), 
the Gymnasium teacher union (with Christian Democratic affiliation) and the Federation of 
Industrialists, all of which provided important background understanding of the political dynamics 
in Austrian education politics. In England, this group included two Scottish Labour education 
policymakers to assess the relevance of Scottish education policy and debates to Labour’s 
education policy in England. In both countries a small number of education experts were 
interviewed; some of these had been involved as advisers in party or government education 
policy while others were external observers.  
Interview candidates were identified from the secondary literature and newspaper 
coverage as well as through recommendations from other interviewees. Snowballing provided 
an important tool to gain a more complete picture of the ‘universe’ of relevant actors involved in 
policy processes behind the scenes. In addition, recommendations (or discouragement) from 
other actors gave useful insights into different political communities within the parties.  
Interviews took place in May and June 2015 in Austria, and in October and November 
2015 in England, with a few interviews taking place during 2016. Interviewees were initially 
contacted by email or phone. In most cases, access was immediately granted; in some cases, 
following up or recommendations from other actors were necessary. A few potential interviewees 
declined or did not respond even after follow-ups; in these cases, information from written 
sources and other interviews generally provided sufficient information for the analysis. Interview 
duration was generally around 60 minutes, with the shortest interview lasting for 25 minutes and 
a few extending 2 hours. Almost all interviews took place in person, usually at interviewees’ 
workplaces; in Vienna, they frequently took place in coffee houses. For logistical reasons, three 
interviews took place via phone and one via email. All but two interviews were tape-recorded and 
transcribed by myself; two interviews were not recorded and written notes were taken. The 
Austrian interview quotes (and other quotes in German presented in this thesis) were translated 
to English by myself (giving priority to conveying particular expressions rather than linguistic style 
in the translation). 
Respondents were provided with information about the research project and, upon 
request, with a more detailed interview schedule before the interviews. Given different customs, 
consent procedures varied across countries. In Austria, verbal consent was given on tape, while 
interviewees in England signed consent forms. Procedures for attribution of interviewees’ quotes 
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differed according to the position of the interviewees. In the case of the key actors involved in 
party processes, the anonymity of the quotes would have been not only difficult to achieve but 
also unconducive to the narrative. In these eight cases, quotes were then sent for authorisation, 
which resulted in some cases in minor linguistic changes and clarifications or a moderation in 
tone and occasionally in less candid expression of opinions compared to the original. Other 
interviewees, who were chosen for their function as representatives of wider groups or had less-
prominent positions, are not named in the quotes. These individuals were provided with the 
opportunity to request to authorise the quote from their interviews, which most did not request. 
3.3.2.2 Interview topics and conduct 
The group of actors interviewed was highly heterogeneous in terms of their positions and 
relevance in the policy-making process over time and across countries. Interview schedules were 
therefore individually prepared and highly personalised to probe particular episodes and events 
in which actors participated in greater depth. However, interview schedules also contained some 
common ground to gain insights into different interpretations of common issues and to cross-
check different accounts of events and processes. Three main types of questions were asked, 
which related to policy interpretation, internal party policy processes and the external dimension 
of the party’s policy, with varying sub-topics in relation to specific policy events or debates: 
 Policy aspirations and preferences: Their opinion on comprehensive schooling (meaning, 
support and doubts, relative importance) and questions on related school policy issues 
(e.g. school governance, choice, diversity, curriculum, private schools, grammar 
schools/Gymnasium); problems, strengths and weaknesses in education in general; wider 
education policy aims; and the relevance of education policy to social-democratic parties. 
 Internal party processes of policy formulation and contestation: Their views on the main 
drivers of policy- and decision-making procedures; the sources of ideas and policy; the 
scope of opinions in the party and relationships between different factions; and key 
struggles and their outcomes. 
 External dimension: Their views on the opportunities and barriers arising from the parties’ 
participation in policy-making and elections, in particular their perception of relevant 
political allies and veto players (parties, interest groups, etc.), voters, public opinion and 
the media, as well as the roles of experts, research and international discourses 
(depending on the interviewee). 
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The interviews were based on a list of questions and probes tailored to each interviewee. 
However, the interviews were flexible as to the order of themes and to allow interviewees to bring 
up new topics, which was a frequent occurrence and generally useful.  
Compared to other forms of interviewing, interviewing political elites has the advantage 
that they tend to be experienced in talking freely about policy issues and comfortable in speaking 
about their personal views and their role in the policy process. However, politicians are also skilled 
at taking control over conversations, dodging questions and giving ‘rehearsed, sometimes 
platitudinous, replies’ (Gewirtz and Ozga, 1994: 194). The issue most frequently stressed in the 
literature on interviewing elites is unequal power relations, although different perspectives exist 
on the actual extent of different groups of elites’ power and authority, and the implications for 
interviewing (see e.g. Harvey, 2011; Grek, 2011; Smith, 2006).  
The actors interviewed for this research varied considerably in their levels of authority, 
experience and confidence. The most senior policy figures were generally quite relaxed and 
comfortable in speaking about their opinions, policy processes and even past mistakes. 
Representatives of interest groups were often more reluctant and careful in answering questions. 
Among the core party actors interviewed, most had retired or moved on to other positions but 
maintained an interest in education policy developments. This group of retired actors tended to 
be the most candid and outspoken in the interviews and seemed to welcome the opportunity to 
reflect on past processes, their contributions and disappointments (similar experiences have been 
reported by Selwyn, 2013 and Ball, 1994). There were a few problems regarding memory gaps 
and some obvious instances where past events were interpreted from current viewpoints, which 
is never fully avoidable and a few interviewees themselves highlighted. Most interviewees were 
quite comfortable talking about different opinions and conflict in the party and education policy 
in general, which sometimes even included outright gossiping. Only on a few occasions were 
statements requested to be ‘off the record’. Attempts to present themselves in a good light were 
common, as were self-critical assessments.  
A common issue in interviews are struggles over control of the interview agenda. 
However, as Grek (2011) highlights, power imbalances in interview situations can be used for 
analytical purposes. Being perceived as a young and ‘harmless’ researcher, one is frequently told 
‘how things work here’, along with other ‘didactic’ performances from interviewees that reveal 
underlying agendas and narratives in education policy (Grek, 2011: 238). I frequently heard ‘you 
might not know this about England/Austria…’ or ‘this might be different where you come from’, 
followed by rich explanations and justifications of particular practices of common understandings. 
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However, thorough preparation for each interview was crucial to not only put this didactic 
exercise into perspective but also make sure this did not crowd out other themes I wanted to 
explore. While interviewees were generally willing to go beyond rehearsed stories once I 
demonstrated background knowledge on particular issues or events, on some occasions I was 
less successful.  
3.4 Data analysis 
This research adopted a constructivist perspective to the analysis of political processes and 
political actors’ policy preferences (Hay, 2008). It understood actors’ preferences as related to 
external conditions and the constraints arising from the political structure, but nevertheless as 
ultimately socially and discursively constructed. Actors’ preferences are therefore ‘perceived’ 
interests influenced by ideational and discursive frames of reference (Hay, 2002: 25), and action 
is affected by ‘the meanings that particular groups of people developed to interpret and organize 
their identities, relationships, and environment’ (Parsons, 2010: 80). Institutions are not objectively 
given but ‘meaningful social constructs’ (Parsons, 2010: 81) that shape power balances between 
actors, providing certain opportunities and constraints for political action; but they are also 
constructs internal to actors, influencing actors’ beliefs about and interpretations of desirable 
course of action (Moses and Knutsen, 2012: 148; Schmidt, 2008). While actors’ interpretations and 
actions are not entirely voluntarist, political processes are complex, lending themselves ‘to many 
interpretations that open endless options for human agency’ (Béland and Cox, 2010: 11). The 
starting point for the empirical analysis was therefore actors’ interpretations (or ‘assumptive 
worlds’; Marshall et al., 1985; McPherson and Raab, 1988); their identities and preferences; the 
problems they wish to address and the policy solutions they see as desirable; and the 
opportunities and constraints they perceive for doing so. It aimed to uncover situated, context-
specific explanations by interpreting the motives of actors from the accounts they provide 
(Flyvbjerg, 2006: 222; Moses and Knutsen, 2012: 222; Parsons, 2010: 93). Acknowledging the 
importance of political and educational contexts to providing particular opportunities or 
constraints for political action, it is ultimately through actors’ interpretation that such 
opportunities and constraints become meaningful for understanding political action and 
processes (Moses and Knutsen, 2012: 191).  
The analysis therefore followed a two-stage approach: 1) two case studies involving 
thematic analysis and process tracing, followed by 2) a comparative discussion.   
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3.4.1 Case studies: thematic analysis and process tracing 
The analysis of the two case studies involved both a thematic analysis of policy meanings and 
tracing the processes through which policy was formed within the two parties. 
3.4.1.1 Thematic analysis: the meaning of comprehensive schooling 
First, a thematic analysis of comprehensive schooling policy was undertaken to assess 
interpretations of this policy (beyond the principle of non-selection) in each case, as well as its 
shifting meanings over time. Given the analytical emphasis on the processes through which 
different understandings and policies came about, the thematic analysis did not engage in 
systematic, in-depth textual or discursive analyses. The aim was rather to uncover and map 
dominant and shared meanings in the party, changes to those meanings and contending 
interpretations between important groups in the party. Policy documents such as party 
manifestos showed the ‘official’ or collectively agreed interpretations of policy, while interviews 
provided individual opinions and information on shared attitudes in the party. These sources were 
coded with qualitative data analysis software (NVIVO) to map: 
 policy goals; 
 policy dimensions (e.g. selection, internal differentiation, curriculum, governance); and 
 support vs. doubts and justifications (including the relevance of education policy / 
comprehensive schooling for the party’s wider goals). 
To gain a more in-depth understanding of the shifts in thinking on education policy, attitudes to 
related education policies (e.g. grammar schools/Gymnasium/vocational education) and 
fundamental questions in education policy (e.g. on the rights and responsibilities of the state, the 
market and the individual) were also coded. The coding process entailed a considerable degree 
of iteration, starting from key policy dimensions identified in the literature and complemented by 
themes emerging from the empirical material (e.g. the notion of ‘school ethos’ in England). The 
parallel empirical investigation of the two cases also enabled the capturing of silences, as well as 
themes relevant to one case but not the other.  
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3.4.1.2 Process tracing: the formation of preferences 
The main part of the within-case analyses involved tracing processes of policy formation within 
the two parties. As a first step, based on detailed historical timelines (created with the aid of 
secondary literature, newspaper sources and party documents), long periods of gradual evolution 
were distinguished from tipping points at which attitudes and policies shifted (e.g. 1995/96 or 
2005/06 for Labour; the early 2000s for the SPÖ). References to these events were then 
scrutinised further in the interviews and the written sources (as discussed above) to gain further 
insights into interactions between different party actors; their motivations, tacit assumptions and 
perceptions of internal and external constraints or opportunities; and their strategies for 
influencing party policy. A particular emphasis was given to investigating the processes by which 
collectively endorsed party documents (analysed in the thematic analysis; see above) were 
created and negotiated.  
Process tracing enables the study of how processes unfold in particular multi-layered 
contexts and how deeply embedded institutional legacies affect political actors’ beliefs and 
choices, leading to a diversity of responses to similar challenges (Falleti and Lynch, 2009: 1157). It 
pays attention to the temporal context (the timing and sequence of events) and is therefore 
particularly useful in uncovering ‘critical junctures’ and path dependence, or ‘the repercussions 
of early events on subsequent and possibly historically distant outcomes’ (Mahoney and Villegas, 
2009: 78). Although process tracing is frequently used in historical-comparative research from 
positivist or critical realist perspectives, which aim to uncover causal mechanisms and test theory 
(Bennett and Checkel, 2015; Hall, 2013), its potential for constructivist political research has been 
recognized e.g. in Moses and Knutsen (2012: 225). 
Piecing together the multiple actors, ideas and interactions into an analytical narrative 
involved a considerable amount of iteration: between theory and data, and between the 
observations made across the two cases. A key insight from the empirical investigation was the 
importance of the internal party dimension for understanding evolving party policy. The analytical 
framework presented in Chapter 2 therefore did not preceded the analysis but largely emanated 
from this iteration, and from trying to make sense of the findings in both cases. Using the 
interaction between parties’ internal and external dimensions proved a workable framework to 
delineate and account for different motivations and interactions within the party, as well as the 
different political, discursive and educational systems in which they took place.  
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3.4.2 Comparative analysis 
In the second stage, comparative analysis explored the ‘common phenomenon in its multiple 
manifestations’ in different contexts (Moses and Knutsen, 2012), building on the parallel empirical 
investigation of the two cases. This involved contrasting the meanings of comprehensive 
schooling policy, patterns in the processes through which policy was formed, and reflections on 
the wider context in which they took place. While the two within-case analyses (presented in 
chapters 4 and 5) emphasised chronology and individual actors’ perception and agency, the joint 
discussion of their findings (Chapter 6) gave greater emphasis to shared elements (in their 
different manifestations) across cases, as well as the influence of political institutions, the 
discursive climate and education policy feedback effects.  
Rather than a term-by-term comparison (which follows the logic of an experiment to 
isolate causal factors), the comparative analysis in this research served to create an encounter or 
dialogue between two cases; observations and particularities in each case served as prompts to 
interrogate the other, opening up an ‘arena of reflection’ (Freeman and Mangez, 2013). The aim 
of this comparative discussion is not to provide generalisable explanations for the evolution of 
social-democratic parties’ education policy across the two cases, or even beyond. However, 
looking at two contrasting cases illuminates our understanding of shared ambitions and 
challenges for comprehensive schooling policy, as well as the particular meanings and processes 
underpinning education policy in different countries. It hopes to shed more light into how two 
political parties with relatively similar social bases and ideological roots have evolved differently 
in their educational thinking and policy strategies. It also highlights the variety of meanings that 
comprehensive schooling can embody and the tacit, taken-for-granted assumptions in political 
debates within each case – without restricting them to a parsimonious measure of party 
‘preference’. The two case studies also allowed for reflection on the complex interplay between 
context and actors and between the roles of political institutions, discursive climates and 
educational legacies – and how they shape and are shaped by political actors – without producing 
a simple answer to the relative influence of each ‘factor’. Aware of the risk of satisfying neither 
the desire for nuance sought among case-study advocates nor the desire for elegance sought by 




3.4.3 Issues in combining case studies and comparative analysis 
As discussed above, this study adopted a ‘bottom up’ research strategy, starting with the 
‘assumptive worlds’ of the key actors involved in processes of collective preference formation 
before situating these processes within wider national, temporal and finally comparative contexts. 
Such cross-national analysis always involves tension between exploring socially and culturally 
embedded meanings and the need for more generic concepts that travel across borders and 
make the analysis intelligible (Hantrais, 2009). Conducting two case studies in parallel reduced 
the depth in which each analysis could engage (or that can be presented in a thesis). Neither can 
such an analysis represent the full range of attitudes or interactions in the processes studied. It 
necessarily treats the cases as the representation of a particular empirical phenomenon, to some 
degree, which hides some elements while emphasising others. However, while this account 
cannot fully do justice to context-specific meanings, the implicit dialogue involved in this cross-
national study was a major source of discovering such meanings in the first place. Conducting 
parallel case studies was particularly useful in teasing out what is special about each case and 
what are more common and shared concerns. The process of going back and forth between 
different cultural and political settings seems particularly fruitful for stumbling over and making 
sense of tacit assumptions about ‘normality’ in education and policies, within both the ‘other’ 
context and one’s own. As Hopkins argues, cross-national research ‘brings a sense of perspective 
to a familiar environment and discourages parochial responses to political issues’ (Hopkin, 2002: 
249), which helps to avoid reifying national traditions and their uniformity (Rose, 1991: 541). 
Political processes do not occur independently from the interpretations of political actors 
who participate in them or of those who observe them. A particular value of case studies is that 
they allow attention to the specific and varied meanings of policy and careful tracing of how 
political processes unfold in specific historical and national contexts. There is never just one ‘true’ 
narrative of how policies are made or how party opinions shift; policy-making is inherently 
contested, and tensions between different accounts of ‘what really happened’ are unavoidable. 
This research obtained accounts from a variety of perspectives and opinions within the parties 
via interviews and other sources of evidence, attempting as far as possible to cross-check 
accounts of policy events by triangulating sources. Although it sought to triangulate different 
sources and accounts, in some cases not enough material existed or materials could not be 
obtained in the required timeframe; in these cases events could not be fully corroborated, 
meaning that some claims are more tentative than others.  
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Finally, there is always a degree of tension in social research between the interpretations 
and justifications given by the actors studied and those of the researcher. While I am not a 
member of any political party and no personal connections to either of these parties existed 
previous to this research in case of the Labour Party or were used to gain access to interviewees 
in case of the SPÖ, it is impossible to prevent personal political opinions from influencing 
research. However, while a personal concern over educational inequalities have stimulated my 
interest in the issue of comprehensive schooling, the complexity of the issues involved in this 
debate also helped to question my own implicit assumptions about the desirability of particular 
policies throughout this investigation. A certain detachedness of this analysis from this question 
was also facilitated through the main interest of this research was not in evaluating the policy of 
comprehensive schooling, but in uncovering how political actors have come to think in particular 
ways about this issue. The analysis therefore attempted to take actors’ assumptive worlds, 
understandings of comprehensive schooling policy and interpretations of the contexts they found 
themselves in as the starting points of the investigation. Without claiming to provide a more 
truthful account of these processes than the actors involved, through engaging with different 
sources across contexts, as well as with the theoretical literature, this account aims to add a 






Chapter 4. The ‘modernisation’ of Labour’s school 
policy and its struggle over comprehensive schooling 
The comprehensive revolution has been a great success, probably the greatest 
success ever introduced by the Labour Party. If it is abandoned the Labour Party 
could collapse. (Hattersley quoted in Hugill, 1994)  
We did not revive the principle of selection … but in every other respect, we broke 
with the traditional comprehensive state school. We made it clear that, in time, all 
schools could and should become self-governing trusts … with far greater flexibility 
in staffing and pay, with partners from whatever sector they wished. (Blair, 2010: 575) 
Tony Blair’s election as leader of the Labour Party in 1994 initiated a profound change in the 
Labour Party’s school agenda, particularly its approach to comprehensive schooling. Blair 
announced the need for ‘modernisation’ of comprehensive schooling and, soon after, for a ‘post-
comprehensive’ era. Although New Labour remained officially opposed to selective schooling, 
the party’s new educational agenda was perceived as a clear departure from its traditional 
commitment to comprehensive schooling, the goals it stood for and the particular meaning it 
had come to embody in England since its introduction in the 1960s (Chitty, 2013; Walford, 2001; 
Tomlinson, 2005). As discussed in Chapter 1, much literature focuses on how far New Labour’s 
education policy resembled a continuity of Conservative education policy and thereby a break 
with ‘Old Labour’ education policy. The aim of this chapter is to provide a more nuanced picture 
of the interactions between different ideas and actors, at multiple sites within the party, in the 
creation and contestation of Labour education policy since the 1980s.  
The first part of this chapter provides an account of the general evolution of Labour’s 
education policy within the wider political context, starting with Labour’s long years in political 
opposition after 1979, which prepared the ground for both the profound changes in its approach 
to education policy and the internal party battles in the 1990s and 2000s. After a brief assessment 
of the nature of change in Labour’s school policy in terms of its goals and policy dimensions, the 
chapter will provide a more in-depth analysis of the interplay between actors and their 




4.1 The evolution of Labour’s policy on comprehensive schooling 
4.1.1 The Labour Party in opposition (1979–94) 
After the victory of the Conservative Party in 1979, the process of reorganising secondary 
schooling along comprehensive lines was officially ended. In the early 1980s, about 90 per cent 
of children attended comprehensive schools in the early 1980s, but 164 selective grammar schools 
had survived (Bolton, 2016).  
The Labour Party was to remain in political opposition for 18 years, during which it started 
a process of programmatic transformation that would culminate under Tony Blair in the mid-
1990s. After its electoral defeat in 1979, the Labour Party was battered by internal factional 
struggles and moved to the Left, while a faction on its right wing broke away to establish the 
Social Democratic Party (which later merged with the Liberal Party) (Thorpe, 2015). After a second 
consecutive election defeat in 1983, former shadow education secretary Neil Kinnock (1979–83) 
became party leader and stabilised the party at the centre-left. During these struggles, education 
policy was not a high priority on the party’s overall agenda (Inglis, 1991). Overall, the party’s 
aspiration remained to defend and continue with the unfinished project of comprehensive 
schooling set out in the 1960s and 1970s. However, there was also a perception that the Labour 
Party had never been entirely clear on what it meant by comprehensive schooling, and that 
previous debates had overemphasised abolishing selection: 
I used to argue … that we have to change our understanding of the word 
‘comprehensive’ in education … that what we meant by comprehensive is what 
insurance salesmen … or people offering holiday brochures mean by comprehensive, 
that is to say, ‘covers all the necessities’. But comprehensive education has been used 
as a term that means ‘everybody in’ – well that’s just a tiny part of the meaning, … 
putting everybody into the same school in the neighbourhood, that's spray on, that’s 
not comprehensive. Comprehensive is what you do in the school. (Neil Kinnock, 
interview, 2015) 
Our education policy, two aspects really, one was trying to resist the effect of what 
the Tories were doing, financially and educationally, and a lot of energy had to go 
into that, the protest side if you like, the resistance side, and on the other side there 
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was a continuation … of the basic precepts. … [Anthony] Crosland  [previous Secretary 
of State for Education] had set as properly comprehensive education, of social 
cohesion, of education maintenance and governance … Having achieved the 
introduction of non-selective education over most of the country, [the Labour 
governments of the 1960s and 1970s] didn’t then follow it through … by saying ‘this 
is what we mean by education that is comprehensive’ and these are facilities and 
changes that we will introduce in order to bring that about … part of it was basically 
constraints, part of it was … [they] became quite content with the changes they made 
between ‘64 and ’70 … if Tony [Crosland] and Shirley [Williams] had picked up and 
pressed on, they could have made the change … but after that, we went into 
opposition for 18 bloody years with Thatcherite policies … all of that stuff. (Kinnock, 
interview, 2015) 
Among educational circles within the party, several debates and initiatives to develop a more 
encompassing understanding and framework of comprehensive schooling, including the 
curriculum and assessment to secure equal entitlements for pupils across the country, emerged 
(The Guardian, 1984; The Labour Party, 1982; Lawton, 2005: 104). However, the main impetus for 
Labour’s educational agenda in the remainder of the 1980s came from the need to respond to 
the reforming zeal of the Conservative government and, increasingly, from electoral 
considerations. After 1986, growing public concerns about the Conservative government’s 
educational cuts and conditions in schools were perceived as providing Labour with an 
opportunity to use education as an electoral asset: 
This increased public interest in and concern about education is good news for the 
Labour Party. Not only is education a more salient issue but, in contrast to the 
position in 1983, Labour now has a big lead in the public opinion polls on education. 
... The new surge of public concern about education and about the Government’s 
handling of it has given the Labour Party a fresh opportunity to recreate a 
progressive consensus in favour of educational change. That opportunity has to be 
seized (Radice, 1986: 2–3). 
For the first time for a decade, Labour’s educational policies are likely to be a 
significant asset to the Party, because they now run not against but with the grain of 
popular opinion (Radice, 1986: 19). 
In the view of Labour’s shadow education secretary Giles Radice (1983–87), the Labour Party 
ought to claime the debate on educational standards by linking its traditional agenda of 
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comprehensive schooling, educational investment and opportunity to a new emphasis on 
parental concerns, educational standards and accountability, which had traditionally been the 
domain of Conservative educational discourse (The Labour Party, 1985; Radice, 1986). 
Comprehensive schooling was presented as crucial in providing high standards for all children, 
and was seen as running not against but ‘with the grain of popular opinion’ (Radice, 1986: 2). To 
further increase standards in education, Radice urged a new ‘framework for partnership’ to 
provide a better balance between central and local governments, and a new advisory ‘Education 
Council’ as a forum for ‘education partners’ – such as teachers and parents, experts, industry, 
unions and the inspectorate – to advise on the development of a core curriculum and an 
assessment system (Radice 1986: 17). Although the press labelled this new attention to 
educational standards as a ‘significant turn for Labour’ and its traditional approach to school 
governance (Moncur, 1985), Labour’s approach to school governance largely remained within the 
parameters of the traditional ‘partnership’ approach to school policy established in 1944; for 
example, it positioned central government as an advocate for more educational equality, but 
refrained from setting minimum provision standards through legislation.  
While Labour attempted to align its traditional agenda of comprehensive education with 
a new emphasis on standards and accountability in schooling, the Conservative government’s 
reforms, and the ideological framework in which they were embedded, transformed the English 
education system from the ground, posing fundamental challenges to educational thinking for 
the Left (Tomlinson, 2005 p. 27). Towards the 1987 General Election, public debate on education 
was dominated by the Conservative Party and its plan for a ‘Gerbil’ – the ‘Great Education Reform 
Bill’, which would become the 1988 Education Act. The electoral campaign foreshadowed 
dominant themes in educational debates to come: a National Curriculum, regular testing of 
student performance to raise standards, and strengthening parents’ role as ‘consumers’ of 
education (Hetherington, 1987). Labour education spokesperson Radice started to lose support 
from the party, especially among local councillors, for his lacklustre performance against 
Conservative education secretary Kenneth Baker’s powerful voice in the education debate (Gunn, 
1986; Wavell, 1987). 
After winning the 1987 election the Conservative government introduced the 1988 
Education Act, which fundamentally transformed educational governance in England (Ball, 1990a). 
The Act reduced the power of local governments in secondary schooling, both by increasing the 
influence of central government in terms of what was taught and tested in schools (National 
Curriculum and national testing) and by decentralising responsibilities for budgets and day-to-
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day running to individual schools (Local Management for Schools). Open enrolment, parental 
choice and a new funding formula linking the allocation of school budgets to pupil numbers were 
the first decisive steps towards the introduction of quasi-markets in the public-school system 
(Glennerster, 1991). Competition among schools was further encouraged through the publication 
of school performance data (school inspection reports, after the 1992 National Curriculum test 
results).  
The Act also introduced two new school types, which would prove highly consequential 
for future Labour policy. First, schools could choose to become grant-maintained, receiving their 
funding directly from central government and thereby opting out of local government authority. 
Until the mid-1990s, Labour’s opposition to Conservative education policy focused on this policy, 
which the party perceived as the key attack on the comprehensive principle (Labour party advisor 
on education policy, interview 2018) because it undermined local control over schooling, 
potentially created a two-tier system between schools with different funding and governance 
conditions, and enabled schools to select a small share of their intake by ability. The second new 
school type, introduced in 1988, was City Technology Colleges – state schools sponsored by 
businesses. Although only a few of these came into existence, they were to become a template 
for New Labour’s academies policy in 2000 (discussed below).  
The Labour Party responded highly critically to the Conservative government’s social and 
education policy agenda. However, after losing the third consecutive General Election in 1987 the 
party entered a period of programmatic transformation (Thorpe, 2015) Aiming to gain votes from 
the ‘upwardly mobile’ sections of the electorate – the aspirational ‘modern working classes’ 
(Kinnock, 1986: 2) – the party started to systematically evaluate its complete policy offer in terms 
of its electoral implications (the so-called ‘policy review’). Labour’s commitment to 
comprehensive schooling was not yet perceived as an electoral obstacle in need of 
‘modernisation’ (Kinnock, interview, 2015), as it would be interpreted in the mid-1990s. However, 
the emphasis on parental concerns, accountability and standards in Labour’s education policy 
became more pronounced during the process of the policy review, and increasingly visible in the 
statements of the party’s new shadow education secretary, Jack Straw (1987–92). In the education 
chapter (‘Parents in Partnership’) of the final policy review report (The Labour Party, 1989), the 
party appeared anxious not to be seen as ‘soft’ on standards. Media coverage at that time 
portrayed this shift as even more radical: 
Nothing illustrates more graphically the shift in Labour's thinking over the past eleven 
Thatcher years than the approach it is now adopting to education. Left-wing 
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buzzwords such as anti-sexist and anti-racist education, associated with the now-
defunct Labour-run Inner London Education Authority in the mid-Eighties, find no 
place in the party's prospectus for the Nineties. Instead, in words uncannily 
reminiscent of much right-wing criticism of state education since the Black Paper 
days of the late Sixties and early Seventies, the accent is on standards, accountability 
and the predominance of the consumer over the producer. (Wood, 1990) 
Impulses for this emphasis on standards also came from the Inner London Education Authority 
(ILEA). The biggest local education authority in England, the ILEA had once been the vanguard in 
the drive for comprehensive schooling; since the 1960s and 1970s it had fostered much 
development and experimentation with comprehensive admission systems, curriculum 
development and progressive teaching methods (Kerckhoff, 1996; Benn and Chitty, 1997). Largely 
Labour-controlled (except from 1967–70), it regularly came under attack as a key ‘looney-Left 
council’ by the Conservative press and government during the 1980s (Davis, 2002). In light of its 
looming break-up by the Conservative government (which occurred in 1990), ILEA leaders started 
to push forward with a more consumerist agenda than mainstream Labour thinking at the time. 
Even before the 1988 Act, Labour ILEA leaders’ suggestions for regaining public confidence in the 
public (comprehensive) school system included publishing school league tables of exam results, 
creating ‘magnet schools’ (inspired by US reforms) and introducing a more rigorous system of 
standardised testing (Bosley, 1986). ILEA-leader Fletcher also started to accuse the Labour Party 
of complacency about low standards and of privileging teachers’ needs over those of parents 
and children (Rose, 1987; Wood, 1988). While Labour’s shadow education secretary, Straw, 
officially distanced Labour’s official policy from Fletcher, many ideas appear to have found their 
way into Labour’ policy in the following years.  
The media at that time called these changes in Labour’s educational policy, driven by 
Straw and Fletcher, a ‘revolution from above’; as they did not necessarily reflect wider thinking 
among the party’s grassroots and rank-and-file (The Guardian, 10 November 1987). Teachers still 
had a strong presence in the Labour Party, but the influence of their unions and associations on 
Labour’s education policy diminished in the late 1980s (teaching union representative, interview, 
2015). Straw’s public questioning of schools’ and (indirectly) teachers’ accountability created 
frictions. The relationship between Labour and the National Union of Teachers particularly 
deteriorated in 1991, when the latter called for a boycott of curriculum tests for 7-year-olds, which 
Straw labelled ‘indefensible’ (Tytler, 1991).  
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Education policy remained high on the Labour Party’s agenda until the General Election 
in 1992. In light of polls showing growing public concerns about school standards, school policy 
was generally perceived as an electoral asset for Labour as the main opposition party (Crequer, 
1990). The main emphasis in Labour’s education policy discourse was attacking the Conservative 
government for having eroded educational standards (The Labour Party, 1991). Another key issue 
in Labour’s critique was the government’s policy of grant-maintained schools, which was accused 
of creating a two-tier system of secondary schooling and reintroducing selection ‘by the back 
door’ (Wood, 1992). Labour also called for more accountability in public schooling, which 
mirrored many of the tenets in the Conservatives’ discourse but attributed more responsibility to 
local authorities than central state involvement (e.g. local authority-driven systems of measuring 
school performance, and systems of appraisal to weed out ‘bad’ teachers). 
While the Labour Party remained supportive of comprehensive schooling as a principle, 
more fundamental debates about its goals and the means to achieve them remained largely 
restricted to educational circles. In an attempt to distance itself from the more radical debates 
about progressive teaching practices that had emerged within the comprehensive schooling 
debate, Labour’s education policy and communication in the late 1980s became even more 
strongly geared towards attempting to credibly display a concern for parental preferences and 
educational standards, increasingly adopting many elements of the Conservative education 
agenda. This trend was only briefly interrupted from 1992–94, when Labour’s education policy 
briefly retreated to more traditional confines. After Labour lost the General Election in 1992, John 
Smith replaced Neil Kinnock as party leader and the new shadow education secretary, Ann Taylor 
(1992–95), promised to revive Labour’s education strategy from the bottom up. After large-scale 
consultations with the educational community and Labour grassroots, a policy document called 
Opening Doors to a Learning Society (The Labour Party, 1994) was developed, which included a 
commitment to further develop the principle and practice of comprehensive education while 
rejecting recent Conservative reforms to school governance. It promised to abolish national tests 
and school league tables, retreat from a centrally prescribed National Curriculum and restore the 
power of local authorities. However, after party leader Smith unexpectedly died in 1994, this 
document became known as the last ‘Old Labour’ education document and was quickly shelved 
after the election of Tony Blair as party leader (Conor Ryan4, interview 2015).  
                                                     
4 Conor Ryan was senior advisor to David Blunkett from 1993-2001 and senior education advisor to 
Tony Blair from 2005-7 
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4.1.2 New Labour and the ‘modernisation’ of comprehensive schooling (1994–
2010) 
4.1.2.1 The modernisation of comprehensive schooling 
Tony Blair became party leader in 1994 on a platform promising to restore the party’s electoral 
fortunes and give it a new sense of purpose through a fundamental change in its programmatic 
orientation – a ‘Third Way’, as it was coined, between the party’s socialist past and the Tories’ 
neoliberal agenda (Thorpe, 2015). In the party’s discourse, particularly that of the party leader 
himself, education policy received unprecedented attention: 
Since I became leader of the Labour Party, I have emphasised that education will be 
a priority for me in government. I have done so because of the fact – increasingly 
recognised across our society – that our economic success and our social cohesion 
depend on it … I said that my three priorities for the government would be education, 
education and education. (Blair, 16 December 1996) 
With education policy as the cornerstone in New Labour’s discourse, Blair was quick to highlight 
that Labour would not undo the educational reforms, particularly those around school 
governance and accountability, introduced by the previous Conservative governments. While 
many of these tenets had already become part of official Labour Party education discourse in the 
late 1980s to some degree, it was the brief intermezzo in the party’s education policy between 
1992 and 1994, as well as wider attitudes among Labour members and educational circles, which 
served as the contrast to signal New Labour’s departure from Old Labour education policy:  
Labour had not yet fully reconciled itself to the changes that the Conservatives had 
brought in … I mean the challenge we had was that an education policy document 
called Opening Doors to a Learning Society had been published … [Tony Blair] was, 
to put it mildly, he was not very pleased with its contents and felt it was stodgy and 
felt that it was really not addressing sort of the voters he knew he would need to win 
in 1997 … So our task really was, I mean we said we were building on that document, 
the reality was we were fundamentally changing a lot of its principal tenets. (Ryan, 
interview, 2015) 
The programmatic bases for this reorientation, which came to underpin much of Labour’s policy 
agenda in its first two terms of government (1997–2005), were developed in the years preceding 
the 1997 General Election (The Labour Party, 1995b; The Labour Party, 1995a; The Labour Party, 
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1997). Like no party leader before, Blair became personally involved in shaping the party’s 
education policy, and kept a tight control over the agenda throughout his time as party leader 
(1994–2007). Apart from David Blunkett (Labour’s shadow education secretary after 1995), policy 
advisers were the key influences in shaping the education agenda in the early years of New 
Labour; the party’s traditional partners, such as teaching unions and LEAs, were largely excluded 
(Ball and Exley, 2010; Exley, 2012). A key influence in New Labour’s reorientation on education 
policy was Michael Barber, a former university professor, who became the main driver in the 
party’s standards and school improvement agenda. At the centre of developing the party’s 
electoral strategies, as well as much work on education policy, was David Miliband – a former 
policy analyst at the think tank the Institute for Public Policy Research (IPPR), Blair’s policy adviser 
in 1994 and later head of the Prime Minister’s Policy Unit. Important input in the early years also 
came from centre-left think tanks (such as the IPPR and Demos) and Conor Ryan (David Blunkett’s 
communication expert and later Tony Blair’s education adviser). New Labour also consulted other 
individuals, often from individual LEAs which had started to adopt innovative approaches to 
school improvement in the early 1990s (Brighouse & Bell, interviews, 2015).  
I think certainly by ‘95, ‘96 we had diagnosed the problem and we had a philosophy 
which underpinned, … a lot of Blairite education policy [of the following two terms in 
government]. (Ryan, interview, 2015) 
In 1994, ‘95, ‘96, everyone knew that Tony Blair was going to be a very different 
Labour politician, everyone knew that New Labour wanted to do something really 
quite dramatic on education … Labour came into power on 1 May [1997] and 
everything started on the next day, there was no gap, everything was brilliantly 
prepared … New Labour was pretty good joining in a lot of people … it was a kind of 
intellectual hothouse … There was a New Labour education project and you might 
say that the education project was the best developed of all the New Labour projects 
when Labour came to power. (David Bell, interview, 2015) 
What would become the educational agenda that underpinned post-1997 school reforms in 
Labour governments was first set out in the documents Diversity and Excellence (The Labour Party, 
1995a) and, after its adoption at the party conference, Excellence for Everyone (The Labour Party, 
1995b). While the title of these documents deliberately alluded to previous Conservative 
education rhetoric (e.g. the 1992 white paper Choice and Diversity), New Labour’s education 
agenda reiterated some of Labour’s traditional promises, such as to end scholarships for low-
income families to attend private schools (the Assisted Places Scheme) and bring grant-
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maintained schools back under the local authority fold. However, as ‘foundation schools’, these 
schools would still enjoy large freedoms from local control, such as responsibility for their own 
assets and hiring of staff, and large autonomy in their admissions. In addition, the documents 
endorsed the principles of ‘local management of schools’, calling LEA control of schools ‘a thing 
of the past’ (The Labour Party, 1995a: 11). Crucially, while the documents reiterated the party’s 
formal opposition to academic selection at age 11, it announced that a Labour government would 
not abolish existing grammar schools through legislation without the support of parents affected 
(The Labour Party, 1995a: 11). Endorsing the key tenets of the previous Conservative education 
agenda around choice and competition (e.g. the publication of league tables) and wishing to 
‘move on’ from the ideological debates of the past, in particular about the remaining grammar 
schools, New Labour also announced the need to ‘modernise’ comprehensive schooling (Blair, 
1995) (discussed below). The changes to core tenets of the party’s education policy announced 
in Diversity and Excellence produced considerable unrest within the wider party; its adoption at 
the party conference resulted in ‘one of the closest votes in the Blair era’ and ‘the last really tough 
pre-election debate that we had at the Labour Party conference’ (Ryan, interview 2015) (further 
discussed below).  
After winning a landslide victory in the 1997 General Election, David Blunkett became 
education secretary, Michael Barber became head of the new Standards and Effectiveness Unit 
in the Department for Education and Employment, and David Miliband became head of Tony 
Blair’s policy unit. An important influence also came from Cyril Taylor, who had advised the 
previous Conservative government on City Technology Colleges and became a key adviser on 
the policy of specialist schools (Exley, 2012). Finally, former journalist Andrew Adonis became 
Blair’s education policy adviser (and, in 2001, Head of the Policy Unit) and the main architect of 
the academies policy. 
At the centre of Labour’s discourse on schools in its first term of government (1997–2001) 
was its ‘zero tolerance’ approach to failing schools, including exchanging the leadership or closing 
schools that did not improve (‘Fresh Start’) (DfEE, 1997). Labour endorsed the previous 
Conservative governments’ ‘accountability’ agenda and continued controversial policies such as 
national testing, publishing school league tables and school inspections. The most visible 
continuity was the retaining of Chris Woodhead, controversial chief school inspector of the 
previous Conservative government. The centralisation of powers at the Department for Education 
increased, leading to further marginalisation of local authorities and teachers’ professional 
autonomy in day-to-day teaching. Underpinning these policies and discourses was a general loss 
93 
 
of trust in the ability of educational practitioners – both teachers and LEAs – to deliver good 
education.  
While New Labour’s modernisers officially held on to their opposition to educational 
selection, they were unified in their perception that comprehensive schooling needed ‘a big 
shake-up’ (Ryan, interview, 2015). This was embedded in a wider discourse and policy agenda, 
executed during the first two terms of government, of ‘tackling school failure’ and raising 
standards of achievement. In a speech at the conservative think tank Social Market Foundation 
in 1996, David Blunkett set out the agenda for this modernisation, which he justified through the 
failure of comprehensive schooling to achieve its aspirations: 
In spite of … 30 years of comprehensive education, the pattern of excellence at the 
top, and chronic underperformance at the bottom persists. Too many commentators 
associate comprehensives with the worst features of secondary moderns ... not 
without justification in too many cases … Our commitment to comprehensive 
education cannot be a commitment to continued mediocrity, to sameness or to 
tolerance of failure. Ours is a vision of a very different future, offering the opportunity 
to the many rather than to the few. (Blunkett quoted in Charter and Sherman, 1996).  
Shortly after being elected, the Labour government published a white paper setting out its new 
educational agenda, including the aim for ‘modernisation of comprehensive schooling’ (DfEE, 
1997). This critique of comprehensive schooling combined different strands of argumentation, 
including that such schooling hadn’t overcome inequality and disadvantage, and that it had 
undermined both parental choice and incentives for schools to develop an ‘ethos of excellence’: 
Although I’m a great believer in comprehensive education … the truth was that it 
hadn’t by itself brought about the transformation that we wanted… so in the sixties 
the Labour Party felt that, to put it very simplistically, if every secondary school was 
a comprehensive school, that would probably solve the problem, by the early nineties 
we had understood that that wasn’t the case so we were looking for different policies 
in order to raise standards. (Estelle Morris, interview, 2015) 
Patronising those who live in deprived urban environments with an expectation of 
failure will not help my constituents or those in other working-class areas to escape 
the poverty trap – as it would not have helped me. High standards of education … 
are vital … There is one C word which is anathema to Labour's education policy: 
complacency. I make no apologies for that. (Blunkett, 9 March 1996) 
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I think there was another feeling that there was a sameness about them, that they 
were a bit monolithic, that they were too big, that they didn’t allow schools to have 
their own ethos and their own identity, that is very much the prime minister of the 
time Tony Blair’s view. (Morris, interview, 2015) 
Comprehensive schooling was presented having failed to transfer ‘the best of the grammar 
school education’, ‘academic scholarship’ and rigour into the comprehensive system. These were 
presented as key reasons why comprehensive reorganisation had not resulted in a more far-
reaching transformation of the system (David Blunkett, interview, 2016): 
The way comprehensives were introduced and grammar schools abandoned was 
pretty close to academic vandalism… grammar schools (selective but also excellent) 
were changed into comprehensives (non-selective and frequently non-excellent, and 
on occasions truly dire). (Blair, 2010: 579) 
New Labour’s reformers linked the ‘failure’ of comprehensive schooling to the model of school 
governance that underpinned this policy in England. Local government was seen as having ‘never 
really addressed issues of school standards’, as they were frequently driven by the ‘vested’ 
interests of local bureaucrats and teaching unions that prevented educational innovation and 
competition between schools (Bell, interview 2015): 
We were never in favour of selection … but we felt that comprehensive education 
needed a big shake-up and that was what underpinned some of the programmes 
that we were doing, whether it was Excellence in Cities or London Challenge or the 
academies programme. It was all about saying, we are going to have non-selective 
schools but just leaving them with a local authority as they are at present, generally 
speaking, wasn’t doing the job. (Ryan, interview, 2015) 
Fatally, the comprehensive principle became confused with dogmatic attachment to 
a bureaucratic model of school governance which institutionalised weak and 
unambitious school leadership. Comprehensives failed on governance … Among the 
worst was the Inner London Education Authority (ILEA) … whose sweeping ambitions, 
vast bureaucracy and intense ideological debates did little to remedy the deep and 
deplorable failure of most of its comprehensives. (Adonis, 2012: 20) 
The conservative Left had spent generations attacking private schools, ‘elitism’ and 
underfunding as the causes of England’s educational ills … But when it came to 
reform of the comprehensive itself, and the local education bureaucracies which had 
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sustained failing comprehensives for decades, [they denounced] virtually any change 
besides an increase in education spending … [There was a] sad lack of knowledge of 
the real world of comprehensives and council estates … What was needed was a 
fundamentally new approach to secondary education … which was Blairism at its best. 
(Adonis, 2012: 36–7) 
New Labour’s response to the perceived uniformity and low standards in comprehensive schools 
was to increase ‘diversity’ – first through a return to internally differentiating pupils (grouping and 
setting by ability) instead of mixed-ability teaching, which was justified as necessary to take 
account of children’s different abilities, stretch them accordingly, allow for different speeds of 
learning and therefore increase standards (Labour Party, 1997; DfEE, 1997: 38). Within the 
specialist school programme, which built on the idea of City Technology Technologies introduced 
in 1988, schools were also encouraged to develop different curricular specialisms and profiles and 
to seek private-sector sponsors (DfEE, 1997; DfES, 2003). Some New Labour reformers thought 
diversity within and between schools should focus on the need of schools to cater to individual 
learners, meeting the ‘needs and aspirations of all children’ (Blunkett, 15 March 2000); others, 
such as Blair and Adonis, emphasised the role diversity for allowing parents to choose and 
therefore pressuring schools to improve. Overall, competition between schools was seen as 
crucial in creating incentives for schools to improve standards of teaching and pupil performance: 
The diverse system we want to build will be one where schools differ markedly from 
each other in the particular contribution they choose to make but where all are 
equally excellent in giving their students a broad curriculum and the opportunity to 
achieve high standards. Far from concentrating success in a few schools, diversity is 
about motivating individual schools, spreading excellence, sharing success and 
working collaboratively. This is at the heart of specialist schools. (DfEE, 1997: 38)  
(Is there a future for comprehensive schooling?) Yes, but in an entirely new way … you 
get a better mix of intake into a school through … improvement; … specialisation; … 
making sure that you play to the strength of the child in the school; … setting, not 
necessarily streaming; … outer school activities; … tutors. … Nurture the excellence 
for children who can benefit from it, and let’s deal with those who have got big 
challenges and special needs … So in a sense going back to the whole essence of 
education, which … should be pupil-based, … develop the system around the needs 
of the child, rather than fitting the child into the system. That to me would be truly 
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comprehensive education. That within the same campus, you have a whole range of 
opportunities … [and] working together with other schools. (Blunkett, interview 2016) 
Linked to diversity and competition between schools, another key ingredient for school 
improvement was seen as a change in the ‘culture’ within schools. Much of New Labour’s 
discourse and measures to strengthen school ethos reverted to features traditionally associated 
with the independent school sector and grammar schools, such as a ‘powerful sense of excellence, 
tradition and purpose’ (Adonis, 2012: 23). A new school ethos, building on strong school 
leadership, high expectations for pupils and ‘healthy’ competition between both schools and 
pupils (former school minister, interview, 2015), would raise standards and increase the schools’ 
appeal with parents (DfES, 2003).  
Part of the turning around of weak schools was having a culture in the school that 
was about learning, that was disciplined, that kids are not going to be distracted all 
the time by bad behaviour, quite often having a uniform because that sort of gave a 
sense of belonging to a particular school and in disadvantaged areas actually that 
was often quite a big thing just to bring a uniform in. … The idea of the house system 
… vertical tutoring system … you got a bit of a healthy competition between the 
houses within a school, so there were just various ways of really just trying to 
recognise that in private schools … ethos is quite important, it is not just the exam 
results, there is a sense that there are various skills that you gain, social skills, team 
building, and so on and actually trying to get a sort of sense of purpose in the schools 
and the schools that were more successful were the ones that got that ethos right as 
well as getting the exam results. (Ryan, interview, 2015) 
In addition, a strong ethos around discipline and standards was seen as necessary in overcoming 
the ‘culture of complacency’ and low expectations of teachers towards the educational potential 
of working-class children, which had ‘perpetrated social divisions’ (Blunkett, 1995).  
During Labour’s first term in government, these ideas about diversity, competition and 
ethos primary became embedded in its specialist schools programme. Out of the specialist school 
programme and several previous initiatives targeted at failing inner-city schools emerged the 
academy schools policy, Labour’s cornerstone for the ‘post-comprehensive era’ (Blair quoted in 
Woodward, 2001). Academies were announced in 2000 and introduced with the Education Act 
2002. Academy schools would take over failing schools in deprived areas and were independent 
of local authorities. They were funded based on individual funding arrangements with central 
government, and were to be sponsored by a private-sector actor – in the early academies, often 
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local businesses. Academies received extensive freedoms in the running of the school (including 
relating to staff and pay), their admissions and the curriculum (West, 2014). The academies’ 
freedoms, private-sector sponsorship and (in the case of the early academies) new school 
buildings were expected to contribute to turning the schools around and attracting local middle-
class parents, who had previously avoided local schools. From the start, Andrew Adonis, who 
developed the programme and pushed for its expansion, envisaged academies as a radical 
departure from comprehensive schooling (Adonis, 2012): 
Academies were born of the failure of comprehensivization to achieve its goals. For 
all the idealism of their pioneers, a large proportion of comprehensives were little 
better than the secondary modern schools they replaced and very few were highly 
successful. The key objective of academies was to replace failing and ‘bog standard’ 
comprehensives … with successful all-ability schools, founded and managed on a 
different and better basis. (Adonis, 2012: 11) 
What these ‘secondary modern comprehensives’ required wasn’t an incremental 
improvement but fundamental reinvention. They needed to be closed and replaced 
by schools with a fundamentally new and better ethos, new and better governance, 
new and better leadership, … teaching, … curriculum, …. Facilities, …. extra-curricular 
activities, … parental and community engagement. The schools to replace ‘secondary 
modern comprehensives’ needed to be strong, self-confident institutions, not council 
bureaucracies in school buildings. And these new schools need a missionary zeal to 
transform educational standards and aspirations in their localities. (Adonis, 2012: 23) 
During its time in government, New Labour also gradually reduced the role of local authorities in 
regulating school admissions. This included both increasing parental choice and expanding the 
share of those schools with power over their own admissions (first the foundation schools, then 
academies and other types of school). Schools were expected to adhere to a non-binding ‘Code 
for Practice’ for Schools admissions in 1998, which banned selection by ability,5 but New Labour 
remained very reluctant to regulate admissions in a more comprehensive and statutory manner 
                                                     
5 The remaining grammar schools, and a few other schools that had partially selective admissions before the 
1998 Act, were allowed to continue with their selective admissions. In addition, specialist schools were allowed 
to select 10% of their intake by ‘aptitude’ in their given specialism, but few schools chose to do so (Coldron 
et al., 2009). 
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(West and Pennell, 2002: 210). As a former (early 1990s) adviser to New Labour’s education team 
recalls: 
If you allow every school to have its own admissions arrangements, how can you 
secure equity for everybody? … they are mutually exclusive. But they have never been 
willing to tackle admissions. They are all trying to make the code fairer and we had 
endless arguments … and in the end, they didn’t make the code fairer … it’s always 
been a battle. (Tim Brighouse, interview, 2015) 
4.1.2.2 Beyond modernisation 
Much of New Labour’s initial school policy discourse focused on standards and school 
improvement through increasing diversity, choice and competition within a system of 
comprehensive education perceived as too uniform and frequently failing to achieve high 
standards. Towards Labour’s third term in government from 2005-2010, the emphasis of its school 
policy agenda shifted towards a more radical reform of school and public service governance, 
aiming to blur the divide between the private and public sectors (Blair, 2010: 210–2). This agenda 
included a move away from the strong central state involvement that had characterised New 
Labour’s early initiatives to tackle school failure. Independence was presented as an even more 
crucial ingredient for the development of school ‘ethos’ and excellence, mirroring the perceived 
successes of private schools and the remaining grammar schools. In Blair’s view, the success of 
these schools was due to not only their selective intakes but also their independence: 
They have an acute sense of ethos and identity. They have strong leadership, and 
are allowed to lead. … They innovate because no one tells them they can’t. They 
pursue excellence. And – here is a major factor – they assume excellence is attainable 
… failure … is their fault … not the fault of ‘the system’, ‘the background of the children’ 
or ‘the inadequacy of the parents’. (Blair, 2010: 579) 
This agenda, driven strongly by Tony Blair himself and Andrew Adonis as his key adviser, 
led to the proposal of ‘independent specialist schools’ (DfES, 2004; The Labour Party, 2005) and 
culminated in the proposal for trust schools and the highly controversial white paper Higher 
Standards, Better Schools for All (DfES, 2005). The white paper announced that all schools were to 
become ‘independent state schools’, free from local authority control and run by a non-profit 
making trust, which could be third sector actors and/or commercial actors (on a non-profit basis). 
Like academies, trust schools would receive extensive freedoms in their management of budgets, 
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assets, staff, curriculum and – crucially – admissions. The traditional role of the local authorities 
as a ‘provider of education’ was reduced to being the ‘commissioner’ for education, as well as 
‘the champion of parent choice’ (DfES, 2005: 1). While the 2005 white paper announced some 
measures to improve ‘choice’ for less advantaged parents, such as choice advisers and transport 
subsidies, it insisted that schools needed to develop their own approach to ‘fair admissions’, 
within the precepts of the ‘Code of Practice’ on admissions.  
The white paper raised considerable discontent among not only long-standing critics of 
New Labour’s education agenda but also considerable parts of the Parliamentary Labour Party 
and former ‘modernisers’, leading to ‘fierce internal arguments’ even among the Blair’s closest 
staff (Blair, 2010: 579). After heated inner-party struggles during much of 2005 (further discussed 
below), and in light of a looming rebellion among Labour MPs, some concessions were made 
around school admissions and the power of local authorities. Still, the vote following the third 
reading of the 2006 Education and Inspections Act produced the biggest parliamentary rebellion 
among Labour MPs under Blair’s premiership, and the Act could only be adopted with the support 
of the Conservative Party.  
In 2007, Gordon Brown succeeded Tony Blair as prime minister and leader of the Labour 
Party, but no major initiatives followed in school policy until 2010. Academies were made to follow 
the National Curriculum for the main subjects, and the range of possible sponsors was expanded 
to include universities, charities, faith groups and even local authorities (West, 2014). Although 
Brown had been more sceptical of the academies programme and, during his term as Chancellor 
of the Exchequer, reluctant to release further funding, the expansion of the academies continued 
after 2007;6 by May 2010, 203 schools had become academies (Long, 2015). After Labour lost the 
General Election in 2010, the academy programme was continued and expanded by 
Conservative-led governments (Avis 2011; Hatcher 2011; Ball 2013).  
                                                     
6 Some sources indicate that Brown had, over time, become convinced over the merits of academies (former 
schools minister, Interview 2015) – a view also held by Adonis himself (Adonis, 2012) – while others indicate 
that a deal was struck between Blair and Brown that linked Blair’s resignation as prime minister to Brown’s 
support of the academy program (Vaughan, 2009). 
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4.1.3 Continuity and change in Labour’s comprehensive schooling policy 
As discussed in the next section, Labour’s support for comprehensive schooling in the 1960s had 
emerged from, and built on, an uneasy consensus between several strands of intellectual 
traditions, educational practice and electoral considerations, as well as a considerable degree of 
pragmatic support for the existing educational landscape. By the 1980s, much of what has 
become regarded as Labour’s ‘traditional’ policy on comprehensive schooling had been shaped 
by educational practice on the ground, which official policy programmes then more or less tacitly 
endorsed.  
From the 1960s to the 1980s, a key feature of this ‘traditional’ comprehensive schooling 
policy was support for non-selective school admissions and all-ability schools (implicitly accepting 
the diversity of schools in age ranges and organisational models), in line with its support of the 
model of school governance that had emerged following the 1944 Education Act. As many 
internal party struggles over comprehensive schooling (discussed in the next section) reveal, 
Labour’s support for this ‘partnership’ approach to school governance (or a ‘national system, 
locally administered’) has become one of the strongest features of its comprehensive schooling 
policy. This approach built on the principle of democratic control over schooling: LEAs as the 
main providers and regulators of schools, with central government having only a limited role. It 
also included a general trust in the professionalism of teachers, who enjoyed much autonomy in 
the practical organisation and content of teaching. The support for mixed-ability teaching (in 
principle, not necessarily in practice; see e.g. Hatcher, 1997: 7), which was particularly held among 
Labour teachers, became part of Labour’s policy manifestos in the 1980s. A further crucial 
characteristic of Labour’s traditional comprehensive schooling policy was restraint in setting 
national requirements for the curriculum (e.g. a common core curriculum, or a balance between 
academic and vocational elements),  
While the party’s support for comprehensive schooling was evident, in the early 1980s 
there was a general perception that the party had to delineate this policy more clearly in its official 
programme. In the early 1970s and early 1980s in particular, there were several debates and 
initiatives that aimed to overcome divisions in the curriculum and examination system (The 
Labour Party, 1982). However, while the commitment to comprehensive schooling remained a 
‘cornerstone of Labour’s philosophy’ in education policy documents from 1979 to 1992 (e.g. The 
Labour Party, 1991), during the 1980s the emphasis in discourse and policy documents shifted 
towards issues such as parental rights, educational standards and accountability. For many, this 
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did not contradict the central tenets of comprehensive schooling, for which a guarantee of 
adequate standards in all schools was a prerequisite to realise opportunities for all students 
(Radice, 1986). But critical voices within the education community felt that in light of the 
Conservatives’ attacks, Labour provided ‘no coherent defence of comprehensive schooling’ 
(Tomlinson, 2005: 46), and that ‘Labour's agenda of comprehensivization, mixed ability 
groupings, social education and the removal of inequality and discrimination in education ha[d] 
slipped from the centre of the debate’ (Inglis, 1991: 7). Participating in the ongoing debate over 
standards in English state schools, of which the majority were comprehensive schools, Labour 
was criticised as ultimately strengthening the Conservative argument that performance standards 
were poor because of comprehensive schooling, rather than defending comprehensive schooling 
as crucial for raising educational standards for all pupils (Inglis, 1991: 8–9).  
Despite the degree of ambiguity in Labour’s educational programme and its 
endorsement of parts of the Conservative accountability agenda (even before the 1990s), there 
were several key differences between Labour policy during the later years of Kinnock’s leadership 
(until 1992) and Labour policy during Tony Blair’s leadership (after 1994). The first such difference 
related to the opposition to selection. Until 1992, every Labour election manifesto included a 
demand to abolish the remaining grammar schools; but while New Labour remained opposed to 
the principle of selection by ability, it dropped this demand after 1995, and, when in government, 
New Labour appeared rather lenient towards other forms of selection (e.g. allowing a small 
degree of selection by aptitude, and officially banning selection by ability but loosely enforcing it 
in practice by making more and more schools their own admissions authorities). Although there 
were some suggestions of balancing admissions between schools to mitigate social selection (e.g. 
in the 2005 white paper, which suggested banding or admissions by lottery), New Labour 
governments remained reluctant to regulate admissions more proactively.  
Other changes appear to be less straightforward. New Labour’s critique of mixed-ability 
teaching and demand for schools to introduce internal differentiation practices (such as setting 
by ability) were seen as a clear break in the traditional understanding of comprehensive schooling. 
Despite support for this general principle, there has always been some scepticism among Labour 
politicians as well as a diversity in teaching practices on the ground. Perhaps the real break in 
Labour policy in the 19990s was that New Labour’s demand for internal differentiation signified 
central government interference in internal school practices.  
Another less straightforward change between ‘Old’ and New Labour school policy was 
the encouragement of diversity between schools. Unlike in other countries, Labour’s 
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understanding of comprehensive schooling has never built on a notion of a national framework 
for the curriculum and school organisation. The existing diversity among comprehensive schools 
was generally supported as reflecting local needs, and proposals to guarantee a broad curriculum 
in the 1980s were debated within these general parameters of local diversity (see e.g. The Labour 
Party, 1982). To some degree, the introduction under New Labour of a range of new school types, 
which differed in funding, governance and curricular specialisation, was similarly justified as 
allowing schools to respond to local demands. However, it appears that there was a shift from a 
more universalist understanding of diversity and local community, with a concern for social 
selection (albeit a concern not always manifested in actual policy outcomes), towards a more 
market-oriented understanding of choice and competition, with less-evident concern about 
social selection (although, as discussed below, there were some differences in opinion among 
New Labour politicians, in particular beliefs about the importance of market mechanisms to 
improve the conditions of the most disadvantaged). 
Overall, the clearest change in Labour’s policy was in the area of school governance – 
specifically, the party’s departure from its original support of the post-1944 ‘partnership 
approach’, in which comprehensive schooling became embedded after its introduction in the 
1960s. Until the mid-1990s, the Labour Party’s understanding of comprehensive schooling 
situated local authorities as the main providers and regulators of schooling, and invested a high 
degree of trust in teachers’ professionalism in the delivery and content of education. This 
understanding was challenged – first by the Conservative government in the 1980s and then by 
New Labour from the mid-1990s – via the marginalisation of local authorities; the reduction of 
teachers’ autonomy; the granting of greater freedoms to individual schools and their leaders; 
increased central prescription (e.g. in the curriculum and teaching methods); and the greater 
involvement of private-sector actors and market-inspired mechanisms, such as choice and 
competition, in public-school provision. New Labour endorsed the New Public Management and 
the system of school accountability that had developed during the 1980s (including national 
testing and the publication of school performance data). It further strengthened the powers of 
the central government while increasing the autonomy of individual schools in their day-to-day 
business – both to the detriment of local authorities. What emerges as the clearest strand of 
change in Labour’s school policy is therefore the reduced role of local government, greater trust 
in teachers and more market-oriented approach to the provision of schooling, expanding 
parental choice and stimulating diversity and competition between schools. Much of this change 
was epitomised in the academies; these remained all-ability schools, but (as Tony Blair’s quote at 
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the beginning of this chapter indicates) they ‘departed in every other respect’ from the traditional 
comprehensive school. Opinions about the extent of this change differ: 
The academies largely are comprehensive schools but they are under a different 
leadership and there was an attempt to try other kinds of partnering arrangements 
… So still comprehensive schools but with new models of school governance. So I 
think Labour, to be fair, was entirely consistent in its approach to the value of 
comprehensive education but it wanted it to evolve. (Bell, interview, 2015) 
I used to be able to say that one of the great strengths and weaknesses of the British 
education system was that it’s a national system, locally administered, which meant 
that because the local councils were responsible for the administration of schools 
two things happened: One, they had to relate to the needs of an area, and two, they 
could get kicked out by the electorate, if it was going wrong. … That’s being changed, 
so that we have a system that, theoretically, was going to be administered at school 
level … but is actually now more centralised than ever in our history because of the 
authority that the Ministry of Education has got in the establishment and operation 
of schools and the multi-academy and trust organisations and so on that are 
responsible for those schools. So we lost the advantage of a national system, locally 
administered and replaced it with a centralised system operated as a series of small 
businesses. (Kinnock, interview, 2015) 
 
4.2 The formation of party policy and the struggle over Labour’s soul  
The remainder of this chapter attempts to provide more in-depth insights into the various (and 
often overlapping) motivations of the actors involved in Labour’s education policy, which were 
revealed during internal party struggles over such policy. While the previous sections indicated 
key motivations and justifications for New Labour policy changes, the following analysis aims to 
provide a more nuanced picture of the motivations of the actors who drove these changes (from 
the mid-1990s to the mid-2000s), the actors who upheld Labour’s ‘traditional’ commitment to 
comprehensive schooling, and the internal party struggles these divisions caused.  
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4.2.1 Traditional attachments  
4.2.1.1 The educational community 
A key characteristic of the drive towards comprehensive schooling in England, as well as its 
support by the Labour Party, was its bottom-up nature; the drive was led by teachers, local 
councillors and the wider education community rather than the party’s ideologists or leadership. 
In the 1920s, the National Association of Labour Teachers led the advocacy for comprehensive 
education, both in general and as official Labour Party policy (Simon, 2000: 92–3). From the 1950s 
on, left-wing academics and activists at the periphery of the Labour Party (such as Caroline Benn 
and Brian Simon) became key advocates of comprehensive schooling and, in the 1960s, gained 
considerable influence over the Department for Education (Kerckhoff, 1996: 29). After 1965, during 
the implementation of comprehensive schooling, the key actors were again teachers and local 
authorities, both of whom had a strong presence in the Labour Party. Equally, there seems to 
have been a clear majority in Labour-controlled local governments for ending selection, which 
parents also saw as divisive (former Local Government Association representative, interview, 
2015). The link between comprehensive schooling and the principles of local authority control 
and teacher autonomy was therefore less an outcome of a particular educational or social 
doctrine than of actual processes of educational reform. It appears that a strong degree of 
ownership developed for this reform among teachers in particular. The 1980s Conservative 
governments’ attacks on comprehensive schooling and teachers seem to have increased this 
attachment and the defence of the project among many left-wing teachers (teaching union 
representative, interview, 2015).  
Much of teachers’ protests against New Labour’s policy came from a feeling of being 
unfairly blamed in New Labour’s discourse about failing schools and teacher’s complacency and 
low expectations towards disadvantaged students. Resistance to New Labour’s policy of 
marginalising local authorities and teachers was therefore perceived as a sign of limited trust and 
a curtailment of their influence and autonomy (teaching union representative, interview, 2015). In 
terms of particular education policies, some division of opinion was apparent between teachers’ 
unions and associations of school leaders (which generally welcomed, for example, New Labour 
increasing the powers of school leaders). However, among both teachers and head teachers there 
appears to have been a considerable normative attachment to comprehensive schooling:  
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I would say most people concerned with some form of policy activism in the Labour 
Party are motivated by non-selective educational ideologies. (Also within the teaching 
force?) Yes, yes. I think that’s one of the strongest features of the policy of organised 
teachers. (Teaching union representative, interview, 2015) 
Even today, the main forum for comprehensive schooling supporters – among not only teachers, 
local councillors, academics but also policy activists and MPs – is the Socialist Education 
Association (successor of the National Association of Labour Teachers). While affiliated with the 
party, the Association’s influence over Labour education policy has significantly diminished since 
the 1960s and 1970s – particularly under New Labour, which saw it as representing Old Labour 
views (Socialist Education Association representative, teaching union representative and former 
Local Government Association representative, interviews, 2015):  
You can see that shift happening in the nineties when Labour was the opposition 
party. Labour’s first response to the 1988 Education Act … was initially critically, and 
it called in effect for a defence for the status quo … but you can see its attitude 
changing in the early nineties towards support for New Public Management, a system 
based on centralisation [of powers to the central government, away from local 
authorities], decentralisation [of powers to individual schools], a National Curriculum, 
a strong assessment system, a strong inspection system, all these things were 
problems for teachers but became part of Labour’s policies. (Teaching union 
representative, interview, 2015) 
4.2.1.2 Attitudes in the wider party 
This attachment to comprehensive schooling in the party seems to have transcended the circle 
of actors directly involved in educational practice. Protest against New Labour’s ‘modernisation 
of comprehensive schooling’ in the mid-1990s came from both an alliance of teachers and local 
authority representatives (generally considered to be on the party’s left wing) and a group rooted 
in the 1960s project of ‘egalitarian socialism’ (on the party’s right wing), the latter of which was 
personified by Roy Hattersley, Labour’s deputy leader between 1983 and 1992. Comprehensive 
schooling and its embeddedness in the party’s ‘egalitarian project’ of welfare-state expansion in 
the 1960s and 1970s had become a core principle; it symbolised ‘what Labour stood for’, and was 
a key battlefield for struggles over the party’s wider societal vision and identity after the mid-
1990s. Hattersley openly criticised that New Labour’s refusal to abolish grammar schools and its 
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plans to create different types of schools and expand parental choice would create social selection 
and the ‘death of comprehensive education’ (Hattersley, 1995).  
New Labour modernisers were aware that selection had become a ‘hugely totemic issue’ 
for the Labour movement (Ryan, interview, 2015) and that the survival of grammar schools was ‘a 
deep-seated and long-standing irritation to the bulk of the Labour Party’ (Blunkett, 2006: 173). It 
seems that, for many supporters of comprehensive schooling, personal and familial experiences 
with the individual consequences of selection were linked with wider concerns over the socially 
divisive effects of selection: 
[Comprehensive schooling is] an issue which, to me, is fundamental to the Labour 
Party. That is the principle of comprehensive, non-selective education … I feel 
passionate about the issue of comprehensive education because … I failed the exam 
and still today remember the trauma … One of the reasons I joined Labour was 
because of their stance on comprehensive schools and the principle of equal 
educational opportunity. … The Labour Party has a duty to ensure that the principles 
of comprehensive education are maintained and improved. … All members of the 
Labour Party should, as a matter of conviction, give their 100 per cent support to the 
comprehensive system and no one should be seen to be undermining it. (Steinberg, 
quoted in Riddel, 1996) 
It appears that this attachment to comprehensive schooling and local authorities was not 
grounded in the ideological ‘doctrine’ of Labour’s 1960s revisionism, but rather had become part 
of the party’s ‘ethos’ – ‘the traditions, beliefs, characteristic procedures and feelings which help 
to animate the members of the party’ (Drucker 1979, p. 1): 
The comprehensive system came about under Labour government and that was not 
an accident because left-of-centre politicians felt that the previous education system 
was divisive and it needed to create a system that was more inclusive. So that was 
very deep in the psyche of Labour that it had been the party of government that had 
introduced the comprehensive principle, had seen through comprehensive 
reorganisation across the country and it was still very, very heavily committed to that 
sense that local schools should serve children of all needs and abilities. … I think there 
was some suspicion that some of these New Labour politicians including perhaps 




Traditionally Labour Party left-wing people believe that [comprehensive schooling] 
is very much about fairness, about social justice, and the frustration has been that 
[while] we claim to be the party of fairness and social justice … our very inequitable 
system … has disadvantaged a lot of people. … This is an issue for lots of people 
within Labour and there’re lots of Labour members working hard locally to fight for 
a truly comprehensive system across the country … and they’re passionate about 
that. (Member of the National Policy Forum, interview, 2015) 
New Labour attacks against local government similarly ‘didn’t go down very well with quite a lot 
of the membership’, and ‘it was felt within the party that he [Tony Blair] was developing a view 
that was not a traditional Labour view’ (member of the National Policy Forum, interview, 2015). 
The link between support for local authorities and support for comprehensive schooling was 
evident in the critique of grant-maintained schools that could opt out from local government; it 
was feared that these would create a two-tier system of secondary schooling, in which a ‘top’ tier 
of schools would be well-funded and attractive to the middle classes, while the working classes 
would have to attend the ‘bottom-tier’ local authority schools (Hatcher, 1997: 7).  
When the blueprint for Labour’s new education agenda was put to vote at the party 
conference in 1995, a stand-off between Hattersley and shadow education secretary David 
Blunkett epitomised the basic rift in the party. The media interpreted this stand-off as a battle of 
‘different worlds, different ways of thinking’, in which Hattersley spoke from the ‘deep dark heart 
of Labour’s conscience’, ‘expressing the anger of an old social-democratic egalitarian and a 
centraliser’ while Blunkett ‘spoke for the current reality of state education, a world where schools 
do fail’ (Marr, 1995). Labour’s support for comprehensive schooling was compared to its support 
for the NHS (Marr, 1995) as ‘one of the most strongly held beliefs of many Labour members’; one 
that had outlived its support for public ownership (the symbolic ‘Clause Four’ in the party’s 
constitution, which Blair abolished): 
The party in the country … wanted to win, but was slightly bewildered, … afraid of 
what this change would mean – were we losing our roots? Were we disavowing our 
values and ideology? … between the two was the parliamentary party, … they had to 
go back each week to their community, … their parties would say: ‘What’s going on? 
What’s all this rapid change?’ (Blunkett, interview, 2015) 
Blunkett had been totally sincere when saying and believing that we have to do better 
for the children of the majority. … But he still had to get up at the Labour Party 
conference and give the categoric assurance that there was going to be ‘no return 
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to the 11 plus’. How do you let things get to a state where you have to say that? 
That’s how distrusting the Labour audience – and not just Labour Party members, 
the wider audience – became of what the ambitions and purposes were of the Blair 
government. (Kinnock, interview, 2015)  
The looming revolt over New Labour’s policy document was only contained after Blunkett 
famously promised: ‘watch my lips – no selection either by examination or interview under a 
Labour government’ (Sherman, 1995).7 The education policy was adopted with one of the smallest 
majorities ever at a Labour conference, and only due to the union block vote (Ryan, interview, 
2015; see also Sherman, 1995). 
Shortly after the adoption of the 1995 document, another revolt broke out in the 
Parliamentary Labour Party after Blair defended his shadow health secretary for sending her child 
to a grammar school. This provoked much unrest in the Parliamentary Labour Party, which led to 
both the resignation of the long-standing chairman of Labour’s backbench Education Committee, 
Gerald Steinberg (see quote above), and to Blair facing one of his ‘toughest weeks’ in his first two 
years as party leader (Riddel, 1996): 
Grammar schools were by and large cordially detested by the party … my nearest 
and dearest in the office thought it pretty indefensible … the party went into turmoil 
… people really did tell me my leadership was on the line. (Blair, 2010) 
The opposition to New Labour’s education policy within the wider party and the educational 
community continued after the party’s election in 1997. However, the prospect of returning to 
government, and the high priority that education policy (and increasing educational spending) 
received in the party’s agenda, pacified much resistance (Phillips, 2003): 
After a period of a complete lack of investment of the Conservatives in the state 
education system, the people were just very pleased to see that we were moving into 
the right sort of direction as far as education is concerned. (Comprehensive schooling 
activist, interview 2015) 
                                                     
7 Blunkett later corrected this statement to mean ‘no more selection’, referring to the fact that a Labour 




Can you imagine what it felt like as an educationalist to have a prime minister was 
saying ‘education, education, education’? I couldn’t believe that. (Brighouse, 
interview 2015) 
Critiques of Labour’s education policy continued after 1995, but there were no more major rows 
over education policy at the party’s conferences. This was partly the consequence of the 
introduction of the National Policy Forum, which shifted the process of policy deliberation away 
from the party conference and towards a more fragmented system of discussions among 
delegates throughout the country. Although the aim of the National Policy Forum was to increase 
intra-party democracy, critics in the party have seen it as a means to centralise decision-making 
and diffuse internal opposition to policy: 
The Policy Forum was seen as a way of giving the membership something to do, 
giving them the sense that they are involved in the process but not really valued as 
anything significant as far as the major decision. … Labour Party policies were the 
ones that were coming out from Tony Blair and his team and there wasn’t anything 
else, so that was it … we knew that the Policy Forum is full of these people who were 
of the same shade as the leadership. (Member of the National Policy Forum, interview 
2015) 
4.2.2 Motives for modernisation 
As discussed above, the reorientation in the party’s school policy after 1994 was developed and 
driven by a ‘handful of people and the predispositions and opinions of their advisers’ (Brighouse, 
interview 2015) around party leader Tony Blair. It appears that these actors were driven by a range 
of motivations for ‘modernising’ comprehensive schooling, including a strong wish to get the 
party elected, as well as a perception that a fundamental overhaul of Labour’s programmatic 
outlook was intrinsically necessary and desirable. In school policy, this included a general 
acceptance – and even endorsement – of the status quo on school governance set out by the 
Conservative governments of the 1980s: 
Labour was fairly clear that it wasn’t going to unpick much of what the Conservatives 
had done. That was partly an administrative drive, why spend all your time just 
unpicking things that had been there? But actually, I think this is a really important 
point, New Labour believed in a lot of these things anyway … that public information 
about school performance through league tables, OFSTED inspections, those were 
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things that left-of-centre politicians should be supporting, because they were 
enhancing power towards individual citizens and their families by giving more 
information about schools, by exercising school choice and so on. (Bell, interview, 
2015) 
While it is difficult to distinguish actors’ motivations from the justifications they give, it seems fair 
to say that while electoral strategies and pragmatic considerations were an important component 
in the overhaul of Labour’s education policy under Blair (see also discussion in the next section), 
New Labour’s reforming zeal in education policy was also strongly driven by ideological 
motivations; it seems that the wish to change individual policies was embedded in a much more 
encompassing vision for societal change. However, apart from a shared ‘Third Way’ ideology for 
social change, it seems that the individual experiences and beliefs of Labour’s ‘modernisers’ 
played a considerable role in their outlook, both on education policy in general and on the 
specific policies brought forward.  
4.2.2.1 Individual experiences and missions 
The importance of personal and biographical experiences in shaping the views of key 
policymakers was frequently highlighted in the interviews (e.g. Brighouse, Ryan, Morris) and by 
the protagonists themselves, e.g. Blair’s middle-class upbringing and attendance at a prestigious 
private school (Blair, 2010: 103). In contrast, David Blunkett, whose experience of school was that 
of a blind pupil from disadvantaged background, came to be very critical about the opportunities 
offered within the existing system (Blunkett, 2006). While there was a shared sentiment that 
fundamental change was necessary, the different backgrounds and experiences within New 
Labour – particularly between Blair and Blunkett – led to different emphases regarding 
‘modernising’ comprehensive schooling, such as the tensions between equity and choice, and 
between community and competition, discussed in the first part of this chapter.  
Blair didn’t understand maintained education for the great majority anyway. He’d 
been to public school, he went to Oxford and was – is – a highly intelligent, very 
decent guy. So he didn’t have any malevolent idea but he just had no real experience 
of the education system in which we’re all brought up and he didn’t have a real 
perception of the place of education in society. … I would distinguish between Blair 
and Blunkett, Blair, through a lack of knowledge and understanding accepted what I 
think are crap ideas about improving education through competition. …. Blunkett 
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moved from being very much on the Left to being part of the mainstream to become 
a faithful adherent of Blairism, of ‘modernisation’ as a guarantee of progress, and 
competition as a force for advance. … It was a pity because he’s a very great guy with 
really decent progressive instincts and judgement but he really did embrace this idea 
of competitiveness in education. He’d be totally sincere when saying and believing 
that we have to do better for the children of the majority. (Kinnock, interview, 2015) 
Michael Barber had started his career as a teacher in a comprehensive school that had retained 
a ‘grammar school ethos’: 
In part, the educational views I came to hold so strongly a decade or more later were 
shaped here: yes, equity really did matter, but it would be achieved not by lowering 
expectations or abandoning traditional good teaching, but by demanding them 
everywhere. (Barber, 2007: 13) 
During his engagement in local politics in a Labour-led council ‘chock full of mad people’ (Barber, 
2007: 7), Barber became critical of Labour’s approach to school policy and the strength of 
‘producer’ [of public services] interests, i.e. organised public sector workforce such as teachers 
and local councillors in the party. 
The local party … was heavily influenced by the left-wing local branch of the National 
Union of Teachers and obsessed with a tokenistic attitude to equality. There was no 
debate about the shockingly bad standards of achievement among, for example, 
black boys in Hackney schools, but there was a massive row over whether or not the 
word 'anti-heterosexist' should appear in the published version of the plan. (Barber, 
2007: 11) 
Finally, Andrew Adonis, who grew up in a deprived council housing estate before being ‘rescued’ 
by a scholarship for a boarding school, became probably the most ardent critic of comprehensive 
schooling in the Labour Party: 
As soon as I started in No. 10 I focused on one objective above all: how to reinvent 
the comprehensive school. (Adonis, 2012: xii)  
I didn’t arrive in No. 10 with a worked-up policy, but rather a sense of what made for 
a good school, from my own school days and from my experience as an education 
journalist, school governor and university lecturer. I had a profound conviction that 
the status quo needed fundamental, not incremental, reform. A complete reinvention 
of the comprehensive school was required. (Adonis, 2012: 34)  
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I saw failing comprehensive schools, many hundreds of them, as a cancer at the heart 
of English society. (Adonis, 2012: xii) 
The emphases in these actors’ memories might be exaggerated, but it appears that they were 
driven by a strong personal urge to change schooling and strong convictions about what this 
change should look like. Adonis, for example, speaks of the ‘foundation and re-formation of 
schools’ as ‘a hallmark of every age … often the greatest legacy one generation passes on to 
another’ (Adonis, 2012: 10).  
Despite their different backgrounds, these actors were united in a condemnation of Old 
Labour and its ‘misguided’ approach to equality and opportunity, a scepticism of existing 
structures of school governance, and an admiration of the ‘ethos’ of grammar and private 
schools. While disagreements among these actors became more pronounced during Labour’s 
time in government (as discussed below), when New Labour developed its new approach to 
school policy after 1994 and had to gain the wider party’s support, these different backgrounds 
– particularly between Blair and Blunkett – were useful. New Labour was aware that it ‘needed to 
win the party over to our philosophy before the 1997 election’ (Ryan, interview, 2015), in particular 
at the 1995 conference, where Labour’s blueprint of this philosophy was voted on (The Labour 
Party, 1995a). David Blunkett’s credentials from his previous involvement in local Labour politics 
and his more moderate approach became an important bridge between the more radical New 
Labour ideas of Blair and Adonis and the more traditional wings of the party, particularly during 
the early years of Blair’s premiership. For example, Blunkett convinced Blair of the need for a 
compromise to bring grant-maintained schools, which had opted out of local authority control, 
back into some sort of local framework in order to gain the wider party’s support for New Labour’s 
education agenda (Ryan, interview, 2015).  
However, in the early 2000s tensions increased within the New Labour team. Some of 
these arose over influence on the government’s education agenda, in particular over Blair’s and 
Adonis’ micromanaging of the Education Department’s policy agenda8 However, differences were 
also visible in policy ideas and goals, in particular. While Blair and Adonis emphasised parental 
choice and competition between schools, and were highly critical of local authorities, education 
secretaries Blunkett and Morris emphasised the need to raise standards to overcome social 
                                                     
8 Andrew Adonis is generally believed to having authored most of New Labour’s white papers following 
becoming Blair’s advisor in 1997 (and later school minister). Estelle Morris’s resignation as education secretary 
has been attributed to this micromanaging from No. 10 (see e.g. Hamed and Hinsliff, 2002). 
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disadvantage, and the need for schools to collaborate with each other and with local authorities 
(Brighouse & Ryan, interviews, 2015).  
I think the real dividing line is this, Tony Blair and Andrew Adonis, I think they were 
really, really sceptical about local authorities and given their time again I think they 
may have preferred to get rid of them between 1997 and 2001. David and I weren’t 
that sceptical, David comes from a local authority background as I do … and we 
worked really hard between 1997 and 2001 to reform local authorities … because 
David and I felt that schools belong to, schools had a place in their locality and they 
needed to hold together and so if you take the word independence … Tony Blair and 
Andrew Adonis, more favoured the words ‘independent autonomous schools’, David 
and I more favoured the words ‘independent schools working within the family of 
schools’, and there’s the difference between the two viewpoints, so what we were 
always doing was compromising on it … and then from 2002 onwards the dividing 
lines seemed to strengthen. (Morris, interview, 2015) 
The basic problem was policy. Estelle fought shy of controversy on the Left and 
favoured incremental reform. Tony and I favoured bold reform. There was much we 
agreed on … But we disagreed on both the need for bold reform and on the reforms 
themselves, notably the principle of independent state schools … Estelle had just 
about been content to see academies launched as a small experiment in 2000 
although she hadn’t been keen. Had she and not David Blunkett been education 
secretary at the time, I suspect that the fundamental principle to state schools being 
managed independently of local authorities might have been a show-stopper. 
(Adonis, 2012: 89) 
Throughout the 2000s, the school agenda was even more strongly driven by Tony Blair and 
Andrew Adonis, and became a key area in which Blair wanted to leave a legacy after his time as 
party leader and prime minister: 
Despite all the difficulties, I felt enormously confident of what I was doing … I was 
now completely on top of the policy agenda … for the first time since I became prime 
minister, I was guided simply by what I genuinely thought was right. … With a trusted 
inner group of ministers who shared the same vision and knew this was where Labour 
had to be, we were still very much in a struggle with a large part of the party. (Blair, 
2010: 374-375, 581) 
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In 2005, Estelle Morris joined the opposition of backbench Labour MPs against Blair’s education 
policy and the 2005 white paper (see below).  
4.2.2.2 The perception of electoral dilemmas and opportunities 
As the previous section indicated, electoral considerations were an important, but not the only, 
motivation behind New Labour’s overhaul of school policy. It is, however, difficult to assess the 
direction of this relationship. It appears that, within a generally strong orientation towards making 
the party electable, school policies themselves were largely shaped by the convictions of key 
actors involved, and electoral strategies and discourses were then used to sell these policies to 
the public (and to justify them to critics within the party). However, different strands of 
motivations cannot easily be disentangled by the researcher (or the actors themselves); nor can 
this section provide a full account of electoral strategies and public attitudes. Instead, the aim 
here is to provide some historical context for the changing role of electoral considerations in 
Labour’s education policy, and to report on the different themes stated in the interviews.  
The influence of electoral considerations over Labour’s stance on comprehensive 
schooling was not entirely new. In the 1960s, popular dissatisfaction over selection had grown 
and the introduction of comprehensive schooling was perceived to go with the grain of popular 
opinion, including among large sections of the middle classes (Kerckhoff, 1996). However, Labour 
politicians, including Crosland himself, remained nervous about the electoral risk involved in 
closing down grammar schools (see e.g. Halsey interviewed in Klingston, 1994). The introduction 
of comprehensive schooling was sold as ‘grammar school education for all’ (DES, 1965). 
Comprehensive schooling advocates indicate that the decision to allow for local proposals over 
the form of comprehensive schooling, and the range of debates and deliberations this involved 
on the ground, created a sense of ownership over ‘going comprehensive’, through which ‘the 
ideas behind comprehensive education have been lodged securely in the hearts and minds of 
countless local populations and communities’ (Simon, 1997: 17). However, there was also a 
perception that, in contrast to grammar schools, comprehensive schools had not developed a 
clear image (Halpin, 1989): 
In education, despite the fact that the public would never accept the re-imposition 
of the 11 plus, many quite like the idea of grammar schools for their kids … grammar 
school attributes … uniforms, teachers in gowns, an old-fashioned curriculum and 
selection within the school. (Kinnock, interview, 2015) 
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From the 1970s on, including during Labour’s long years in political opposition in the 1980s, the 
image of comprehensive schooling was attacked via media scare stories about out-of-control 
educational experiments in ‘looney-left councils’ (Kerckhoff, 1996: 40), and the Conservative 
governments’ school reforms and discourse challenged Labour’s educational legacy:  
It’s almost like every time you had an example of something going wrong in a school, 
it was blamed on the comprehensive system. So that was picked up, this idea that if 
you’re going to improve schools that you have to … move away from the 
comprehensive model in some way, without reverting back entirely into selection. It 
was very easy to scapegoat, the comprehensive model, but at the same time there 
are very good examples of comprehensive schools throughout the country and in 
London, so it was an argument that was used for a purpose in my view. (Labour Party 
activist, interview, 2015) 
From the mid-1980s on, in an attempt to regain its hold over the public education agenda, 
electoral considerations were more strongly emphasised in Labour’s education policy. This 
increasing emphasis on educational standards and parental concerns was presented as a 
necessary correction of the image that Labour had been unconcerned with standards, as well as 
a tool to attack the Conservative governments in charge of schooling in the 1980s (Radice, 1986). 
As discussed in section 4.1., in the late 1980s Labour’s education discourse focused on the need 
to respond to parental preferences. But it seems that, while Labour perceived parents as worrying 
about educational standards and individual school quality, the party nonetheless perceived the 
project of comprehensive schooling as popular among the public (Radice, 1992).  
Under Tony Blair, electoral considerations and the strong urge to appeal to middle-class 
voters took centre stage in adjusting not only Labour’s school policy but also its overall 
programme and image: 
There was a concern in the Labour Party, and certainly amongst New Labour, that 
what you didn’t ever want to do was to frighten away middle-class voters who have 
come over very strongly to vote for Labour in 1997 and 2001. (Bell, interview, 2015) 
The modernisers wanted to signal their credibility and commitment to educational standards, 
which built on a very strategic and deliberate communication strategy and media spin, steered 
mostly by Blunkett’s media adviser Conor Ryan and involving the repetition of mantras such as 




For some reason the Left has never been associated with high standards and rigour 
and the basics, it’s the right wing who was seen to value reading and writing and the 
Left was too often associated with airy-fairy that doesn’t make a difference … we 
wanted to give a clear signal that the basics were important and that we understood 
the need for a child to read and write. (Morris, interview, 2015) 
The first statement that David issued when he was appointed, he started talking 
about raising standards in schools and the language was quite important because 
the phrase ‘raising standards’ was not one that had been used that much, it was seen 
as too right wing, but it was a deliberate point, and it coincided with some quite 
important changes that had happened in accountability, particularly in the English 
system ... we had to do a few symbolically important things to show people that we 
meant that. … Blunkett wrote an article for The Times and did an interview with The 
Frost Programme where he said that Labour was going to continue publishing league 
tables … it was a carefully argued piece. (Ryan, interview, 2015) 
Endorsing and deliberately using the image of a division between ‘producer’ and ‘consumer’ 
interests in education, which had been commonplace in the Conservative discourse, New 
Labour’s discourse not only aimed to signal sensitivity to parental concerns and to distance itself 
from the teaching unions but also served to undermine internal party opposition to its new 
education project: 
It was a perception that Labour’s education policy had [been], with the exception 
probably when Jack Straw was shadow education secretary, … too closely aligned 
with the teaching trade unions. … Blair was very keen that Labour’s education policy 
was going to be much more aligned to the concerns of parents … the National Union 
of Teachers and others were outraged and highly critical when we did that. We didn’t 
mind that because actually, that was sending a signal to a lot of the people who 
Labour wanted to vote for them, that we were on their side and we weren’t on the 
side of poor standards in schools, so you needed to do something big like that. (Ryan 
interview, 2015) 
The more the trade unions opposed us the better it was for us politically, they never 
realise that if we had an awful time, and we had many awful times at trade union 
meetings, of being yelled at, the result was the public felt we were standing up for 
their children against militant teachers. (Senior Labour politician, interview, 2015) 
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Perhaps most importantly within Labour’s overall electoral discourse, school policy – particularly 
the party’s changing stance on comprehensive schooling – was used as a symbol to signal the 
party’s change from ‘old’ to New Labour; to paint a broader picture about its values and goals, 
about individual aspirations and opportunities, and about the future role of the state. School 
policy therefore functioned to ‘sell’ the party and its new policy to the wider public, whose 
orientation, particularly in Blair’s view, had become meritocratic rather than egalitarian : 
The purpose of focusing on education … also served to emphasise how we saw the 
role of the state: enabling the fulfilment of potential, not controlling lives or business. 
(Blair, 2010: 103) 
(Why was education part of the modernisation agenda?) [It was] about modernity and 
coming to terms with globalisation and understanding how the world was working. 
In other words, being on the same page as the electorate and recognising what was 
happening with business. Underpinning that was education, because education is a 
symbol of reform and modernisation – if you believe in reform, you believe in 
modernisation – then you got to start with educating the workforce, educating the 
individual for the world of tomorrow … in the minds of the electorate, in the minds 
of parents, what you say about education gives them an impression of what you 
stand for overall, what your general political offer is. (Blunkett, interview 2016) 
[‘Old’ Labour politicians] didn’t ‘get’ aspiration. … When injustice and inequality were 
reduced – in part through their efforts – they failed to see what would happen … It 
is about aspiration, ambition … having their children do better than them. My dad’s 
greatest wish was that I be educated privately … The problem with the intellectual 
types was that they didn’t quite understand this process, or … [they] resented it … 
they wanted to celebrate the working class, not make them middle class – but middle 
class was precisely what your average worker wanted himself or his kids to be. … The 
impulse of many of those helped by well-meaning intellectuals was essentially 
meritocratic, not egalitarian – they wanted to be helped on to the ladder, but once 
on it, they thought ascending it was up to them. (Blair, 2010: 43)  
Through its electoral discourse, New Labour aimed to create a wider cross-class appeal for its 
education policy, lifting its education proposals beyond distributive conflicts between 
disadvantaged and middle-class families by creating the category of ‘ordinary but aspirational’ 
people. Attacking standards in comprehensive schools was justified as both benefiting the poor 
(who had been ‘failed’ by comprehensive schooling) and attracting the middle classes (preventing 
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their exit from the public to the private school sector). Through improving the quality of public 
schooling – by increasing diversity, improving school ‘culture’ or ‘ethos’ and expanding ‘choice 
for all’ – New Labour’s electoral strategy tried to link its traditional concern with equity with a 
discursive emphasis on the ‘consumers’ of education. This construction of a cross-class coalition 
was mirrored by the link between Blair’s middle-class persona and Blunkett’s personal experience 
of disadvantage: 
I had a philosophy that was clear and clearly different from that of a traditional 
Labour politician. I was middle class, and my politics were in many ways middle class. 
My programme was every bit as much geared by the aspirations of the up-and-
coming as the anxieties of the down-and-out. (Blair 2010) 
These different strands of electoral concerns and strategies are particularly visible in statements 
regarding Labour dropping its long-standing electoral promise to abolish the remaining 
grammar schools. The main justifications given for this were that retaining grammar schools 
signalled moderation and that ideologically charged debates were an undesirable distraction:  
Labour could never have closed grammar schools … in 1997, any more than the 
Tories opened new grammars after 1979. For both parties, the policy has been a 
symbolic statement to signal moderation on education. (Ryan, 2007) 
[People in the wider party] were still nostalgic about the idea that we should have 
abolished the remaining 163 grammar schools and we said we’re not getting side-
tracked ... diverted into the old shibboleths of grammar schools versus the rest. 
(Blunkett, interview, 2016) 
I came to accept the line … that we shouldn’t be distracted by 168 schools, … we will 
use up a huge amount of political capital and time and resources solving a problem 
that didn’t affect that many people. … We would occasionally discuss it and then, in 
the end, it went back into the too-difficult drawer. (Former schools minister, interview, 
2015) 
The decision to not abolish grammar schools was also presented as informed by calculations of 
electoral risk, or the potential loss of votes among parents affected by the changes. Critics, 
however, doubted the actual level of electoral risk involved:  
We knew that in order to win support in marginal constituencies, we had to drop the 
idea of abolishing grammars. (Ryan, 2007)  
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We had Labour MPs in areas with grammar schools who would come with a terrified 
look in their eyes ‘if you do this I’m gonna lose my seat’ … everyone knows that 
there’s something wrong there and they [grammar schools] don’t really work … no 
one really knows what to do about them because they’re popular in the areas where 
we have them because, in the end, aspirational parents are the more articulate, the 
most likely to vote, all think that their kid’s gonna get into grammar schools. (Former 
schools minister, interview, 2015) 
[The grammar school issue] was too emotionally based because of this kind of fear 
that we would lose votes – and I’m not convinced that anybody had actually 
demonstrated that we would lose votes, to be honest, but it was believed that this 
was about losing voters. (Labour Party activist, interview, 2015) 
I think they constructed the parent as a particular sort of entity, I think there were 
other ways of constructing the diversity of parent interests … I would say that Labour 
has absolutely nothing to lose in opposing grammar school education. (Teaching 
union representative, interview, 2015) 
But it wasn’t only pushy middle-class parents who New Labour believed to be attached to 
grammar schools; the party believed that old myths about grammar schools as ‘proper education’ 
and a ‘ladder of opportunity’ were also alive and well among lower-middle class constituencies:  
The feeling [in the Labour Party] is that the most vocal people … are not the middle-
class people, they’re those with aspiration, lower-middle-class people who think it’s 
their children’s chance to do better for themselves … wanted to retain the 11 plus; the 
people that we see as our core voters … aren’t aware of this full argument … that 
most children will not get into the grammar schools … they just see the aspirational 
aspect of it and see the prospect of their opportunity being taken away as very 
negative. (Member of the National Policy Forum, interview 2015)  
There was also a feeling amongst the public that we’d lost something good in the 
old grammar schools, they say ‘ah the days of the grammar schools’ … there was a 
feeling … that grammar schools were good, it was secondary-modern schools that 
we wanted to change. ... And I think some working people thought, we’d sooner 
have had the chance to fight for a grammar school place and probably not got it 
than not have the chance to get it at all … It’s like buying a lottery ticket. You know 
you’re not gonna win … I’d sooner spend the two pounds and hope I’d win rather 
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than abolishing the lottery. So it is quite complicated in a way. (Senior Labour 
politician, interview, 2015) 
Although the issue of grammar schools only affected a small share of the electorate (those who 
lived in areas where selection still existed), grammar schools were perceived to have left an 
imprint on the public imagery as embodying educational standards and ethos, and there was 
considerable nostalgia for them. The issue of grammar schools therefore highlights the symbolic 
dimension of education policy – the values and ideals these schools assumedly embodied in the 
minds of voters. New Labour thought (or at least stated) that even for the wider electorate, most 
of whom have never been inside a grammar school, these schools were symbols of educational 
excellence and meritocracy – in stark contrast to presumed dissatisfaction with comprehensive 
schooling: 
You went out into the wider world and no one was saying thank God we’ve got 
comprehensive schools, there was a level of dissatisfaction with secondary education 
and comprehensive education got blamed if you like, so things had to change, so 
given we decided as a party not to have more selection we had to do something 
about the comprehensive system, so I think that did become described as 
modernising comprehensive schools, which is good, I think that was fine. (Morris, 
interview, 2015) 
New Labour likely thought that being seen as closing down grammar schools – even if local 
parents would have supported this9 – would be damaging for the message about ‘aspirations’ 
and ‘meritocracy’ and educational standards that underpinned its general narrative. Mobilising 
long-standing collective myths about grammar schools remained a feature of Labour’s agenda 
to modernise comprehensive education and school ethos, especially in the academies 
programme (as discussed above). 
New Labour attempted to create cross-class appeal for its education policy through a 
discourse that constructed similar interests, aspirations and opportunities between different social 
groups (helped by the fact that investment in education was increased substantially). But tensions 
within Labour’s policy became visible in growing public concerns over school admissions. The 
increasing competition between parents over places in oversubscribed schools, and the 
                                                     
9 The specification for parental ballots on grammar schools in the 1998 Standards and Framework Act have 
been criticised as being biased towards the status quo. The only (negative) parental ballot took place in 2000 
in Ripon (Chitty, 2013: 91). 
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opportunity for some schools to select parents, created concerns among parents. It seems that 
some of MPs’ discontent regarding the Labour governments’ reluctance to regulate school 
admissions was also informed by feedback from parents in their constituencies (House of 
Commons Education and Skills Committee, 2004).  
4.2.3 Modernisers divided 
During fights over school policy between the New Labour government on the one hand, and the 
wider party, local councillors and teachers on the other, the Parliamentary Labour Party appears 
to have taken a middle position. As discussed, occasional unrest over school policy had flared up 
in the early 1990s, but many Labour MPs supported New Labour’s education agenda of tackling 
school failure and increasing educational investment (for example, through the specialist school 
programme). Academies had initially been popular among MPs in areas with failing schools; they 
were seen as a way of tackling school failure through new investment and of being more attractive 
to middle-class parents, which was hoped to lead to a better balance in school intakes (Socialist 
Education Association representative, interview, 2015). At the same time, fears remained that the 
increasing differentiation between schools could lead to a stronger hierarchy between schools, 
which would undermine the party’s general commitment to comprehensive schooling (Exley, 
2012: 234). Over time, worries over the diversity of school types and the increasing complexity of 
school admissions had grown, and the Labour-led Education Select Committee in the House of 
Commons launched an inquiry into the government’s secondary school policy (House of 
Commons Education and Skills Committee, 2004). During the early 2000s, the Committee became 
a vocal critic of the government’s ambivalent approach to selection and reluctance to regulate 
school admissions beyond a non-statutory code of admissions: 
A government that permits the continuing expansion of selection, by ability or by 
aptitude, can only be understood to approve of both the practice of selection and 
its outcomes. ... The Government needs to explain how it reconciles its insistence that 
there will be no return to selection with its willingness to retain and increase selection 
where it already exists. (House of Commons Education and Skills Committee, 2004: 
5) 
Allowing an increasing number of schools to be their own admission authorities was seen as not 
only contradicting the party’s traditional opposition to selection by ability but also furthering 
schools’ selective practices, undermining the principle of parental choice: 
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The weakness of the regulatory framework for admissions has eroded the role of 
parental preference by failing to regulate school admissions effectively and address 
the behaviour of admissions authorities which attempt to choose their pupils by 
covert means; thus the rhetoric of parents choosing schools has been transformed 
into schools choosing parents. (House of Commons Education and Skills Committee, 
2004: 75) 
While academies were not necessarily opposed as a targeted solution for underperforming 
schools, concerns became more widespread when trust schools became a blueprint for the whole 
school system in a 2005 white paper (Socialist Education Association representative, interview, 
2015). Unease within the Parliamentary Labour Party about the Labour government’s education 
policy grew in the months leading up to the publication of the white paper, the presentation of 
which sparked heavy debates, as well as the publication of an Alternative Education White Paper 
(Compass, 2005) signed by 58 backbenchers (including nine former government ministers). The 
Alternative White Paper particularly criticised the absence of a mandatory admissions code, the 
ban on local authorities establishing new community schools and the forced conversion of 
schools to trust schools, and displayed a general unease with a ‘market-driven’ approach to 
schools, which ran ‘contrary to Labour values’ (Martin Salter, (HC Deb, 15 March 2016: 1517). 
Although the trust school policy did not go as far as the academies policy, it would affect the 
whole school system:  
What was actually being proposed was not quite as dramatic as the way the story 
was spun … I think that there was a widespread concern that the more schools you 
allow to be their own admissions authorities … the more potential there is for 
selection, and that’s what united a lot of people. (Comprehensive schooling activist, 
interview, 2015) 
School policy became entangled in disagreements over Blair’s radical public-sector reform 
agenda, as well as a general leadership struggle between Blair and Brown and their supporters. 
As a New Labour adviser recalls, there ‘was a bit of politics going on both sides’ and the Schools 
Bill became a sort of ‘litmus test’ for a ‘group of middle-ground … soft-left MPs, who were feeling 
increasingly dissatisfied with the direction of public service reform’ and the ‘general direction of 
travel’ (Ryan interview 2015).  
After months of negotiations and some concessions around admissions and the powers 
of local authorities, as well as out of concern that the Conservative Party would benefit from the 
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disunity among Labour, many rebels – including the chairmen of the Education Select Committee 
Barry Sherman and many the authors of the white paper – backed the government (e.g. Martin 
Salter, (HC Deb, 15 March 2016: 1516-1517). However, 46 MPs remained opposed to the 2006 
Education and Inspections Bill – the biggest backbench rebellion in a third reading during Blair’s 
premiership. 
As well as this unrest among Labour backbenchers, more prominent figures in the 
moderniser circle expressed unease with Labour’s school policy, including Blair’s deputy prime 
minister, John Prescott. Having failed the 11-plus as a child, Prescott had been a strong supporter 
of comprehensive schooling, but in the late 1990s had become convinced of the need to 
modernise it. During the early 2000s, he then became concerned about academies (and then 
trust schools) leading to more social selection and producing a ‘first-class/second-class' 
education system (Prescott quoted in Crosland, 2005). During the negotiations between Blair and 
the rebel MPs, he figured as a mediator. Other senior members of the Labour Party, such as Neil 
Kinnock and Estelle Morris, publicly criticised the policy, including at events organised by 
comprehensive schooling campaigners in 2005. Kinnock had been generally supportive of Blair’s 
modernisation of the Labour Party, perceiving it as building on the groundwork he laid in the 
1980s, but he nonetheless became critical of New Labour’s school policy. The following 
statements by Kinnock and Blair reveal their differences in opinion:  
Tony Blair and his education secretaries had this idea that schools could be treated 
as competitive units and that improved education would come about because of a 
contest for higher standards. … It was bound, as I warned Blair (it was our most 
serious disagreement) to lead to worse social segregation, reduced social mobility 
and locked-in underperformance, it was bound to happen … You will get 
oversubscribed schools, where parents who are knowledgeable and articulate will 
manage to get their kids in, even if they have to move house, and the school that 
has attracted applicants by being successful will become more successful and not 
really part of that community. … It isn’t that it’s philosophically transgressing against 
the comprehensive idea, especially if that only means ‘all-in schools’, but it does 
mean that, in practice, we are gradually getting more social selection which is even 
more invidious than the honest upfront 11+ examination, stupid though it was. … He 
said I was old-fashioned, it’s in his autobiography, it was the one really big row we 
had and it lasted quite a long time. Indeed, it came to a head when they came up 
with this lunatic idea in about 2004, 2005, of ‘trust schools’, which would have gone 
a step beyond academies … that was the last big row I had with him … I was very 
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loyal and we remained good friends, but he was fundamentally wrong about 
education, absolutely. (Kinnock, interview, 2015) 
[Kinnock’s] take on academies was that they were elitist … they weren’t … they were 
better than other local schools. For me, this was the point. However well motivated, 
it was classic levelling down. It was an argument that went to the heart of what New 
Labour was about and its championing of aspiration. Equity could not and should 
never be at the expense of excellence. My abiding insistence was never give up on 
excellence, wherever it might be. Attacking it – irrespective of what we felt about 
grammar schools, private schools, special schools, any schools – was to commit a 
fatal solecism. It meant that, in the ultimate analysis, we were prepared to get rid of 
something that was excellent on the basis that it represented the wrong ideology. 
(Blair, 2010: 578)  
4.3 Conclusion 
This chapter has traced the main processes underpinning the evolution of Labour’s attitudes 
towards, and strategies on, comprehensive schooling policy.  
The change in Labour’s school policy over the past 30 years was strongly linked to a 
profound change in the party’s wider ideological orientation and overall policy project. The 
party’s embrace of what has been called ‘Third Way’ involved clear changes in its understanding 
of the roles of the state, the market and the individual, and a shift from a notion of equality of 
opportunity towards a more individualistic conception of aspiration. Comprehensive schooling 
was portrayed as a symbol for a bureaucratic and paternalistic welfare state that denies choices 
and prevents innovation. Within the ambition of modernising the Labour Party, New Labour 
policymakers attempted to modernise its approach to the governance of public services in 
general and to comprehensive schooling in particular.  
Internal party struggles over comprehensive schooling emerged as a pronounced conflict 
between defenders of the party’s traditional approach to such schooling and those wishing to 
fundamentally alter the policy position. However, the interplay of actors and motivations behind 
the struggles that gave way to the evolution of Labour’s policy are more complicated, and often 
overlapping. Although the main cleavage in this struggle was between the ‘party in public office’ 
and the ‘party on the ground’, at times this cleavage was bridged while at other times fissures 
emerged – including within New Labour’s moderniser circle itself.  
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Key to understanding Labour’s traditional attachment to comprehensive schooling was 
first of all its emergence from educational practice – teachers and local authorities had developed 
a strong sense of ownership over this policy through their involvement in the implementation 
and day-to-day practice of comprehensive schooling since the 1960s. Second, support for the 
principle of comprehensive schooling had become part of the ‘ethos’ of the wider party, linking 
many Labour members’ individual or proximate experiences of selection in school with a general 
attachment to Labour’s ‘egalitarian project’ of welfare-state expansion in the 1960s. It seems that 
the Conservative governments’ assaults on what was perceived as Labour’s legacy in schooling 
(and the welfare state in general) both strengthened the emotive attachment to the principle of 
comprehensive schooling and, to some degree, sowed doubts over its effectiveness.  
During the 1980s Labour’s discourse on education policy became more concerned about 
the issue of standards and the need for the party to consider the concerns and preferences of 
parents in educational matters, without however questioning the policy of comprehensive 
schooling as such. The considerable change in the Labour Party’s school policy from the mid-
1990s on resulted from a change in the actors involved in policy formulation. For New Labour’s 
school policy modernisers (central among whom was Tony Blair), electoral tactics were linked 
with wider shifts in programmatic thinking about the goals and means of social reform, as well as 
leading policymakers’ personal educational experiences, and they clearly admired the educational 
traditions that grammar and private schools were seen to embody. The trend towards 
centralisation within Labour’s policy formulation and decision-making, which had begun under 
party leader Kinnock, was strengthened under Blair. Policy advisers and think tanks gained 
important influence over the education policy agenda, which was steered more strongly than 
before by the party leader himself, while teaching unions and local government representatives 
were largely excluded from policy development.  
The change in the party’s education policy led to a few big rows in the wider party in the 
years between Blair’s election as party leader (1994) and Labour’s election to government (1997). 
Opposition came from not only those directly affected by the policy changes (such as teachers 
and local government) but also an unease in the wider party, particularly its former right wing, 
for whom debates over school policy were linked with debates over the party’s identity. These 
initial rows required some concessions, but Blair’s prioritisation of education and electoral outlook 
helped to overcome open resistance within the party. Internal party opposition was made further 
invisible through the introduction of the National Policy Forum: – a forum for policy deliberation 
outside of the party conference. New Labour’s successive electoral successes continued to 
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provide a strong basis for withstanding internal party critique, but internal party unease with New 
Labour’s school policy continued throughout Blair’s leadership.  
In 2006, a more radical agenda of school governance reform, strongly driven by Blair and 
his advisers, led to one of the biggest parliamentary backbench rebellions in a third reading the 
Labour Party has ever witnessed. These debates in the Parliamentary Labour Party highlighted 
that many had initially supported the agenda of tackling school failure and moderate changes to 
educational governance, including (to some degree) parental choice and the introduction of 
academies to replace failing schools. However, concerns voiced under the banner of 
comprehensive schooling included the rising involvement of private-sector actors, the loss of 
‘local democratic control’ over schooling, and the deregulation of school admissions and the 
danger of these leading to social selection and the reproduction of social disadvantage. For both 
Blair and his critics, school policy became a core symbol for both public service reform and the 
Labour Party project overall. These debates ultimately revealed divides even within the former 
moderniser circle. Since then, there has been a degree of unease with Blair’s legacy (which 
Conservative-led governments have built on since 2010) without a clear alternative vision for 
school policy to emerge. If the election of Jeremy Corbyn as party leader in 2015 will stimulate a 








Chapter 5. SPÖ school policy: between utopia and 
pragmatism 
It all goes back to the 1920s... the reform ambitions … and the obstacles for these 
ambitions … and this continues until today. It is the last really ideologically dominated 
policy field with completely rigid ideological convictions … diametrically opposed, 
alas. (SPÖ senior civil servant, interview, 2015) 
There is this century-old lip service paid by the social democrats to comprehensive 
schooling, but it has never been important enough to make it a precondition for 
agreeing to a coalition [government] … it was always ‘if there’s a way, good, if not, 
then we will find some sort of compromise’… under this Austrian willingness to 
compromise, school policy has badly suffered. (Education researcher and policy 
activist, interview, 2015) 
The Austrian Social Democratic Party (SPÖ) has displayed some of the longest-standing support 
for comprehensive schooling among European social-democratic parties – and has had the least 
success in bringing this goal about. After the failed attempts to introduce comprehensive 
schooling at the lower secondary level (by postponing selection from the age of 10 to 14) in the 
1920s and 1970s, the party’s programmatic aspiration for such schooling has coexisted with its 
pragmatic and compromise-oriented political strategy, which has largely side-lined its traditional 
demand in favour of expanding educational opportunities within the existing differentiated 
school system. However, in the 2000s, comprehensive schooling made a comeback on the 
education agenda and the SPÖ pushed once more for school experiments with non-selective 
schooling. This third attempt ended in 2012 with a political compromise between the SPÖ and its 
coalition partner, the Christian Democratic Party (ÖVP), in which the quality of the lower-tier track 
was to be improved and possibilities for transferring between school tracks at the end of lower 
secondary schooling were increased, while academic selection at the age of ten was to remain. 
Research on the party’s previous initiatives to introduce comprehensive schooling has often 
doubted the SPÖ’s political will for such change (Dermutz, 1983b; Pelinka, 1985; Gruber, 2015). 
However, given the extent of political opposition to changing the structure of the Austrian school 
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system these authors also highlight, it is important to also ask why this policy has ultimately 
survived as a programmatic aspiration for the SPÖ.  
This chapter aims to shed more light on the fundamental tension between the SPÖ’s 
continuing programmatic commitment to comprehensive schooling and its pragmatic, risk-
averse political behaviour. It starts by tracing the main developments in the party’s school policy 
from the early 1980s until the most recent compromise on school organisation in 2012. It will then 
investigate how far the SPÖ’s policy on comprehensive schooling has changed and the interplay 
of actors, motivations and strategies that has shaped the party’s policy over the past three 
decades.  
 
5.1 The evolution of SPÖ school policy 
5.1.1 From the speechless 1980s to new hopes in the 1990s 
In the 1980s, social-democratic education policy in Austria was characterised by two a widespread 
disillusionment among comprehensive schooling supporters following the end of the 
comprehensive school experiments of the 1970s, while the SPÖ was coming to terms with the 
loss of its absolute majority and its attempts to modernise the its programme and profile in the 
public. Although the SPÖ continued its control over the school ministry until the mid-1990s, 
education policy barely figured on the party’s agenda during the 1980s, and the SPÖ was 
generally perceived as having lost the political initiative on education policy (Seel and Scheipl, 
2004).  
The 1982 Act (7. Schulorganisationsgesetz-Novelle) had marked the end of a decade of 
educational expansion and reforms under the SPÖ governments of the 1970s. In 1971, the SPÖ 
government had initiated experiments with comprehensive schooling hoping to expand them 
their non-selective nature to all public secondary schools. Ten years later, despite a generally 
favourable evaluation of these pilots, comprehensive schooling had failed to gain political 
support from the ÖVP, whose votes were necessary to reach the required two-thirds majority for 
changing school legislation (which had been given constitutional rank in 1962). The SPÖ 
eventually agreed to a compromise in 1982, which maintained academic selection but allowed 
mainstreaming the other organisational and pedagogical innovations tried out in the school 
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experiments to the Hauptschule – the lower-tier track of secondary schooling. To increase 
permeability between the school tracks, the curriculum of the Hauptschule was aligned to the 
Gymnasium so as to allow high-achieving graduates of the Hauptschule (at age 14) to transfer to 
the upper level of the Gymnasium. Stand-alone upper-level Gymnasiums (for the ages 15–18) 
were also introduced to absorb the increasing number of Hauptschule graduates staying on in 
schooling after the age of 14. Despite these improvements, the compromise resulted in much 
disappointment among comprehensive schooling supporters within the party, (Matzenauer, 
interview, 2016; education researcher, interview, 2015).  
In 1983, after 13 years of political dominance in Austria, the SPÖ lost its absolute parliamentary 
majority. From then until 1999, it remained the strongest party but had to seek coalitions, first 
with the then small FPÖ (until 1986) and subsequently in grand coalitions with the ÖVP (1986–
99). During the 1980s, SPÖ school ministers recurrently declared their support for comprehensive 
schooling as a long-term aspiration (Zilk, 1983; Moritz, 1984; Hawlicek, 1988), but in light of the 
well-known political opposition from their coalition partner ÖVP no further initiatives for 
comprehensive schooling emerged from the SPÖ school ministry. Although the party’s education 
spokesperson, Hans Matzenauer (1980–92), and other policy activists tried to keep the debate 
going (for example, by initiating new comprehensive schooling experiments in Vienna), education 
received rather low priority on the political agenda in general and on the SPÖ’s policy agenda in 
particular. Among school reform advocates, there was growing awareness that the 1982 
compromise marked the end of the optimistic reform decade of the 1970s and the 1980s were 
generally perceived as a lost decade of ‘educational speechlessness’ (Gruber 1991; Matzenauer, 
interview, 2016). 
There was a rupture in the eighties, but we didn’t know that then or haven‘t 
understood it yet. We were aware that there are new laws and they are made of iron. 
The leader of the ÖVP teacher union at that time said: ‘after this law, they will keep 
quiet for the next 50 years’ … And then we all felt that the reforms had run out of 
steam. You cannot play reforms for 10 or 20 years. (Oskar Achs,10 interview, 2015) 
In the 1990s, two developments directed some renewed attention to the issue of 
comprehensive schooling: first, the rising educational demand for places in the Gymnasium and 
                                                     




the resulting pressure on the differentiated school system, and second, the preparation of a new 
SPÖ party programme in the mid-1990s in which education policy became more salient.  
Aligning the curricula between the Hauptschule and the lower stage of the Gymnasium 
since 1985 had in theory improved the opportunities of children initially not selected by the latter 
to still transfer to higher levels of secondary and tertiary education later on. However, the hope 
that this upgrade would increase the appeal of the Hauptschule was not realised and parental 
demand for the Gymnasium rose, particularly in urban areas (Spudlich, 1991). Gymnasium school 
places were under pressure to keep up with rising educational ambitions, while Hauptschulen in 
urban areas saw declining numbers (Rohrer, 1993). This continuing mismatch between 
educational demand and school places caused regular debates about comprehensive schooling 
in the media and local party-political bickering between ÖVP and SPÖ politicians, despite some 
agreement on initiating school partnerships between Hauptschulen and Gymnasiums in Vienna 
and Graz (Engelbrecht, 2014: 80–9). SPÖ’s education spokespeople, Hans Matzenauer (1983–92), 
and Helmut Seel (1992–94), reiterated their demand for comprehensive schooling in light of the 
failure of the Hauptschule reforms to ease the pressure on transitions at the age of ten. 
Conversely, ÖVP politicians raised alarm over the ‘comprehensivization’ of the Gymnasium, and 
instead demanded reinstating entrance exams and a more academic curriculum for the 
Gymnasium while raising the profile of the Hauptschule among parents by allowing it to develop 
distinct curricular profiles (such as IT or sports) and introducing an intermediate school-leaving 
exam (often called Mittlere Reife) for those pupils not destined to take the Matura examinations 
at 18 (Die Presse, 1992; 1993b; 1993a; Rohrer, 1993; Witzmann, 1993a). While well-covered in the 
national press, most of these debates remained on a local level, in particular in Vienna. And 
although the SPÖ reiterated its demand for comprehensive schooling occasionally in its electoral 
manifestos (SPÖ, 1990) or leadership speeches (Die Presse, 1993b), the party’s leadership 
appeared to be reluctant to engage in this debate. SPÖ’s school minister, Rudolf Scholten (1990–
94), appeared particularly anxious about getting dragged into this ‘blockage of labelling’ 
(Blockade der Etikettierung), which he was perceived as paralysing all other school reforms 
(quoted in Witzmann, 1993b).11  
                                                     
11 During this period, the ÖVP regularly denounced any reform initiated by the SPÖ ministry, such as including 
disabled children in mainstream schooling or increasing curricular freedoms for schools, as introducing 
comprehensive schooling ‘through the backdoor’ (Salomon, 1993). 
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The SPÖ was responsible for appointing the school minister for 24 years (1970–94), but 
in 1995 it relinquished its ‘traditional claim’ on the school ministry to its coalition partner, ÖVP. 
For school-reform advocates, this signified that the party had relinquished its thematic leadership 
in education policy (Seel and Scheipl, 2004: 49). However, this ‘low point in SPÖ school policy’ 
(Matzenauer, interview, 2016) also led to new dynamics in the debate. In particular, the aspirations 
of the new ÖVP school minister to return to clearly differentiated curricula for Gymnasium and 
Hauptschule reignited some protest within the SPÖ (Witzmann, 1994; Die Presse, 1995).  
In the mid-1990s, school policy gained an additional (small) push on the party’s agenda 
during the preparation of a new party programme (the first since 1978). After Austria’s accession 
to the EU in 1994 and the election of social-democratic parties in many European countries, SPÖ 
leader Victor Klima (1994–99) sought to demonstrate ideological and personal proximity to Tony 
Blair and Gerhard Schröder. Preparations for a new party programme, which aimed give the party 
a modernised public profile, were then used by SPÖ school-reform advocates to also devise a 
new education programme – the first comprehensive programme published since 1969 (SPÖ, 
1999a; SPÖ, 1999b). This new education programme linked traditional SPÖ ambitions with the 
emerging debate about life-long learning, which was popular across the EU (Einem, 1999; 
Swoboda, 1999). The priority Tony Blair had given education policy in his Third Way discourses 
was also perceived as useful for the SPÖ’s education agenda (Karl Duffek,12 interview, 2015). 
Interestingly, Tony Blair’s critique of comprehensive schooling in England was not commented 
on by SPÖ education policy makers as the party reiterated its support for comprehensive 
schooling (Wiener Zeitung, 1997). In an attempt to overcome the usual party-political 
controversies, comprehensive schooling (Gesamtschule) was renamed as ‘common schooling’ 
(Gemeinsame Schule): 
When we presented the draft of the education program to the media, we were asked: 
‘Are you now not supporting comprehensive schooling anymore?’ The Conservatives 
have succeeded in attaching the comprehensive school to the negative notion of 
‘hotpot school’ [Eintopfschule]. We do however still advocate for comprehensive 
schooling. We will not give up on a concept … which has been implemented in most 
European countries (with conservative approval) and which has proven beneficial. 
(Swoboda, 1999: 14) 
                                                     
12 Karl A. Duffek was director of the SPÖ think tank Karl Renner Institut from 1990 until his death in 2016 
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Overall, the SPÖ 1998 party programme (SPÖ, 1998) contained many ‘Third Way’ elements, such 
as a generally positive outlook on the market and the new role of the state, and a focus on 
individual rights and responsibilities (Cap and Duffek, 1999: 136). Despite some similarities 
between the discourse between New Labour’s manifestos in the mid-1990s and this SPÖ program 
(Stuiber, 1998), however, the SPÖ did not fundamentally alter its programmatic-ideological 
stance. While holding on to the goal of an expansive welfare state, by the 1980s the SPÖ had 
already become a centre-left, mainstream-European party with a pragmatic economic policy 
stance (Pelinka, 2013). 
5.1.2 The third attempt for comprehensive schooling (2000–12) 
In the 1999 parliamentary elections the SPÖ suffered major losses. Despite remaining the 
strongest party in parliament (with 33 per cent of the vote), the SPÖ found itself in political 
opposition for the first time in 30 years when the ÖVP and the FPÖ formed a coalition 
government. While the SPÖ, under new party leader Alfred Gusenbauer (2000–08), tried to come 
to terms with this unfamiliar role as opposition party (Gehler, 2006: 49), the incoming centre-right 
coalition government initiated a programme of welfare-state restructuring and retrenchment 
(Tálos, 2006). In light of budget cuts for schools and other unpopular reforms – particularly the 
reintroduction of tuition fees, which the SPÖ government had abolished in 1972 – education 
policy once again rose on the SPÖ’s agenda (SPÖ, 2002).  
We had a party leader with Alfred Gusenbauer who was well versed in education 
policy issues … And who liked to talk about it. So it was always clear that this is a topic 
which the party leader emphasises as well … and the second thing was, we had a 
good team which was able to work unburdened form daily politics … being in 
opposition gives you more opportunities to demand things … and we were also lucky 
having a school minister as our counterpart which had a rather unlucky story, with 
the introduction of tuition fees, so [education minister] Gehrer has really lost all the 
credit with the teachers and the pupils and the students. And this constellation has 
facilitated things, but we still had to work hard, there wasn’t a month without a press 
conference from the parliamentary party about education policy and Gusenbauer 
attended about a third of these. (Erwin Niederwieser, interview, 2015) 
In addition to this conducive political context for SPÖ school reform advocates, it was in 
particular the publication of the first PISA studies (OECD, 2001; OECD, 2004) which awarded 
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education policy unprecedented attention in media and public debates in Austria (Bauer et al., 
2005; Popp, 2010). Although Austrian education researchers had long criticised early selection, it 
was only with the PISA studies that detailed comparative data on the association between family 
background and educational achievement became available. In addition to highlighting the 
particular strength of this association in Austria, the PISA studies also revealed a comparatively 
average student performance (despite with comparatively high spending), which challenged 
widespread beliefs among politicians and the public about the superiority of Austria’s (selective) 
education system (Member of the government’s Education Expert Commission 2003–05, 
interview, 2015). Widespread assumptions about educational standards were particularly 
challenged in late 2004, when the second round of PISA results showed even lower average 
performance and Austria experienced its own ‘PISA-shock’ (Bauer et al., 2005). Within this context, 
demands for comprehensive schooling became additional backing through the explicit 
recommendation of PISA-representative Andreas Schleicher to postpone the age of selection in 
Austria (Der Standard, 2004). By the end of 2004, comprehensive schooling had become the 
dominant topic in political educational debates (Witzmann, 2005), the media was paying greater 
attention to the Finnish comprehensive school system, and more and more social and political 
actors were coming out in favour of postponing selection (particularly voices from business, the 
Church and even the ÖVP; see e.g. Der Standard, 14 September 2003).  
SPÖ education spokespeople Erwin Niederwieser and Josef Broukal, perceiving education policy 
as a key asset in developing the party’s profile for the upcoming election in 2006 (Niederwieser, 
2008), started to develop a new education programme (SPÖ, 2004) that formally endorsed 
comprehensive schooling. The education spokespeople regularly reiterated this demand (Die 
Presse, 2004), but the party’s electoral campaign on education initially emphasised policies 
perceived as less contentious, such as the expansion of early-childhood education and full-day 
schooling, and abolishing tuition fees for higher education (Niederwieser, interview, 2015). After 
the publication of the findings of the second PISA round in December 2004, the party became 
less cautious; SPÖ leader Gusenbauer announced that, in the case of a Red–Green majority in the 
2006 elections, it would push for the introduction of comprehensive schooling (Die Presse, 
2005b). 
In the meantime, the centre-right government found itself under increasing pressure to 
introduce education reforms in response to the PISA results, and appointed an expert commission 
led by the Austrian PISA coordinator. In its first report, the commission recommended a 
fundamental change to the Austrian model of school governance – from ‘resource-based input-
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steering by the central administration to results-based output-steering’ – to improve the quality 
of Austrian education (Zukunftskommission, 2003: 7). This included implementing a national 
system of quality control with regular central testing of pupil performance at key transition points 
(Bildungsstandards), as well as devolving greater autonomy and responsibility for quality 
development to individual schools. Most of these changes required two-thirds of the 
parliamentarian vote. Being in opposition, the SPÖ now become the main veto player for 
government school reforms. 
In these changing political circumstances – with the ÖVP now aiming for introducing 
educational reforms – ÖVP education minister Gehrer announced her willingness to abolish the 
two-thirds-majority requirement in all areas of school legislation – a long-term demand of SPÖ 
school reformers. However, concerns were now raised within the SPÖ about how the end of the 
two-thirds majority requirement in turn diminishes the SPÖ’s status as a veto player for future 
school reforms by a centre-right government, which could include the introduction of market-
oriented reforms in public schooling in Austria (Der Standard, 2005; Die Presse, 2005a). In an 
unusual coalition, the SPÖ approached the Catholic Church and together they started to advocate 
for retaining a two-thirds-majority requirement for particular core principles, such as the ‘public 
nature’ of schooling (and the ban on tuition fees for public secondary schooling) and the existing 
regulations on state subsidies for Catholic private schools and religious instruction in public 
schools. Minister Gehrer retaliated by demanding in turn to keep the principle of differentiated 
schooling in constitutional rank – an issue for which a platform of Catholic organisations and 
Conservative teacher associations had started to mobilise very vocally (Die Presse, 2005b; 
Nimmervoll, 2005; Die Presse, 2005c). In 2005, SPÖ and ÖVP agreed a compromise which 
abolished the two-thirds requirement for most areas of school legislation, thereby allowing to 
introduce the recommendations of the expert commission, with the exception of the 
aforementioned ‘core principles’ – including the differentiated nature of Austrian school 
education. While the SPÖ initially insisted that this would not prevent the introduction of 
comprehensive schooling as such13, the party was widely criticised among school policy activists 
                                                     
13 The compromise entailed a vague formulation around ‘adequately differentiated secondary schooling’. The 
SPÖ initially insisted that this would allow for the introduction of comprehensive schooling (since the school 
system would remain differentiated after the age of 14), but constitutional experts remained sceptical (Die 
Presse, 6 Mai 2005; Kobenter, 2005). The continuing requirement of a two-thirds majority for introducing 
comprehensive schooling has since become accepted. 
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as having de facto sold out the future option of introducting comprehensive schooling (e.g. Green 
Party education spokesperson, interview, 2015).  
The 2006 election brought an unexpected victory for the SPÖ. In coalition negotiations, 
the ÖVP insisted on retaining selective schooling as one of its three conditions for forming a 
coalition government (Der Standard, 2006). A compromise was found that allowed a small 
number of school experiments on ‘differentiation’ and ‘individualisation’ in secondary schooling 
(Bundeskanzleramt, 2007) – a vague formation that the new SPÖ school minister Claudia Schmied 
used to announce experiments with non-selective ‘New Middle Schools’ (NMS) (Neue 
Mittelschule). A new expert commission, again under the leadership of the pro-comprehensive-
schooling PISA Austria coordinator Gunter Haider, was appointed to work out a concrete design 
for these schools, which would involve a ‘new learning culture’ based on more flexible forms of 
internal differentiation and individualisation (including team teaching with Gymnasium and 
Hauptschul teachers) (ExpertInnenkommission, 2007). 
(Was there ever an opportunity for comprehensive schooling without school 
experiments?) No, there was such a hostile front … and I thought ... the door doesn’t 
open that often, we need to try this New Middle School, with the additional 
resources, with the team teaching, with the new name, so that we take a step … since 
the middle of the interwar period, we [have] demand[ed] comprehensive schooling. 
We can’t keep debating in theory, we need to go into the field. That was my 
motivation, create facts and take it from there. (Claudia Schmied, interview, 2015) 
For the ÖVP the Gymnasium was set in stone. And with the Hauptschule, we knew 
there were deficits. What can we do? Tracking didn’t work, streaming didn’t work, we 
need to do something else. And then there was this idea about the New Middle 
School, trying to incorporate Gymnasium teachers in order to be able to differentiate 
more internally because the groups were more heterogeneous than in the 
Gymnasium, so we could address problems there and invest additional resources. 
(Elmar Mayer, interview, 2015) 
There was a passage in the coalition agreement around the creation of ‘model 
regions’ … this was worded vaguely, so we have used it politically … [so] that in 
alliance with the Länder [governments] [we could] develop model regions for lower-
secondary schooling. We, of course, aimed at introducing comprehensive schooling 
in model regions which would comprise entire Länder … that was the original idea. 
(SPÖ senior civil servant, interview, 2015) 
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The hope that these experiments would involve all schools (including the Gymnasium) within 
‘model regions’ (ideally, entire Länder), thereby de facto abolishing the Gymnasium as a separate 
school for ages 10–14, was premature. Over the next five years, negotiations between the SPÖ 
school minister, the ÖVP, the teaching unions and the Länder governments became increasingly 
protracted as controversies arose over the number and nature of these experiments which 
reflected considerable differences in ideology and struggles over influence in schooling provision. 
Although the ÖVP had become under pressure from a range of societal actors, including 
influential employer interests (Industriellenvereinigung, 2006; Die Sozialpartner Austria, 2007) to 
soften its stance, the party maintained its effective opposition to comprehensive schooling. It 
successfully prevented the introduction of school experiments across whole regions, and insisted 
that each school applying to participate in the NMS programme required the support of two-
thirds of all teachers and parents, thereby largely preventing the participation of Gymnasiums 
(Nimmervoll, 2011). 
In 2008, the first NMS-experiments started in five of the nine Austrian Länder. With their 
additional funding from the federal government for team teaching, the experiments proved 
popular and Länder governments pushed for their expansion (Der Standard, 2008). However, the 
negotiations between the SPÖ school minister and the ÖVP university minister soon completely 
broke down, which necessitated negotiations at the highest level between the SPÖ federal 
chancellor and the ÖVP vice-chancellor. Additional fights between the parties in other policy 
areas led to the breakdown of the coalition and preliminary elections in 2008. After both parties 
suffered their worst election results since 1945, they agreed to form a new coalition, without 
having come any closer to an agreement over the future of the school experiments. In 2009 and 
2010, increasingly hostile negotiations with teaching unions over a new teacher labour code had 
largely paralysed the SPÖ school minister’s policy agenda. At the same time, rising demand for 
places in the NMS, and their popularity among the Länder, put pressure on the ÖVP to allow the 
expansion of the programme, and more and more Conservative voices spoke out in favour of 
postponing selection in general (Die Presse, 2010). After many rounds of negotiations and 
deadlock, the ÖVP surprised with suggesting to convert all Hauptschulen to New Middle Schools. 
Concerned about the future of her project, the SPÖ school minister eventually agreed (Die Presse, 
2011), justifying this compromise with her desire to see at least some changes in school 
organisation after decades of non-reform. 
Interestingly, [the suggestion to convert all Hauptschulen] has come, somehow 
surprisingly fast, from the ÖVP. We wanted to first evaluate the schools, but the 
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pressure among the Hauptschul teaching unions has increased because team 
teaching would involve more teaching staff and also the pressure from the Länder  
… the conversion would certainly have come two or three years later, if we had 
followed the initial plan … I’d say this doesn’t change much in the overall project … 
the teachers that really wanted to participate, they are committed and the conversion 
of the others just needs a bit more support and guidance, but ultimately it is a matter 
of time. (Schmied, interview, 2015) 
The slogan was, ‘the New Middle School comes, the Gymnasium stays’. And the 
school minister tried to fend it off and said we need to fund this, this is a lot of money, 
and the ÖVP who had the finance ministry … all agreed … we’ll fund it … and with the 
pressure from schools, we want this too, and the demand of the coalition partner to 
expand it to all schools … the money is provided … we were in a predicament and 
so, for better or worse, we agreed ... and this is an example of this tedious story … as 
it happens, the foul compromises in a coalition. (Mayer, interview, 2015) 
In 2012, 30 years after the 1982 compromise had ended the political debate on comprehensive 
schooling, a strikingly similar compromise was found to modernise and improve the Hauptschule, 
while maintaining the differentiated nature of lower-secondary schooling. Compared to the 
Hauptschule, the NMS brought more flexible arrangements for internal differentiation and in 
theory easier transitions for high-achieving graduates into the upper cycle of the Gymnasium 
(through a differentiated assessment system at age 14) (Eder et al., 2015). By agreeing to convert 
all Hauptschulen to NMS, the SPÖ hoped that the new learning culture around individualisation 
and team teaching would both sustain the popular demand for the schools and mark the first 
step towards comprehensive schooling (SPÖ, 2013).  
Among comprehensive schooling advocates, however, this renewed ‘Hauptschul-Reform’ 
led to much disappointment as it was seen as further perpetuating the two-tracked nature of the 
Austrian school system: 
Generations of social democratic education policymakers turn in their grave. (Seel, 
2012) 
A big mistake, they have been led into temptation by the ÖVP. I still hear the slightly 
jubilant sentence of the ÖVP party leader, ‘the middle school comes, the Gymnasium 
stays’ … I had the impression the school minister was rather disconnected at the end, 
in the ministry there was a defensive circle around the New Middle School, to pull it 
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through at all costs … and comprehensive schooling has once again been sacrificed 
for a short-term gain. (Education researcher and member various government expert 
commissions in the 2000s; Interview 2015) 
Personally, I think that it wouldn’t have taken much longer and the ÖVP would have 
… had to declare … where they stand, are they for a segregated school system from 
the age of ten or are they for comprehensive schooling. We have spared them … 
through this New Middle School construction … and somehow the SPÖ has opened 
the door where they could slip away and now they have an easy time to argue: ‘now 
that we have the New Middle School, why should we change anything anytime 
soon?’. (Niederwieser, interview, 2015) 
[The New Middle School] was a mistake in its implementation, because the ÖVP 
demanded to convert all Hauptschulen, it didn’t give the New Middle School a 
chance … some [schools] weren’t ready, they didn’t want it … the teachers were not 
trained, they had never practised team teaching. (Mayer, interview, 2015) 
Since the compromise in 2012, comprehensive schooling has remained official party policy (SPÖ, 
2013) but disappeared from the agenda of the coalition government, particularly during the term 
of the last SPÖ school minister (2016–17) (Der Standard, 2016).  
5.1.3 Continuity and change in SPÖ school policy  
Programmatically, the SPÖ’s commitment to comprehensive schooling goes back to the 1920s. 
Since then, no leading party official has renounced their support for comprehensive schooling, 
nor openly criticised the principle. In programmatic terms, many aspirations underpinning the 
educational thinking of the 1920s, and later the 1970s, are still visible in current programmes, but 
the agenda has generally become more fragmented. Despite continuity in the programmatic 
demand, political constraints on introducing comprehensive schooling created a split between 
the party’s education policy ‘on paper’ and its strategy for school policy during its long periods 
of holding the school ministry, in which it focused on expanding educational opportunities within 
the existing differentiated system. 
At the core of the ‘Viennese school reform’ of the 1920s was the concept of a common 
middle school (Allgemeine Mittelschule), which linked questions of school organisation and 
selection to curricular and pedagogical reforms, as well as to an encompassing programme for 
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improvements in teacher training and social and child welfare (for details see Glöckel and Achs, 
1985). Some elements – such as the strong focus on the individual child, the goal of 
democratisation within and through schooling, and a general emancipatory goal of education 
policy – still resonate in contemporary programmes (e.g. SPÖ, 2004). These commitments have 
also been regularly updated with new themes arising from contemporary educational research 
and international reform discourses. Overall, though, the reform agenda in the party’s 
programmatic and political debates has narrowed – as early as the 1970s – to questions of school 
organisation (external and internal differentiation), while curricular and pedagogical questions 
have received less attention.  
SPÖ proposals for comprehensive schooling (Gesamtschule or Gemeinsame Schule) have 
aimed to unify the lower level of secondary schooling (ages 10–14/15), which would involve 
integrating the ‘general’ track of lower-secondary schooling (the Hauptschule) with the lower level 
of the academic secondary schools (the Gymnasium). Closely linked with comprehensive 
schooling in SPÖ’s education policy was the demand to unify teacher training for all secondary 
school teachers. SPÖ policymakers generally saw the differentiated nature of upper-secondary 
education (ages 14–18/19), with its various school types along the academic–vocational spectrum, 
as desirable, because it was seen to give young people choices and labour-market opportunities. 
In practice, efforts here centred on broadening vocational curricula towards more ‘general 
education’ (Allgemeinbildung) through a greater modularisation of the curriculum in upper-
secondary schooling, blurring the line between different types of Gymnasium and vocational 
college routes (Schnell, 1980: 120; SPÖ, 1999a; SPÖ, 1999a). 
While comprehensive schooling was intended to overcome the degree of external 
differentiation in lower-secondary schooling, the SPÖ has never officially endorsed the absence 
of internal differentiation (mixed-ability teaching, currently supported by the Green Party). In the 
1960s and 1970s, key school reformers outlined that some form of internal differentiation was 
necessary to cater for different abilities and needs (Schnell, 1980: 111; Schnell, 1980: 22; 64), while 
others were more supportive of mixed-ability teaching (Matzenauer, interview, 2016). Teachers 
participating in the 1970s experiments also tended to support more flexible forms of mixed-ability 
teaching (Schnell, 1993: 239), and a few left-wing educators raised concerns over the reproduction 
of mechanisms of social selection through school-internal differentiation practices in the 1970s 
experiments (Kutalek, 1976: 9–10). Official party policy has remained in favour of internal 
differentiation, but proposals have become more flexible; for example, from streaming (in the 
1920s experiments and to setting experiments (in the 1970s experiment and subsequently in the 
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Hauptschule) to more flexible forms of differentiation and individualisation, such as temporary 
grouping and team teaching, in the NMS experiments (in the 2000s). A key reason for why the 
SPÖ insisted on some internal differentiation was also the anticipation of political resistance. 
Highlighting the internally differentiated nature of comprehensive schooling was also seen as a 
political necessity to counter political attacks and public worries over the levelling down of 
educational standards, which endangered the whole project of comprehensive schooling 
(Matzenauer, interview, 2016; Achs, interview, 2015). An additional (and perhaps even stronger) 
motivation for internal differentiation emerged from the institutional constraints of the secondary 
school system itself. Comprehensive schooling (experiments) needed to ensure that it remained 
possible for high-achieving pupils to transfer into the upper level of the Gymnasium at the age 
of 14, which was achieved via differentiating by ability in the Hauptschule or the experimental 
comprehensive schools (SPÖ, 1969; Schnell, 1980; Achs, interview, 2015). Most interviewees 
stressed the need for internal differentiation in comprehensive schooling today, but implied that 
this should be flexible and within the discretion of the school or teachers.  
In terms of the curriculum, similar pragmatic approaches have shaped SPÖ policy on 
comprehensive schooling. The 1920s reform programmes had broad ambitions to restructure the 
curriculum to align the content of schooling to children’s life realities (Lebensrealität), and to 
overcome strict divisions between academic and vocational education ( (Glöckel and Achs, 1985). 
Most of these aspirations can be found in the SPÖ’s programmes throughout of the 1970s, and 
even within the party’s contemporary programmes. These debates – including calls for political 
education, less subject-oriented curriculum and more modularisation – are visible in school 
programmes (SPÖ, 1999b; SPÖ, 2004) but rarely debated under the banner of comprehensive 
schooling. Questions around comprehensive schooling specifically have focused on aligning the 
curriculum of proposed comprehensive schools (and then, in practice, the Hauptschule) with that 
of the Gymnasium to enable transitions (Schnell, 1980: 126). The pragmatic alignment of the 
curricula of the Hauptschule and Gymnasium allowed the former to have general rather than 
vocational curriculum, but it also prevented more fundamental debates over what kind of 
education a ‘common school’ (Gemeinsame Schule) should provide. While the 1970s school 
reformers engaged in much theorising around the curriculum (see in particular Schnell, 1980), 
curricular questions have since become rarely featured in comprehensive schooling debates. This 
was apparent from the interviews conducted for this research, in which, beyond a general 
endorsement of ‘broad general education’, questions about the content of comprehensive 
schooling elicited little response. 
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The narrowing of the SPÖ’s comprehensive schooling around agenda organisational 
issues is particularly visible in pedagogical questions, which again were a fundamental part of the 
1920s vision for comprehensive schooling (Achs, interview 2015). Some left-wing teacher circles 
tried to reconnect with this debate in the 1970s (and to then-thriving Europe-wide debates over 
equality and social justice within and through pedagogical practice). This engagement was 
generally supported by SPÖ school ministers and spokespeople of the time, but failed to gain 
much ground in party debates or policy practice in schools at that time (Achs, 2013b: 14–5; 
Kutalek, 1972). Since then, the pedagogical dimension of the SPÖ’s education programmes has 
become less pronounced, apart from a general commitment to more child-centred and 
individualised teaching and learning and the replacement of rigid numerical grades at the end of 
each school year (SPÖ, 1983; SPÖ, 1999a; Achs, interview, 2015).  
Overall, the party’s comprehensive schooling policy in the 1970s was already mostly 
focused on organisational questions of external and internal differentiation, in the 30 years 
between 1982 and 2012 the party’s comprehensive schooling policy changed very little in terms 
of its programmatic aspirations.  
However, an assessment of SPÖ school policy needs to address the existence of a clear 
gap between the party’s programmatic commitment to comprehensive schooling and its actual 
policy strategy pursued when it led the school ministry (1970–94) (Hilde Hawlicek, interview, 
201514, Matzenauer, interview, 2016). The emphasis of creating ‘bridges and transitions’ (‘Brücken 
und Übergänge’) within the differentiated school system gradually improved educational 
opportunities for those pupils not selected into the Gymnasium (Schnell, 1980: 120). In practice, 
the SPÖ’s school policy, however, also included expanding access to the Gymnasium itself, 
particularly of girls and children from rural areas. Overall, the SPÖ’s strategic choices in schoo l 
policy have therefore in the long-run contributed to stabilising the existing differentiated system. 
In contrast to England, debates about comprehensive schooling in Austria have not been 
explicitly linked to school governance questions. However, during the recent (since 2007) episode 
of school policy change (driven by the SPÖ school ministry) there have been considerable 
changes in Austria’s school governance and administrative framework, with strong input from the 
OECD. The main emphasis in political debates about school administration in Austria has been 
the power and influence between the Lander and Federal government, which share 
                                                     
14 Hilde Hawlicek was SPÖ school minister from 1987-1990 
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responsibilities for schooling in a complicated constitutional framework. The SPÖ has always 
tended to favour centralisation of responsibilities at the federal level, reflecting ambitions to 
overcome regional inequalities as well as the party’s stronger power base in the federal 
government compared to the Länder governments. Within a highly bureaucratic system of school 
administration in Austria, schools themselves had long essentially functioned as ‘subordinate 
administrative units’ (Lassnigg, 2016), with few freedoms to make decisions over their curriculum 
or teacher allocation. In addition, until recently the allocation of school leadership positions 
followed a clientelist model based on party membership in either of the two main parties (SPÖ 
or ÖVP). Since 2007, the SPÖ-led ministry has endorsed the OECD critique of Austria’s highly 
bureaucratic and ‘input-oriented’ model of school administration, and pushed for a more ‘output-
oriented’ system (Mayer, interview, 2015; see also e.g. Schmid et al., 2004: 50). The latter would 
involve giving schools greater autonomy over their budgets, curriculum and day-to-day running, 
while measuring their performance centrally through a new system of national testing of 
educational standards and the standardisation of high-school-leaving examinations at 18/19 (Eder 
and Thonhauser, 2015: 45–6). This centralised system of quality assurance and performance 
monitoring reflects SPÖ’s traditional concern with securing equal entitlements and provision, as 
well as its frustration with hitherto lacking comparable data on educational trajectories and 
inequalities across the federalised system (Schmied, SPÖ senior civil servants I & II, Niederwieser, 
interviews, 2015).  
The SPÖ’s recent support for more school autonomy is a rather new concern. While 
giving schools more pedagogical freedoms and teachers more participation in delivering 
education has theoretically been a demand among social-democratic school reformers since the 
1920s, the SPÖ has generally been wedded to a more centralised understanding of school 
administration. In the 1970s, a rather top-down and bureaucratic approach to school reform was 
reinforced by the aim of overcoming political opposition to school reforms from the ÖVP and 
the teaching force through a strong steering of the school experiments by the SPÖ-dominated 
school ministry (Schnell, 1993: 298–9). This has been criticised by educationists for leaving little 
space for bottom-up pedagogical innovation by teachers (Kutalek, 1972; Dermutz, 1983a: 28; 
Gruber, 2015: 57). In the early 1990s, under an SPÖ school minister, schools gained more 
autonomy over some parts of their budgets and some curricular flexibility. From the interviews, 
it appears that prevalent views within the SPÖ tend to favour school autonomy regarding the 
internal organisation of teaching and learning and the development of more subject profiles, but 
most are sceptical towards schools gaining full responsibility for hiring, budgets or even 
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admissions. However, there appears to be limited shared consensus over the party’s approach to 
decentralisation and school autonomy:  
I always tried to avoid the term ‘autonomy’ and tried instead to talk about 
responsibility at the school level, more decision-making power, to make responsibility 
come to live. As long as everything works through regulations and decrees, there’s 
always an excuse … the evil ministry.. [my aim was] to turn this around. (Schmied, 
interview, 2015) 
If I’m being mean I'd say that the SPÖ currently has no position [on] what autonomy 
should look like. (Education policy activist, interview, 2015) 
We did have clear positions, but [it was] everyone for themselves. For example, 
during my time we developed a position paper in the parliamentary club and then 
we negotiated in working groups with the Länder governments and the ministry … 
but if you go into detail [about] what is meant by autonomy, then positions diverge 
diametrically. The Länder governments think we [should] replace a federal centralism 
with a Länder centralism … I would rather reduce the latter and give more 
responsibility to the school level. (Mayer, interview, 2015) 
Everybody understands something different by ‘school autonomy’; some say schools 
can have a say in hiring teachers ... the others say local parents should have a say … 
I like to look at the Finnish example … [where] the ministry specifies the content, 
curriculum and other areas and then there is the school, I could imag[in]e this to 
work here as well, I’ll give the resources directly to schools, depending on their needs, 
pupil numbers, pupils with migration background or special needs. (Mayer, interview, 
2015) 
Overall, changes in school governance driven by the SPÖ school ministry in the 2000s have 
shifted towards a New Public Management agenda but have not explicitly endorsed a market 
approach to governance (i.e. they have not used school competition as their primary governance 
mechanism, e.g. by publishing school performance data to stimulate competition) – although 
there are indications that decentralisation policies have increased competitive dynamics between 
schools (Altrichter et al., 2005; Altrichter et al., 2015). In the interviews, the possibility of publishing 
individual schools’ performance data, which had become available after the introduction of 
national testing (Bildungsstandards), was generally perceived as positive by SPÖ policy makers 
(including comprehensive schooling advocates).   
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I’d argue strongly in favour [of publishing performance data] because I think that this 
would bring more transparency … it would increase responsibility … the conservatives 
claim that this would lead to an explosion in private schools … I don’t think that … 
because I assume that this would only make sense if you have schools which are led 
well … I would not give all of them autonomy overnight … but would act purposefully 
step by step. (Mayer, interview, 2015) 
 
Summing up, since the 1970s the SPÖ’s engagement with comprehensive schooling policy has 
exhibited considerable programmatic stability, and has sparked rather little internal debate or 
disagreement over policy and ideas per se. However, the SPÖ’s case clearly shows an uneasy 
balance between repeated ideological commitment on the one hand and hesitant, pragmatic 
politics, in face of considerable constraints in education policy-making, on the other. Recurrent 
pledges of support for comprehensive schooling as the centrepiece of social-democratic 
education policy coexisted, over long periods, with an unwillingness to engage in high-level 
debates about school policy.  
 
5.2 Policy formation in the SPÖ and the lonely quest for comprehensive 
schooling 
SPÖ school policy has evolved within a context of significant political constraints on school 
reforms. The source of these constraints has largely been the opposition of ÖVP, the votes of 
which have until now been required to meet the two-thirds quota for school reforms, and which 
has become the main coalition partner for the SPÖ. Since the 1920s, the question of differentiation 
in lower-secondary schooling has attracted a high degree of confrontation, which has left limited 
leeway for debating the substantial matters of educational reform or research evidence 
(Robinsohn et al., 1975; Glowka, 1975; Gruber, 2006). Further barriers to school reforms emerged 
from the mobilisation of the Gymnasium teaching unions against comprehensive schooling and 
the intertwining of constitutional responsibilities for secondary schooling between the federal 
and Länder governments. In light of these obstacles, the SPÖ has frequently displayed a highly 
pragmatic and compromise-oriented perspective, and, as a result, has been the target of 
scepticism as to the authenticity of its support for comprehensive schooling (Dermutz, 1983a; 
Dermutz, 1983b; Pelinka, 1985; Gruber, 2015) 
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This section will explore why, given the extent of the aforementioned political constraints, 
comprehensive schooling has remained on the party’s agenda. It will also consider the strength 
of internal party support for such schooling, as well as key actors’ perceptions of the constraints 
on and opportunities for school reforms, the strategies they have undertaken (or refrained from 
undertaking) to overcome them, and the tensions this has produced within the party. 
5.2.1 Political obstacles  
The most dominant characteristic in Austrian school politics has been a fundamental opposition 
between Social-Democratic and Christian-Conservative camps, which stretches back to the early 
20th century, particularly around comprehensive schooling and the role of the Church in 
education. During the post-war decades, antagonisms and ideological differences between the 
parties narrowed in many policy areas (Seeleib-Kaiser et al., 2005: 9), but school policy was one 
of the few areas in which the rigid polarisation survived. To defuse this issue, both parties agreed 
to a compromise in 1962, which maintained the selective system but allowed the expansion of 
opportunities for those pupils not selected at the age of ten. To secure this compromise and 
guarantee both parties a veto position in school reforms, school legislation became part of the 
constitution, meaning that a two-thirds parliamentary majority was required to amend it.  
The ÖVP remains opposed to comprehensive schooling today; it presents itself as the 
‘defender’ of the Gymnasium (Gruber, 2015: 63) and regularly pledges its fundamental opposition 
to comprehensive schooling and its ‘commitment’ or ‘creed’ (Bekenntnis) to a differentiated 
school system in which children are sorted into a hierarchy of educational routes, based on their 
innate abilities and corresponding to different social functions (Olechowski, 1988: 17; Amon, 2006: 
548). Key themes in its school policy discourse are merit (Leistung), educational diversity and 
parental rights (Katschthaler, 1983: 111). While the ÖVP has incorporated aspects of New Right 
thinking into other areas of its policy (Tálos, 2006), it has so far not explicitly supported quasi-
markets in education and retains a generally statist orientation to school governance – mingled 
with the traditional notion of ‘subsidiarity’ in Catholic social teaching and the emphasis on 
parents’ right to choose the best education for their child (including in Catholic private schools) 
(Schnell, 1993: 306; Gruber, 2015: 66).   
As the previous chapter indicated, though, voices within the ÖVP have become more 
diverse. Within the party’s ‘economic wing’ and the closely related employer organisations 
(Economic Chamber and Federation of Austrian Industrialists), in particular, support for 
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postponing selection have grown over the past two decades. A range of individuals, often in 
regional ÖVP branches, has also expressed outspoken support for comprehensive schooling, and 
some (but not all) Catholic or Church-affiliated organisations have likewise expressed support for 
overcoming the differentiated nature of schooling. In the interviews, SPÖ policymakers regularly 
highlighted their experience of more pragmatic voices within the ÖVP, as early as the 1960s 
(Matzenauer, interview, 2016) as well as more recently (Schmied & Niederwieser, interviews, 2015). 
However, as the most recent episode of school reforms demonstrated, the ÖVP has thus far been 
able to close ranks around its traditional opposition to comprehensive schooling.  
SPÖ actors have perceived the highly organised Gymnasium teaching unions, which are 
well connected within the ÖVP, as the main lobby defending the Gymnasium. In 2007, the head 
of this union was even nominated as the ÖVP’s education spokesperson and chief negotiator for 
school reforms. Gymnasium teachers have developed a vested interest in the differentiated 
system of secondary schooling, which has been reinforced by the differentiation between 
teachers of the Hauptschule and the Gymnasium) regarding their training, qualifications, and the 
resultant differences in labour law, pay and social status. Through their influential position in the 
ÖVP, their strong negotiation position (as part of the highly organised civil servant union) and 
their influence over the public debate, Gymnasium teachers were named in most interviews as 
the main obstacle to introducing comprehensive schooling. 
A strong and influential group within the ÖVP, the Gymnasium union representatives 
... who are strongly interconnected within the ÖVP and who repeatedly managed to 
prevent reforms against any reason, because they just make pure clientelistic politics 
for Gymnasium teachers. (Mayer, interview, 2015) 
Definitely the group of Gymnasium proponents … The biggest problem in education 
policy is the fact that education policy issues are dominated by the teaching union 
so that the ÖVP de facto doesn’t take any decision against its teaching union. For 
me, this was almost a paradox, that a party which calls itself the party of the economy, 
is in the public sector so controlled by the union … In reality, it is about ... status 
thinking ... ‘we have studied at university and we are something better’, there you 
already have this superiority–inferiority thinking and this thinking in boxes. (Schmied, 
interview, 2015) 
They think they are something better … because they went to university and the 
[Hauptschul] teachers have ‘only’ [been to] the teacher colleges … in the 
comprehensive school, the super-intelligent Gymnasium teachers would need to sit 
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next to the dumb ones from the Hauptschule in the staff room … that was [a problem] 
with the school experiments … and that remains until today. (Hawlicek, interview, 
2015) 
Further constraints on policy-making stem from the fragmented and overlapping division of 
responsibility for education policy in the federalist system, particularly in secondary schooling. 
While Länder governments are responsible for the provision of the Hauptschule, the federal 
government has authority over the Gymnasium (Lassnigg, 2016; Eder and Thonhauser, 2015: 45). 
Merging the lower-secondary level into a comprehensive school system would therefore require 
a compromise (in the form of a constitutional contract) over the future division of authority (and 
resources) in secondary schooling. The potential for Länder governments to block educational 
reforms became particularly visible in the post-2017 NMS experiments. Länder governments 
turned out to be a difficult ally for the school ministry. They were helpful in their desire to speed 
up the school experiments and their expansion and thereby putting pressure on the ÖVP but also 
challenged the school minister with their insistence on devising their own organisational models. 
Ultimately, negotiations became a struggle over influence and resources between the federal and 
the Länder governments, irrespective of their partisan composition (Niederwieser & SPÖ Senior 
civil servant I, interview, 2015): 
[The proposal] was watered down in every round of negotiations. … From the 
regional clusters which would have spanned the federal states quickly to smaller 
units, local or district clusters … we departed more and more from the initial model 
character ... what was left was this system of the New Middle School which then 
started and which was tied in tightly with the question of resources. (SPÖ senior civil 
servant I, interview, 2015)  
Regarding the practical implementation, the heads of the federal states are very 
powerful in Austria. They threaten their politicians at the federal government, their 
ministers, to refuse their support if they want to change anything at the cost of the 
Länder … I’m a supporter of federalism in many areas but here it is to the detriment 
of children and education policy. (Mayer, interview, 2015) 
Overall, the requirement of a two-thirds majority, the influence of the Gymnasium teachers and 
the nature of education policy-making in a federalist system are three key constraints for most 
school reforms, and were stated as key barriers to introducing comprehensive schooling in 
Austria. However, the SPÖ has frequently been accused of having contributed to its own inability 
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to introduce school reforms, due to its highly pragmatic and consensus-oriented political 
behaviour after 1945. Within Austria’s hyper-consensual post-war politics, both parties shared a 
strong elite consensus over compromise (Lijphart, 1969; Lehmbruch, 1967; Pelinka, 2006; Pelinka, 
2009) and benefited from partisan patronage in educational administration (particularly the 
inspectorate and school leadership). In education policy, both parties guaranteed their mutual 
veto position in the 1962 compromise. By creating and upholding this ‘educational partnership’, 
the SPÖ has frequently been accused of deliberately undermining its own ideological 
commitment, particularly in its backing down over comprehensive schooling in 1982 (e.g. 
Dermutz, 1983a, for a reply see Schnell, 1993: 301). Further evidence for this consensus orientation 
can be seen in the fact that SPÖ school ministers in the early 1980s could have introduced some 
measures, such as aligning the curricula in lower-secondary schooling by ministerial decree alone, 
but instead sought to find a parliamentary compromise with the ÖVP (Wollansky, 1983: 16). 
It is difficult to judge the extent to which the post-1980s restraint in SPÖ school policy 
reflects a pragmatic concern with requiring a two-thirds majority (masking limited support for 
comprehensive schooling) or a general belief that broad political support is needed to guarantee 
the viability of comprehensive schooling reforms in the long run. While the party’s school 
ministers remained supportive of comprehensive schooling in the 1980s, the dominance of this 
topic and the political stalemate around it have been perceived as a barrier to other reforms in 
the early 1990s:  
There is currently no two-thirds majority for new school legislation … comprehensive 
schooling [remains] as utopia … a desirable and aspirational goal. (Zilk, 1983: 5–6) 
School reform and school development need both … on the one hand the big visions 
… on the other hand also a method of small steps and compromises … I think it was 
right that we put school legislation in constitutional status in Austria … thereby we 
can avoid that every political change brings a change in school reforms. (Hawlicek, 
1988: 15) 
The predominant theme in education debates [is that] … we are fighting for 30 years 
over comprehensive schooling or not comprehensive schooling … my argument was 
not that this is unimportant, my argument was just that it is not as dominantly 
important as everyone acts. And if there are already barriers to realise 
comprehensive schooling, … then there are enough other areas … one could, of 
course, retreat and say ‘until we [have] settled the topic of comprehensive schooling, 
we are not touching anything else’, but that would be an excuse that nothing else 
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happens … I could be school minister for five years without doing anything … this 
appeared very bleak to me. (Rudolf Scholten,15 interview, 2015) 
[Comprehensive schooling] wasn’t a taboo, but the school minister [Scholten] said, 
as they say in Vienna, ‘let’s not cause waves’. But it was my role, on the other hand, 
to say, we need this, we are convinced of it. (Matzenauer, interview, 2015) 
It is difficult to empirically assert whether the SPÖ’s post-1982 school policy has been shaped by 
an inherent compromise orientation or a lack of political will (or even lack of support) for 
comprehensive schooling. What seems certain, however, is that the party’s office-seeking 
ambitions have remained strong; its status as the governing party (which it has maintained over 
long stretches since 1945) seems to have become a crucial dimension for its self-conception and 
its control of key power resources, the welfare state and the social insurance system (Pelinka, 
2013). While the general political culture of consensus orientation among SPÖ and ÖVP party 
elites in Austria has become much weaker since the 1980s, the SPÖ has become highly dependent 
on the ÖVP to govern since the loss of its absolute majority in 1983. The ÖVP has thus become 
not only crucial in preventing a two-thirds majority for comprehensive schooling but also, de 
facto, the only coalition partner for the SPÖ. The demand for comprehensive schooling has 
therefore regularly been discarded during coalition negotiations (Achs, interview, 2015; 
Matzenauer, interview, 2016; see also Seel and Scheipl, 2004): 
[in the 1980s] the SPÖ has lost its parliamentary majority ... it was already a minority 
party and the ÖVP and FPÖ could have formed a government ... the SPÖ continued 
to govern, but they were weakened and they learned, if the ÖVP says no, then there’s 
nothing you can do and then the pragmatics become stronger. (Is there still demand 
for comprehensive schooling?) Yes, that remained … but there weren’t many people 
to engage with these issues ... the intellectual capacities were rather lean … 
programmatically it remained … but it didn’t reach the coalition agreement. (SPÖ 
education activist policy, interview, 2015) 
The end of the Kreisky era [1983] ended the demand for comprehensive schooling. 
Too delicate for the coalition partner. And then you couldn’t … then it disappeared, 
in my perception … so until the election campaign of Alfred Gusenbauer, you couldn’t 
                                                     
15 Rudolf Scholten was SPÖ school minister from 1990-94 
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use the term ‘comprehensive schooling’ anymore … that was a no-go … the thorny 
issue … let’s leave that aside. (Education expert and policy activist, interview, 2015)  
It was only when the SPÖ went into political opposition in 2000 (for the first time since 1966-70) 
that the party’s leadership under Gusenbauer started to openly advocate for comprehensive 
schooling. But even then, the anticipation of having to form a coalition mediated the party’s 
support of comprehensive schooling: 
I think [comprehensive schooling] is pedagogically the best school type. I am 
however aware that we won’t reach a compromise with the ÖVP on comprehensive 
schooling. This will not be feasible within the next four years. We therefore need to 
take steps to make the school system, its inner quality, more comprehensive in 
nature. (Gusenbauer, interview in Die Presse, 2007) 
But even when ÖVP and SPÖ had agreed on school experiments as part of their coalition 
agreements in 2007, subsequent negotiations over these reforms strained the coalition, and 
federal chancellor Gusenbauer frequently appeared to distance himself from both the reforms 
and school minister Schmied. The SPÖ’s concessions to the ÖVP led to much frustration among 
school policy activists.  
In the coalition, all social-democratic educational ambitions went down the drain – 
given all the concern for the coalition partner, there was not much else … they just 
say ‘yes we are for comprehensive schooling’, but look at the [2013] coalition 
agreement, it’s a joke … ridiculous small steps … the coalition agreement does not 
even contain the smallest common denominator and there is just much frustration, 
there’s no point, there’s stagnation, even in the SPÖ, there is no progress. (SPÖ 
education activist, interview, 2015) 
With shrinking electoral majorities since the 1980s and the SPÖ’s dependence on the ÖVP to 
participate in government and maintain its influence over welfare-state administration (its main 
power resource), the party’s office-seeking orientation and generally limited internal mobilisation 
for comprehensive schooling (discussed below) seem to have been the main constraints for SPÖ 
advocates of comprehensive schooling. The SPÖ’s insistence, in the 2005 negotiations, of keeping 
parts of the school legislation in constitutional status also indicates that it saw the risk of losing 
influence over school policy in general (in light of future spells in political opposition) as more 
significant than that of being unable to introduce comprehensive schooling in particular:  
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There were many which only opposed [the two-thirds majority] in Sunday speeches, 
but in reality were okay with it, it was an easy explanation (sometimes maybe even 
excuse) why this and that was not possible … during the [centre-right government], 
the two-thirds majority was particularly protected in the SPÖ, as it gave the 
opportunity to prevent reactionary changes to the school system. (Niederwieser, 
2009). 
5.2.3 The party as a tankship 
In addition to rather difficult ‘external’ conditions for school reforms in Austria, the tracing of 
debates and policy formation processes within the SPÖ revealed a rather limited interest in and 
mobilisation for comprehensive schooling also within the SPÖ, despite the party’s long-standing 
programmatic commitment to comprehensive schooling, and the general approval of this policy 
among the wider party. While education programmes are usually adopted unanimously (SPÖ 
party conference delegate, interview, 2015), frequent declarations of support and references to 
past reform ambitions under Otto Glöckel and Bruno Kreisky in party debates appear to have a 
more ceremonial or declaratory character – ‘like the Amen in the prayer’ (Matzenauer, interview, 
2016) – while the actual involvement of the wider party in education debates (e.g. during the 
preparation of the 1998 education programme) remained limited (Witzmann, 1997).  
The impression gathered from the interviews and other party sources was that the 
majority of party members and officials perceived a need for a juster and less selective school 
system, but that the explicit policy of comprehensive schooling failed to develop a party-internal 
lobby or mobilisation strong enough to create the sustained pressure on the party leadership 
necessary for political action: 
There are always two, three headings that are comprehensible for everyone: … free 
and universal Kindergarten, comprehensive schooling for 10–14-year-olds and full-
day schooling, and the free and open access to higher education … every SPÖ official 
can tell these if you wake him up at three o’clock in the morning and ask him what 
is important in education policy. All the other debates are very technical, that’s why 
the teachers play an important role, they have the capacity to lead these discussions. 
(SPÖ party conference delegate, interview, 2015) 
In principle, everyone is for education, for a juster one, for more equality of 
opportunity and so on, but if you weigh up the different portfolios then education is 
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not the one with the highest weight … it’s important for the teachers … but the wider 
party public focuses somewhere else, I mean, who is the wider party? Behind the 
social ministry, there is the union, which determines the social minister, there is a 
lobby behind it. Which lobby is behind education? The teacher association with their 
decreasing relevance and declining membership? Who is the lobby for education? 
(Matzenauer, interview, 2016)  
[Motions on education policy at the party conference occur] all the time, … but this 
has nothing to do with education policy. This is the culture in the party, there’s always 
this or that motion and motions on school or education policy occupy a central place 
in this … it’s more about declaring ‘the school is important and that’s why we are 
voting on this motion’. (SPÖ party conference delegate, interview, 2015) 
Large organisations are always like big tankships that do not move much, but such 
discussions [about education policy] contribute … to a sense of self-assurance, where 
we are and where we go. (Duffek, interview, 2015) 
[Were there any debates about comprehensive schooling in the 1990s?] Yes, of course, 
but always, how can I say, it was always like a taken-for-granted accompanying 
programme. So you always felt like, this is like the film that is screened in the 
background, even if it’s not the latest one, or the most pressing thing, but it always 
ran in the background. (Scholten, interview, 2015) 
The absence of a strong party lobby for comprehensive schooling became apparent during the 
2006 coalition negotiations, when comprehensive schooling and tuition fees were the two main 
disagreements in education policy between SPÖ and ÖVP. The introduction of ‘open access to 
higher education’ (Offener Hochschulzugang, i.e. the absence of tuition fees and non-selective 
admissions) is seen as a historic victory of the SPÖ government of the 1970s, and the 
reintroduction of tuition fees by the centre-right government in 2001 had sparked a very 
defensive reaction from the SPÖ. Despite many party policymakers voicing scepticism in the 
interviews over the progressiveness of free higher education, the principle of open university 
access seems to have enjoyed stronger internal party backing and mobilisation – among not only 
the party’s pupils’ and students’ organisation but also the wider party – than the issue of 
comprehensive schooling. 
A potential source of opposition to comprehensive schooling within the party came from 
the Gymnasium teachers. While this group has been largely organised within Christian-
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Conservative associations (which have strong links to the ÖVP), some Gymnasium teachers are 
affiliated with the SPÖ and the Association of Social Democratic Academics (BSA), which until 
recently was perceived as the main opposition to comprehensive schooling within the SPÖ. 
Although the BSA recently adopted a pro-comprehensive-schooling position (BSA, 2011) and 
there have always been some social-democratic Gymnasium teachers campaigning for 
comprehensive schooling, on the whole, the teachers organised in the BSA are still perceived as 
the main opposition to comprehensive schooling within the SPÖ: 
The teachers in the BSA … are at least as conservative as the Christian ones. (Kurt 
Scholz, former director of the Vienna School Board, interview, 2015) 
The only ones that are massively against [comprehensive schooling] are social-
democratic Gymnasium teachers … whenever this topic is being discussed, they are 
the loudest. (Niederwieser, interview, 2015) 
Teacher representatives highlighted concerns over the possibility of deteriorating working 
conditions and pay in comprehensive schools, as well as over the practical aspects of teaching 
heterogeneous learning groups consisting of children with different academic abilities, cultures 
and language backgrounds (Gymnasium teaching union representative, interview, 2015): 
[The BSA is now] strongly in favour of comprehensive schooling, but among 
Gymnasium teachers, it is not easy, there are always debates … in Austria teachers 
are predominantly Conservative, which makes it difficult for the BSA and SPÖ, we are 
losing touch with the grassroots … in terms of comprehensive schooling … we don’t 
hear enough the concerns of teachers, who are confronted with a lot of problems, 
especially in Vienna, there are classes where no pupils is a native German-speaker … 
we need to take these concerns seriously. (BSA representative, interview, 2015) 
Given the inability to introduce comprehensive schooling beyond school experiments, 
Gymnasium teachers did not need to actively mobilise their opposition and have for example 
never formally blocked party programmes that include the demand for comprehensive schooling. 
However, but the party’s school-reform advocates were well aware of their potential threat and 
mobilisation potential, which was highlighted in many interviews. 
In contrast, representatives of the Social Democratic Teacher Association (SLÖ), which 
represents social-democratic teachers of the Hauptschule and has its roots in a teacher 
organisation founded by Otto Glöckel in the 1920s, have traditionally been key supporters of 
comprehensive schooling. Its members are generally perceived as supportive of comprehensive 
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schooling (Niederwieser & SLÖ representative, interviews, 2015), but rarely mobilise for it, which 
has been attributed to either the increasingly depoliticised nature of the teaching force (Achs, 
interview, 2015) or their political weakness compared to the Gymnasium teachers organised in 
the BSA (representative of Vienna School Board, interview, 2015). While groups of teachers in the 
1970s appear to have been more involved and interested in school reform, much of this interest 
has petered out over time (Kadi, 1995). One reason for teachers’ limited ownership of the 
comprehensive schooling (and other school reforms in general) is indicated in their generally 
limited professional autonomy, and limited opportunities for bottom-up pedagogical innovation 
within Austria’s highly bureaucratic school governance (including the bureaucratic nature of the 
1970s school experiments) (Kutalek, 1972; Dermutz, 1983a: 28; Gruber, 2015: 57; Gruber, 1988). 
While both Gymnasium and Hauptschul teachers are highly organised, their activism mainly 
focuses on interest politics (pay and working conditions) rather than educational issues per se.  
5.2.4 Electoral opportunities and dilemmas 
Within the context of considerable external political constraints on school reforms and limited 
mobilisation within the party, advocates for school reforms mainly tried to gain public legitimacy 
for comprehensive schooling, and thereby increase pressure for reforms. However, during the 
1980s and 1990s, education policy was not very salient in the SPÖ’s electoral strategies. Although 
the party was in government, it was prevented from major education policy undertakings by the 
two-thirds majority requirement, and it seems that education policy was not seen as a useful 
agenda for mobilising the public (Seel and Scheipl, 2004: 49): 
There wasn’t a huge interest. At the beginning of an electoral campaign ... there was 
sometimes a timid ‘education policy is important, because it concerns everyone’ and 
so on, but that petered away in the course of the election campaign. (Matzenauer, 
interview, 2016) 
Education policy only became a major element of the SPÖ’s electoral agenda when the party was 
in political opposition (2000–06) – similarly to the late 1960s, when the party was last in 
opposition. As then, school-reform advocates were successful in criticising the educational record 
of centre-right governments and ‘selling’ education policy as a potential electoral asset to the 
leadership. In the late 1960s, this criticism focused on the governments’ inadequate response to 
rising educational demands, while in the 2000s it focused on the unpopularity of the Christian 
Democratic education minister due to budget cuts and the reintroduction of tuition fees 
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(Niederwieser, interview, 2015). Being in opposition therefore enabled the SPÖ to position itself 
and strengthen its profile through education policy (Niederwieser & Duffek, interviews, 2015). 
Developing a new education policy programme in 2004, and the many internal and public events 
associated with it, was seen as useful for externally positioning the party as ‘competent’ in 
education policy. 
In the past 15 years, educational questions increasingly became a focus of elections; 
before that, education was a marginal topic. I think people recognise now that 
education is an important topic and repeatedly surfaces in elections, and one needs 
to position oneself. (Representative of the Austrian Chamber of Labour, interview, 
2015) 
In opposition, it was a particular ambition that we are the party which, despite an 
ÖVP-dominated school ministry, has the competence in education policy … we 
always tried with education policy debates, beyond the day-to-day debates, to prove 
that the SPÖ has a vision in education policy, about the school for the future and it 
can react to the challenges of the present, that it has something to refer to … and 
these events were always a good opportunity for PR [public relations], they 
positioned the party to the public in education policy. (Niederwieser, interview, 2015) 
We had identified school and education policy as a topic of conflict with the 
government, aside from the classical social-democratic topics. (SPÖ party conference 
delegate, interview, 2015) 
[Education policy] is in my view one of the areas where social democracy can clearly 
differentiate itself from conservative policy. (Schmied, interview, 2015) 
The role of the PISA studies – which for the first time since the 1970s had stimulated broad media 
coverage of, and public interest in, education in Austria – was seen as crucial to SPÖ’s attempt to 
achieve issue ownership and ‘interpretive hegemony’ (Deutungshoheit) over education policy 
(Education expert and member of the government education commission, interview 2016). 
Because the SPÖ was in opposition for six years, people suddenly noticed education 
policy and said, ‘something needs to happen here’. Gusenbauer said ‘let’s make a 
school manifesto’ and then things started moving, ‘let’s make a critique’ and this 
critique was justified … in 10 years there had not been any school legislation … at the 
same time there was an international movement, PISA … which has strengthened the 
critique of the SPÖ in opposition; they have presented this critique of the ÖVP-
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steered school system in the wider public and the media, and this was an 
exceptionally strong argument – the same effect would be if Austria loses against 
Hungary in football 3 to 0 and next week against England 5 to 0. The bad 
performance of Austria in the PISA test has hit the national pride of the Austrians and 
has created a reform-friendly climate. (Policy activist, interview, 2015) 
There were indications that, during these debates over PISA, public attitudes were becoming 
more supportive of comprehensive schooling (Witzmann, 2005). However, SPÖ electoral 
discourse remained cautious, highlighting less controversial policies (such as smaller class sizes, 
the expansion of early years’ education, the provision of full-day schooling and abolishing higher 
education tuition fees) rather than comprehensive schooling in its electoral campaign 
(Niederwieser, interview, 2015): 
Essentially, people want ... that their children are educated as best as possible ... there 
is little where there is so much consensus as in this question. And we also know, from 
our own opinion polls, how much support there is here … it’s a bit torn of course in 
the question of differentiation in secondary schooling … Gymnasium, Hauptschule, 
New Middle Schools. [how to address different interests within the electorate?] Oh 
well, you simply have to convince them. [is this possible?] Yes, I mean, it’s simply a 
matter of providing quality in the day-to-day organisation of a school. If you ensure 
this, all is won. (Duffek, interview, 2015) 
The main challenge in gaining political support for comprehensive schooling was perceived as 
the public’s limited familiarity with the concept. To overcome this, much energy was put into 
campaigning and awareness raising: 
[What were the obstacles for comprehensive schooling?] I think it is not just the 
teachers – the Gymnasium teachers – I think also most Austrians don’t have a clear 
awareness what comprehensive schooling means, and there is still the tried and 
tested Gymnasium, which we’ve always had. I think the problem is in the heads of 
the people, to rethink … and I think there is still much work to do with awareness 
raising, which has already happened in other countries. (Representative of the 
Austrian Chamber of Labour, interview, 2015) 
Of course, the public would need good information, awareness raising, I think we 
have tried that over years and we also succeeded. There were frequently surveys 
where the term ‘comprehensive schooling’ – many people don’t know what that 
means, and comprehensive schooling [Gesamtschule] and full-day schooling 
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[Ganztagsschule] has been mixed up – but the demand for a fairer school system, 
where decisions are only taken at age 14, this had a majority. But this needed much 
argumentation and the SPÖ has invested many resources. (Niederwieser, interview, 
2015) 
As early as the 1960s and 1970s (the last time comprehensive schooling had been on the party’s 
agenda), SPÖ school-reform advocates used OECD reports and other countries’ reform 
experiences as leverage to create popular support. But even back then, comprehensive schooling 
was perceived as a potential electoral risk and other, less contentious measures (such as 
investment in educational infrastructure, educational allowances, and free transport and school 
textbooks) were foregrounded in the party’s electoral message, while comprehensive schooling 
was kept in the background: 
[Comprehensive schooling] would not have worked, no, no, with that we wouldn’t 
have won the elections; but the material incentives, they were quite effective … 
[comprehensive schooling] was always present as well … we wanted comprehensive 
schooling, of course … but you wouldn’t win an election with it. (Matzenauer, 
interview, 2016) 
For decades, ÖVP politician and Gymnasium teachers had warned against the comprehensive 
schooling creating (rather untranslatable) slogans to depict the uniformity of such schooling such 
as ‘sozialistischer Einheitsbrei’ and ‘Eintopfschule’. In the 1970s, SPÖ school reformers had hoped 
that the scientific evaluation of the comprehensive schooling experiments would allow them to 
win the ‘public battle of arguments’ over comprehensive schooling and standards (Schnell, 1993: 
300). Many interviewees also indicated that, since the 1970s, the Gymnasium had become the 
centre of educational aspirations within the party’s traditional constituencies – especially among 
the ‘aspirational’ working and middle classes in the cities – an aspiration partly promoted by SPÖ 
policy and discourse itself: 
Back then our motto was: ‘more working-class children into higher schools’... because 
we knew that the Gymnasium is set in stone ... so we said ‘our people too‘, working-
class children should also have access to the Gymnasium … we wanted to bring our 
children in as well. (Hawlicek, interview, 2015) 
To understand the low acceptance of comprehensive schooling [in Austria] one has 
to consider the changed economic and social context. The favourable economic 
climate [in the 1960s and 1970s] brought many families an improvement of their social 
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status, many parents saw in the opportunity to send their children to the Gymnasium 
the visible evidence for their social progression and therefore were not interested in 
creating a common middle school. (Schnell, 1993: 300) 
The advancement of a social class … more children went to the Gymnasium, so in 
many parent circles the desire was fulfilled, our children are on the right track and 
will automatically achieve something in life. (Matzenauer, interview, 2016).  
[Is comprehensive schooling a topic in elections?] Yes, but … more for the core 
constituencies, for the identity of the core constituencies. … But the children of the 
working class, which gave the political majorities in the past …. were not there 
anymore … Vienna was a middle-class society … the loss of the comprehensive school 
was also a loss of the working-class majority …. It’s the interests of the middle classes 
that became important, and the middle classes were the social climbers, … and they 
said: ‘I better sent my kids to the Gymnasium’. (Achs, interview, 2015) 
The tension between the party’s programmatic commitment to comprehensive schooling and its 
concern over public opinion is particularly visible in Vienna, the largest city and strongest SPÖ 
bastion. In the early 1990s, the SPÖ education spokesperson used the increasing competition 
over Gymnasium school places to campaign for comprehensive schooling. However, 
representatives of the Viennese School Board – traditionally the ‘spearhead of social-democratic 
school policy’ (Witzmann, 1997), some of which exhibited much personal attachment to the 
‘Viennese school reform’ of the 1920s (Scholz, interview 2015), became more cautious by the late 
1990s and early 2000s. While fostering school partnerships between the Gymnasium and 
Hauptschulen to ease the pressure for educational selection at the age of 10, they also tried to 
distance themselves from the ‘ideological debate’ of the past and the focus on comprehensive 
schooling ‘by force’ (Kadi, 1997; Witzmann, 1998; Witzmann, 2004; Linsinger, 2013): 
[In the end] the school partnerships have not changed the fact that in the eyes of the 
Austrians the Gymnasium remains the Rolls-Royce of the school system. When you 
get in, then everything is fine. But we have at least tried to create more commonality 
[through the partnerships], but I would lie if I’d say that we succeeded throughout. 
(Scholz, interview, 2015) 
It would require a rethinking on the part of parents. Do I want my child to sit in a 
class where there are only good ones or do I say it is completely mixed? … Many fear 
that, if the pupils of the Hauptschule are added, then my child will suffer and probably 
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won’t become so intelligent. There are many, many images in the heads of parents, 
that is a big issue. (Representative of the Vienna School Board and SLÖ, interview, 
2015) 
Overall, it seems that the return of comprehensive schooling to the party’s electoral agenda 
around 2006 owes more to its supporters’ mobilisation than to a perception of a straightforward 
electoral appeal. While PISA was a source of legitimacy for demands to postpone selection and 
educational decisions, it appears that it was trickier to construct a powerful counter-image of 
comprehensive schooling against prevalent societal images of the Gymnasium as the secure 
route to social mobility. The party’s long-term strategy to compensate for early selection by 
improving alternative educational routes appears to have reduced societal pressure, from among 
its constituencies, to abolish selection. The main group affected by early selection has become 
immigrant children. While a few interviewees indicated that comprehensive schooling would be 
a key contributor to social integration, several others indicated that, in an overall discursive 
climate over immigration kindled by the right-wing FPÖ, parents have become increasingly 
anxious about schools with a large share of immigrant children, which has created a certain 
anxiety among the SPÖ regarding taking a more proactive stance.  
5.2.2 Driving for change 
Given the considerable political barriers to introducing comprehensive schooling, the doubts over 
the electoral support and the lack of strong party-internal lobby groups for this policy, why did 
the SPÖ hold on to this programmatic aspiration?  
Since the 1960s, the key driver of comprehensive schooling policy in the SPÖ has been a 
small group of individuals, clustered around the party’s education spokespeople in the SPÖ 
Parliamentary Club, which is responsible for the programmatic work, including developing the 
education policy sections in party programmes and election manifestos.16 While the party leaders 
remained crucial for placing (or not placing) education policy on the party agenda, particularly 
during electoral campaigns and coalition negotiations, they were generally not involved in 
                                                     
16 The position of a parliamentary policy spokesperson is similar to that of a British shadow education secretary. 
However, the former keep their position in the parliament in case the party participates in the government 
(and even if the party also appoints the minister in the same policy area). The minister is then responsible for 
concrete policy development and implementation, and the parliamentarian spokesperson for developing 
new programmes and manifestos. Both are involved in inter-party negotiations over school reforms.  
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programmatic discussions regarding education policy, which were generally initiated and led by 
the party’s education spokespeople (Matzenauer, interview, 2016; Niederwieser, interview, 2015; 
see also Schnell quoted in Kadi, 1995). Other individuals involved in education debates within the 
party came from affiliated societies such as the Socialist Teacher Association (SLÖ), the 
Kinderfreunde (children’s and family association) and the Chamber of Labour; representatives 
from the social-democratic pupils’, students’ and parents’ associations; and individuals from the 
school ministry and regional party branches.  
Until the 1990s, individual actors tended to be involved in education policy over long 
periods of time, with a considerable overlap in their functions. Key individuals who shaped the 
party’s programmatic stance from the late 1960s to the 1980s, such as education spokespeople 
Hermann Schnell (1970–83) and Hans Matzenauer (1983–90), were also heads of the Socialist 
Teacher Association, the Viennese School Board and the SPÖ (Schnell) and Kinderfreunde 
(Matzenauer). Individuals expressed a strong personal commitment to the goal of comprehensive 
schooling, as well as to the ideals and programmes of the ‘Viennese school reform’ of the 1920s 
(Achs, 1999: 156; Schnell, 1999): 
There is still no doubt in the conviction that this would be the best school ... we know 
for centuries, or at least since the time of Glöckel, … which solutions would be the 
best, and throughout the years and the experiences these beliefs have not changed; 
they have been modified … adapted to changing situations … but there is, in reality, 
no other solution than an internally differentiated comprehensive school. 
(Matzenauer, interview, 2016) 
Good reasons for comprehensive schooling until 14/15 have existed long before the 
PISA studies, and the social democratic school reformer Otto Glöckel propagated 
this school form to make use of the reserves of talent available but failed against the 
forces who prioritised the retention of educational privileges as status privileges. 
(Niederwieser, 2008: 432) 
Comprehensive schooling in the SPÖ goes back to Glöckel, there you have a 
programme, no need to change much. The question is rather the strategy with which 
to implement it – this is the challenge, not the contents, because I think the contents 
are clear. (Representative of the Austrian Chamber of Labour, interview, 2015) 
After the comprehensive schooling reform experiments ended in 1982, Hermann Matzenauer and 
later school spokespeople Herman Seel (1990–94) and Erwin Niederwieser (1994–2007) tried to 
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keep the debate about comprehensive schooling going; for example, by trying to harness 
structural problems regarding educational transitions in urban areas, new research findings and 
international debates to gain legitimacy and raise the SPÖ’s education profile among the public 
(Matzenauer, interview, 2016; Niederwieser, interview, 2015).  
Most interviews emphasised that the crucial change in their fortunes for placing 
comprehensive schooling on the SPÖ’s agenda, came in the early 2000s. The party’s position in 
political opposition and the burgeoning PISA debate opened a window of opportunity to present 
education policy as a potential electoral asset, making education policy attractive to both the 
party leadership and the wider party. Pushing education policy (and support for comprehensive 
schooling on the back of it) to the top of the party agenda required significant background work 
– and, crucially, a new party leader (Alfred Gusenbauer) with a personal interest in education 
policy (Niederwieser, Duffek, SPÖ senior civil servants, interviews, 2015). During the late 1990s and 
2000s, the party’s main think tank – the Renner Institute, which is also involved in formulating 
election manifestos – provided a key link between school-reform advocates and the party 
leadership: 
I met with him [Duffek, the head of the Renner Institute] and we said, let’s use the 
topic, the education topic, and we made many events ... there were many people ... 
and the media ... and then, to our all surprise, the party leader suddenly says: ... ‘the 
SPÖ wants comprehensive schooling’ ... this was the first time ... so we used PISA 
politically ... we could have never positioned the topic so broadly without it. (SPÖ 
education policy activist, interview, 2015) 
Despite their strong personal attachment to comprehensive schooling, these actors – particularly 
the education spokespeople, who were also involved in inter-party negotiations (e.g. on coalition 
agreements and the NMS reforms) – were highly aware of the practical constraints on education 
policy-making and resultant need for compromise:  
There is this shared commitment [to comprehensive schooling], and that’s clear, and 
everything that happens in between are the practical constraints, the requirements 
in politics to form compromises … and so we continued this path, this long and stony 
path, in the hope, I mean, at some point it will have to work out. (Matzenauer, 
interview, 2016) 
However, the drawn-out nature of political negotiations, and the subsequent compromises that 
the SPÖ enabled, resulted in considerable personal disappointment among comprehensive 
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schooling advocates. The 1982 compromise, which one interviewee called ‘a fall from grace’ 
(Matzenauer, interview, 2016), led to the resignation of the party’s long-standing education 
spokesperson (and embodiment of the 1970s school reform) Hermann Schnell (1970–82) and was 
followed by what was perceived as a ‘long mourning period‘ and an ‘identity crisis of school 
reformers‘ (Niederwieser, 1997). Similarly, the gradual watering down – or ‘foul compromises’ 
(Mayer, interview, 2015) – of the school experiments after 2007 ultimately contributed to the 
resignation of education spokespeople Niederwieser and Mayer.  
5.3 Conclusion 
The SPÖ has been the largest party in parliament for most of Austrian post-war history, leading 
the government for more than 30 years between 1970-2000 and 2007-2018. However, the need 
to gain a two-thirds majority for educational reforms, powerful opposition from Gymnasium 
supporters and the complicated nature of responsibilities between different levels of 
governments have created substantial barriers to SPÖ school policy proposals introducing 
comprehensive schooling. This was exacerbated by strong office-seeking motivation among the 
party leadership and its dependence on the ÖVP as a coalition partner. These constraints 
legitimised non-action while simultaneously enabling the SPÖ to keep its ideological 
commitment to comprehensive schooling as an abstract, ‘unenforceable ideal’ (Pelinka, 1985: 32). 
Internal party disagreements over comprehensive schooling mostly evolved on the question of 
which political strategy to follow, which largely submerged potential disagreements over the 
goals and means of educational reform within the party. Within the wider party, comprehensive 
schooling has until today remained a general policy aim but never developed a strong 
followership or lobby of beneficiaries; instead, it was confronted with latent but visible resistance. 
In addition, the SPÖ’s long-term policy of expanding educational opportunities within the 
differentiated system has not overcome the inequalities entrenched in the system, but rather 
appears to have diminished societal pressure to abolish selection. 
These restrictive conditions and the risk-averse attitudes among the party leadership 
(and, to some degree, the party’s school ministers) beg the question: Why has the party not 
dropped this ‘hopeless’ policy? And why has this issue come back to the centre of the SPÖ’s 
education policy agenda in the mid-2000s? It appears that the engagement of a few reform-
committed actors centred around the party’s spokespeople, was crucial. Since the 1970s, the 
efforts of comprehensive schooling advocates within the SPÖ have centred around building a 
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case for comprehensive schooling to convince not only the public but also the party itself. These 
advocates tried to use international reform discourses, as well as problem pressure arising from 
the school system itself (such as the depopulation of the Hauptschulen in the cities), to legitimise 
the policy of comprehensive schooling. The use of international education research and 
discourses – particularly around PISA – was therefore geared towards not only creating public 
pressure on the ÖVP but also convincing the SPÖ leadership that attention to school policy could 
be electorally beneficial for the party. However, due to their key involvement in inter-party 
negotiations with the ÖVP, the reform-oriented education spokespeople had to balance their 
policy commitment with the need for a pragmatic compromise orientation, which frequently led 
to personal disillusionment and resignations. Today, comprehensive schooling has dropped from 
the SPÖ’s immediate policy agenda but remains, as before, a programmatic commitment – 







Chapter 6. Comparative discussion 
This research has investigated how two social-democratic parties that were once key supporters 
of comprehensive schooling policy have positioned themselves on this issue in the period 
following the ‘golden age’ of social-democratic school reform in Europe (the 1960s and 1970s). 
The in-depth case-study analysis, whose findings have been presented in the previous chapters 
has allowed for delving into the particular meanings this shared agenda has come to adopt in 
two contexts since the 1980s, as well as the particular processes that have given rise to policy 
differences between the two parties. 
These particularities and distinct trajectories do not easily lend themselves to comparative 
discussion. The case of the Labour Party indicates a considerable degree of change in its policy 
commitments to, and interpretations of, comprehensive schooling; whereas the case of the SPÖ 
reveals a tension between a relatively stable programmatic commitment to comprehensive 
schooling on the one hand, and the party’s political strategy – which is geared towards expanding 
educational opportunities within (and thereby largely reproducing) the existing differentiated 
system – on the other. Similarly, the processes through which attitudes and policies have formed 
within the two parties highlight rather different dynamics. During its long period of exclusion from 
political power (in the 1980s and early 1990s) the Labour Party underwent a fundamental 
programmatic transformation, within which the policy of comprehensive schooling became one 
of the battlefields over the party’s ideology and identity. Despite its long period in government 
office since the 1970s, the SPÖ has been de facto constrained from introducing structural reforms 
in schooling. Its pragmatic accommodation of this situation mobilised comprehensive schooling 
advocates, who (more or less successfully) tried to hold the party to its programmatic 
commitments and heritage. 
The aim of the discussion in this chapter is not to isolate factors that explain the divergent 
developments across countries. Instead, I will discuss the insights that can be gleaned from this 
in-depth study of two very different cases, and their potential to offer a more nuanced 
understanding of how similar phenomena have played out in different contexts. This chapter will 
therefore discuss commonalities in, and differences between, (1) the particular meanings of 
comprehensive schooling has come to hold for the two parties and how these reflect more 
national educational traditions and political contestations over education policy in England and 
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Austria more generally; and (2) the particular processes through which attitudes and policies have 
formed within the Labour Party and the SPÖ.   
More general reflections on the interplay between policy meaning and processes of 
policy formation, on the role of ambiguity in the functioning of political parties, as well as on the 
interplay between actors and institutions in these policy-formation processes are then are then 
offered in the Conclusion chapter. 
6.1 Shared concerns and distinct meanings in school policy 
Comprehensive schooling has been one of the most central problems in the history of education 
policy across Europe. It has become a point of reference in most countries – even those that, like 
Austria, have never successfully introduced a form of comprehensive schooling. In recurrent 
political controversies much symbolic value has been attached to this policy. While, in principle, 
comprehensive schooling addresses the relationship between instruction and selection (and 
raises the question of whether there can be instruction without selection), debates about it have 
become fora for more fundamental questions about the role of the school in society. What 
prompted this study in the first place was the ostensible divergence between two parties’ school 
policy preferences: while the Labour Party appeared to have departed from its traditional 
commitment to comprehensive schooling since the 1990s, the SPÖ appeared to have recently 
rediscovered its traditional commitment to this policy (observable in its renewed attempt to bring 
it about). However, further investigation during this study soon revealed that notions of ‘support 
for’ or ‘departure from’ comprehensive schooling masked several issues: 
First of all, there are highly divergent views on what constitutes party ‘policy’ (or 
‘positions’ or ‘preferences’) in the first place. In both cases, the tensions between different ‘sites’ 
of party policy – i.e. wider attitudes shared within the party, its official policy programmes or the 
particular strategic choices its leaders make in the electoral and legislative arenas – have turned 
out to be not only highly visible but also a very fruitful analytical ground for understanding how 
parties engage with policy. Studying this blurred nature of party ‘policy’ rather than adopting a 
more parsimonious definition of it, also made assessments of the degree of change within party 
policy on comprehensive schooling more nuanced, but also more tentative.   
Secondly, tracing the particular debates in both parties soon revealed that actors in the 
two countries were clearly talking about rather different things when they speak of 
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comprehensive schooling. Despite a shared concern for a ‘common’ or non-selecitive school for 
all, debates under the similar banners of ‘comprehensive schooling’ and ‘Gesamtschule’ (or 
‘Gemeinsame Schule’) have had rather different connotations in each country –not only in terms 
of the specific policy measures and wider ideological questions addressed but also in the ways 
they echoed past battles, shared aspirations and particular historical contexts. While 
comprehensive schooling has received much symbolic attachment within the two parties, there 
remains a considerable degree of ambiguity as to the particular changes such schooling would 
entail, the wider vision of education and society within which it is embedded, and the political 
steps necessary to introduce it.  
As discussed in Chapter 1, during the 20th century comprehensive schooling was a 
cornerstone in educational and political debates within the European Left about equality of 
educational opportunity. Comprehensive schooling advocates, who were often from educational 
circles and had links to social-democratic parties, were frequently motivated by more radical 
visions of transforming existing educational structures and practices to overcome educational 
hierarchies and differentiation. Debates over the ‘comprehensive ideal’ or the ‘common middle 
school’ transcended organisational questions of selection and school admissions to include 
questions about the content (curriculum) of comprehensive schooling, internal differentiation, 
pedagogical practices and the role of the school in the wider community and society. In many 
such debates comprehensive schooling figured as an umbrella concept encompassing various 
aspirations and policy dimensions; this not only reflected different strands of thinking about 
radical educational change but also evolved within national educational traditions and realities 
(for a discussion, see Glöckel and Achs, 1985; Achs, 2013a, Benn and Chitty, 1996; Pring and 
Walford, 1997; Hewlett, 2006, 61). While the SPÖ and Labour Party provided fora for many of 
these debates among comprehensive schooling advocates and practitioners, and some of the 
latter’s aspirations found their way into the parties’ programmes, the two parties tended to adopt 
a narrower approach to school reform than many left-wing comprehensive schooling advocates 
had hoped. As discussed in the previous two chapters, in their policy proposals and political 
strategies both parties have largely focused on abolishing outright selection and increasing 
opportunities within existing institutional structures and practices, rather than more radical 
attempts to alter the structural logic of education and selection in each particular educational 
setting.  
Looking at both parties’ policies on comprehensive schooling in parallel, the degree to 
which their educational thinking and policies reflect (and reproduce) national educational 
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traditions and structures becomes apparent. Labour’s traditional policy on comprehensive 
schooling has combined support for non-selective school admissions with an endorsement of a 
particular approach to school governance, which emerged from the 1944 Education Act which 
had subsequently become one of the ‘unwritten’ pillars of English comprehensive schooling 
(Haydn, 2004; Phillips, 2003). In this ‘partnership approach’ to school governance, central 
government involvement and standardisation remained limited; the local authority took centre 
stage in the provision and regulation of schooling, and teachers had a large degree of autonomy 
in the daily practice of teaching. When introducing comprehensive schooling in 1965, the Labour 
Party in government therefore refrained from developing and prescribing policy on other 
dimensions of comprehensive schooling, such as the curriculum which was seen as the 
prerogative of the schools and teachers. Despite several attempts made by the Labour Party since 
the 1970s to develop a more encompassing vision of comprehensive schooling, one that would 
help ensure equal entitlements for all children, these were limited by the powerful notion of ‘local 
democratic control’ over schooling in the party’s educational thought.  
It was New Labour’s approach to school governance which signified the biggest change 
to traditional Labour thinking on education: the powers of the central government and individual 
school (especially their leaders) were increased, local authorities and teachers lost influence and 
autonomy. Central state involvement and standardisation increased under New Labour (and the 
previous Conservative governments), through the expansion of National Curriculum testing and 
a stronger prescription of teaching practices. Doubts about comprehensive schooling were raised 
regarding not only its ability to raise educational standards but also, and more fundamentally, 
the desirability of a ‘common school for all’. This line of critique emerged from a wider ideological 
critique of the post-war provision of welfare and public services, which first entered British political 
debate in the discourse of the ‘New Right’ (and the policies initiated by the Conservative 
governments of the 1980s) but subsequently became influential in Labour Party thinking as well. 
Initial concerns over the responsiveness of public services and educational provision to parental 
preferences had first entered Labour’s debate in the late 1980s. This developed into a full-fledged 
critique of comprehensive schooling from the mid-1990s onwards when New Labour politicians 
started to criticise ‘uniform’ and ‘bog-standard’ comprehensive schools for restricting parental 
choice, Market mechanisms were hoped to only address the more fundamental epistemic 
problem of state welfare provision of adjusting the supply of public schooling to ‘consumer’ 
demands but also contribute to individual freedom and choice; in particular of disadvantaged 
groups, who were argued to have been particularly let down by vested interests in local 
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bureaucracy and the organised teaching force (Le Grand, 1997; Griffiths, 2014). Encouraging 
competition between schools over parents was hoped to enable more accountability of the 
schools (and the teachers within) and to encourage more innovative approaches to teaching and 
school leadership, and thereby raising educational standards. New Labour’s ‘modernised’ 
approach to comprehensive schooling also foresaw that such schooling, while remaining officially 
non-selective, would become more ‘diverse’. Schools received increasing powers (e.g. over 
funding, curriculum, etc.) and were encouraged to compete for parents through diversifying their 
educational offer (e.g. through curricular specialisation or the development of a particular ‘school 
ethos’). New Labour’s quest for (non-selective) alternatives to traditional comprehensive schools 
then culminated in the academy schools, which were state-funded but independent of local 
authorities, which can be run by a variety of non-state providers (on a non-profit basis).  
This emphasis on diversity within and between schools in New Labour’s educational 
agenda has been considered a major change to the party’s traditional approach to 
comprehensive schooling. As discussed in chapter 4, critics of New Labour’s education policy 
perceived its embrace of diversity as actively endorsing the possibility of creating a two-tiered (or 
multi-tiered) hierarchy in the education system. On the other hand, comprehensive schooling in 
England has never developed uniform organisational forms or curricula; it has always been 
inherently diverse, and previous Labour policy had not been particularly concerned with 
overcoming these differences between schools (e.g. in terms of resources or minimum 
entitlements). The key difference between Old Labour and New Labour endorsements of 
‘diversity’ appears to have been the shift from a stronger ‘universalist’ notion of diversity (in which 
schools reflect the needs of their local communities while providing similar entitlements within 
the community) towards a more individualist and competitive understanding of diversity (which 
allows for more individual parental choice and stimulating competition between schools in a 
community). That said, within New Labour, different strands of thinking existed, which differed 
especially regarding their views on the balance between competition and collaboration between 
individual schools (as discussed in Chapter 4). In many ways, this shift from universalism to 
individualism and competition also connects to longer-standing traditions in English education 
(particularly in the private school sector), which emphasise a strong role for school leaders and 
the freedom of schools to develop their particular individual mission and ‘ethos’ (McCulloch, 
2003), a notion rather unfamiliar to the Austrian context. So while the Labour Party’s approach to 
school policy clearly changed, the individual tenets clearly reflect the wider repertoire of long-
standing English traditions of educational provision.  
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The evolution of SPÖ school policy in the 20th and early 21st century differs in many 
respects from Labour’s approach. In contrast to Labour’s lack of educational doctrine throughout 
the first half of the 20th century, an encompassing vision for comprehensive schooling had been 
developed by social-democratic school reformers in Austria already in the 1920s. The SPÖ 
therefore officially endorsed the goal of comprehensive schooling almost thirty years earlier than 
the Labour Party. But despite later attempts by SPÖ school reform advocates to revive this 
heritage which included curricular and pedagogical reform demands, over large stretches of the 
second half of the 20th century, the SPÖ’s school policy has remained largely focused on structural 
issues of school organisation and postponing selection. Given the political constraints for 
introducing comprehensive schooling, SPÖ’s policy strategy has since the 1950s revolved around 
expanding educational opportunities within the differentiated system by opening up access to 
selective schools, and improving alternative school tracks to compensate for early selection. 
Gradually, the quality of these school tracks (the Hauptschule and various post-14 vocational 
pathways) was improved, the permeability between all educational tracks enhanced and several 
second-chance opportunities for educational qualifications introduced. In practice, the SPÖ’s 
policy also included a highly pragmatic approach to the selective Gymnasium which in theory the 
party wanted to see abolished (at least its lower cycle, for the ages 10-14). Under a SPÖ-led school 
ministry, entrance exams for these schools were abolished in the 1970s and the number of schools 
expanded. Over time, the Gymnasium became therefore an increasingly accessible target of 
educational aspirations for many previously excluded groups, without however mitigating the 
effects of early selection on educational opportunities overall. While holding on to comprehensive 
schooling in principle, much of the SPÖ’s school policy was geared towards securing transitions 
and ‘security’ within the tracked school system, in which specific pathways provided clear 
credentials for advancement within a differentiated education system and labour market.  
In contrast to the Labour Party, comprehensive schooling debates have never been 
particularly linked with questions of school governance in Austria. The Austrian school system has 
been marked by a high degree of bureaucratic regulation since its emergence in the 19th century, 
which has highly restricted the autonomy of individual schools and hindered the development of 
teacher professionalism. The SPÖ was, to some degree, torn between giving schools more 
freedoms and teachers more involvement in delivering education – a demand first made in the 
1920s reform proposals – and securing a strong role for the central state in order to both 
overcome regional inequalities in educational opportunities and give the SPÖ a stronger power 
base in the federal than the Länder governments. Recent changes in Austria’s approach to school 
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governance, stimulated by OECD recommendations, have shifted school administration from a 
highly ‘input-oriented’ towards a more ‘outcome-oriented’ mode of governance and moderately 
increased school autonomy. The SPÖ has generally viewed the trend towards more ‘outcome 
monitoring’ as positive, as it links to more traditional social-democratic demands for data to 
monitor inequalities and standardisation to ensure equal educational entitlements. SPÖ polcy 
makers generally perceived an increase in autonomy for individual schools as positive for allowing 
schools more freedom in the organisation of teaching and learning, while few have (at least in 
the interviews) voiced concerns that school autonomy could lead to increasing competition and 
potentially segregation between individual schools (in addition to the differentiation and 
segregation already existing between school types).  
Although both parties’ understandings of comprehensive schooling have shifted to some 
degree, both still reflect (and reproduce) national traditions and approaches to education. Both 
Labour’s traditional and ‘modernised’ policies on comprehensive schooling reflect the diverse 
and fragmented nature of the English school system; however, Old Labour advocated a more 
universalist approach, geared towards the local community, while New Labour adopted a more 
individualised and competitive notion of school policy. In contrast, SPÖ school policy has largely 
reflected the highly differentiated education system in Austria, which is underpinned by ideas of 
‘status differentiation’ similar to Austria’s conservative-corporatist welfare-state model; however, 
due to previous SPÖ school policy this approach to schooling has received a layer of 
‘permeability’ and ‘security’ for those in the lower-tier school tracks.  
Beyond these systemic differences in the long-term characteristics of school policy in the 
two countries – which have, to some degree, been reproduced in the parties’ educational thinking 
and policy – there has been more change in the two parties’ specific approaches to school policy 
(as discussed in the two previous chapters). However, despite both parties’ continuing 
commitment to non-selective schooling, interviewees indicated a considerable diversity of views 
and ambiguity within the parties regarding the ultimate goals of this policy and the means 
necessary to achieve it. The next section will discuss some general observations about the 
formation of attitudes towards, and policies on, comprehensive schooling within the two parties.  
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6.2 The formation of attitudes and policy in the parties 
The two case studies revealed the unique dynamics of the processes through which school policy 
within the Labour Party and the SPÖ has been formed over the past decades, and the nature of 
the struggles this has involved.  
In the case of the Labour Party, comprehensive schooling policy has been shaped by the 
party’s wider ideological-programmatic reorientation towards the end of its 18-year period in 
political opposition in the mid-1990s. Electoral concerns were crucial in this reorientation but 
changes in the party’s stance on school policy also reflected more profound ideological changes, 
challenging shared sentiments of what the party stood for overall. The key actors driving this 
change in party policy were also motivated by individual (and, to some degree, differing) beliefs 
about the qualities of ‘proper’ schools, which had a visible bearing on the shape of New Labour 
school policies.  
SPÖ school policy emerged from a struggle between actors wishing to revive the party’s 
programmatic heritage of comprehensive schooling (going back to the 1920s school reforms) 
and the party’s pragmatic strategy of expanding opportunities within the differentiated system . 
Through attempts to use international reform discourses to legitimise comprehensive schooling 
among the public and within the party, its traditional programmatic commitment was gradually 
‘updated’. However, the main school policy struggles within the SPÖ were not over particular 
policy ideas, the relationship between education and the party’s wider social project or what the 
party stood for, but rather about political strategy and the willingness to take political action.  
Despite the unique and complex processes through which party policy has been shaped 
in both cases, a shared insight to emerge from both is that party policy (and changes to such 
policy) can only be meaningfully understood by investigating both internal party dynamics and 
impulses arising from the party’s engagement with its external environment. While these dialectic 
processes have played out very differently in each case, similar ‘dimensions’ have been present 
in both. The next two sections will contrast these dimensions, not with the intention of fully 
explaining different policy trajectories but instead to highlight how similar ‘ingredients’ have 
manifested differently in shaping party policy.  
173 
 
6.2.1 Internal party dynamics 
The importance of internal party dynamics is stressed in the literature on party organisation 
(discussed in Chapter 2), which highlights the nature of parties as internally differentiated 
coalitions in which different actors or factions attempt to influence party policy in line with their 
particular interests and motivations. However, political parties share with other organisations or 
social movements the purpose of uniting members around a common goal and providing a sense 
of identification and belonging. Both of these theoretical perspectives have contributed to the 
aim of this research; that is, making sense of party policy on comprehensive schooling in the two 
cases studied. The two case studies have indicated four strands of interrelated ‘internal’ influences 
on party policy: programmatic and ideological legacies; shared experiences and practices; the 
specific demands of organised groups within the party; and incorporation of new ideas from 
educational research or international discourses.  
6.2.1.1 Party ideology, doctrine and ethos 
Classical approaches to political parties understand policy commitments as deriving from the 
party’s overall ideology or its dominant notions of the goals and means for social change, the 
role of the state, preferences for redistribution, and so on (for a discussion, see White, 2006). 
However, parties’ ideologies are rarely unified, coherent and stable doctrines; rather, they strike 
an often-uneasy balance between different intellectual legacies and aspirations (Barker, 1972; 
Paterson, 2003b). The importance attributed to different strands tends to shift over time, creating 
particular conditions for the development of educational thought. In addition, educational 
thinking and education policy programmes within the parties have, to some degree, developed 
independently from the party’s overall ideological projects; often, they have been stimulated by 
debates and practices in the educational world and influenced by national educational legacies. 
However, over time, ideas about education policy can become embodied within a party’s wider 
social project. It appears that this embedding of comprehensive schooling within a wider project 
of social reform and the construction of a welfare state has occurred to a considerable degree in 
Scandinavia. Here, a ‘citizenship-based model of comprehensive schooling’ is said to have 
become the cornerstone of the ‘Nordic model of education’, underpinned by widely shared 
values of ‘social justice, equity, equal opportunities, inclusion, nation-building, and democratic 
participation for all students, regardless of social and cultural background and abilities’ (Imsen et 
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al., 2016: 1; Oftedal Telhaug et al., 2006). Neither the Labour Party nor the SPÖ, however, has ever 
given education policy comparable significance in their overall program for social reform, and 
neither party has positioned education policy as interdependent within a unified social doctrine. 
That said, in the Labour Party, educational ideas that emerged ‘from the ground’ in the 1960s 
have, to some degree, become embedded within the party’s wider social project.  
In the 1950s and 1960s, non-selective schooling became a key policy demand within the 
Labour Party’s ‘revisionist’ or ‘egalitarian’ project of democratic socialism (Crosland, 1956), which 
evolved around the notion of a universal welfare state and underpinned Labour’s terms in 
government in 1964–70 and 1974–79. Internal party struggles over the ‘modernisation’ of 
comprehensive schooling in the mid-1990s indicate that support for the principle of 
comprehensive schooling had become widely held within the party. Participants in and observers 
of these struggles (on both sides) understood selection to be a ‘totemic issue within the British 
labour movement, going back to Tony Crosland and when he introduced comprehensive schools’ 
(Ryan, interview, 2015), and comprehensive schooling to be ‘one of the most strongly held beliefs 
of many Labour members’ (Riddel, 1996). Interviews and other statements indicated that Labour 
members’ personal experience with the ‘divisive’ nature of selection featured strongly in both 
their personal identity and their identification with the Labour Party (Steinberg, 1996; Prescott in 
Crosland, 2005), and that the introduction of comprehensive schooling was seen as an important 
‘past victory’ and legacy of the Labour Party (Kinnock, interview, 2015). For many in the party, it 
appears that the symbolic nature of and attachment to comprehensive schooling, and the 1960s 
egalitarian project in which it was embedded, grew rather than faltered during the discursive and 
material attacks from the Conservative government in the 1980s. It seems fair to say that 
comprehensive schooling has become part of the party’s ‘ethos’, or its ‘traditions, beliefs, 
characteristic procedures and feelings which help to animate the members of the party’ (Drucker, 
1979: 1). However, this did not necessarily involve a nuanced understanding of what 
comprehensive schooling means in detail (or ‘what happens in schools’); instead, it revolved 
around general support for non-selection and ‘local democratic control’ over education, as well 
as scepticism of private-sector involvement in education (as in the case of the academies).  
In contrast, SPÖ policy on comprehensive schooling is, in principle, based on a very 
encompassing educational doctrine developed during the 1920s at the intersection between 
educational theory and practice. As Chapter 4 highlighted, references to the ‘Viennese school 
reform’ and its protagonists (clustered around Otto Glöckel) remain very frequent, particularly 
among the core comprehensive schooling supporters within the party. Similarly, many individual 
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aspects of this doctrine are still visible in contemporary party education programmes. However, 
after 1945, much of this educational thought was largely forgotten until SPÖ school reformers 
rediscovered it in the 1970s. The party’s commitment to comprehensive schooling has therefore 
not become embedded in its post-war social project of welfare-state expansion and social 
partnership. Rather than an encompassing comprehensive schooling agenda, it appears that 
‘differentiated’ educational expansion (through the Gymnasium and vocational education) 
achieved considerable ‘fit’ within this project’s focus on security and social protection. In the 
1970s, SPÖ school reformers had tried to link the 1920s idea of comprehensive schooling and its 
egalitarian and emancipatory notions to the party’s emerging social modernisation agenda 
(under party leader Bruno Kreisky). However, within the wider party it seems that 1970s ideas 
about modernising education and society referred as much to (or perhaps even more than) 
comprehensive schooling as to opening access and routes of promotion through the Gymnasium 
and the differentiated vocational education system. 
While comprehensive schooling has remained a cornerstone of the SPÖ’s educational 
programme, its attachment to this policy and mobilisation potential within the wider party appear 
to be much weaker than in the Labour Party. As interviewees indicated, ceremonial pledges to 
comprehensive, non-selective schooling was just part of the inventory at party conferences (‘like 
the Amen in the prayer’, Matzenauer, interview, 2016), and comprehensive schooling is seen as 
one of the pledges ‘which every SPÖ member can recite when woken up at three in the morning’ 
(SPÖ party conference delegate, interview, 2015). However, there were many indications that, 
while in principle ‘everyone is for education and a more equal one’ (Hawlicek, interview, 2015), 
education policy was not of particular interest to the wider party. Despite this degree of symbolic 
relevance, and perhaps a ‘logic of appropriateness’ (‘SPÖ school ministers know what the party 
line is’ Matzenauer interview, 2016), comprehensive schooling does not seem to have developed 
a stronger attachment among the wider party. This lack of mobilising potential appears to be 
particularly pronounced when contrasted with the issue of free and non-selective university 
entrance – a legacy of the 1970s SPÖ government that led to considerable mobilisation within 
the party when a centre-right government reintroduced tuition fees in 2001. 
6.2.1.2 Lobbies: teachers and educationists 
In both cases, attitudes among teachers within the parties influenced policy, through both their 
‘vested interests’ in particular education systems and their general attitudes towards selection 
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and student sorting. Labour’s commitment to and understanding of comprehensive schooling 
has largely been shaped by groups within the party that have a particular interest in the policy, 
particularly teachers and educationists. The drive for comprehensive schooling in the 1950s came 
from a grassroots movement of parents, teachers and local councillors, and when comprehensive 
schooling was introduced in 1965, teachers had significant autonomy in shaping the practice of 
comprehensives and thereby seemed to have developed a strong sense of ownership over this 
project. The interviews with representatives of teaching unions and educationalists, as well as 
teacher statements in the media, suggest that teachers in general supported comprehensive 
schooling (and opposed New Labour’s education policy) both on symbolic grounds – having 
been involved in building the project – and given a continuing vested interest in the system that 
had provided them with much autonomy in their daily practice. In addition, teachers appear to 
share a general opposition to sorting of children by ability as such (‘non-selective educational 
ideologies’ are ‘one of the strongest features of the policy of organised teachers’, as one union 
representative said). Although teaching unions had never been officially affiliated with the Labour 
Party, teachers had a strong presence among the party membership base, and teaching unions 
had significant influence over Labour education policy in the past. Until the mid-1990s, many 
tenets of Labour’s policy on comprehensive schooling – such as support for the principle of 
mixed-ability teaching – stemmed from teacher practices rather than Anthony Crosland’s 
educational doctrine of the 1960s.  
Within the SPÖ, comprehensive schooling has never developed a strong lobby among 
teachers; to the contrary, the structural division within the teaching force (in terms of 
qualifications and occupational status) have created a latent opposition to comprehensive 
schooling among SPÖ-affiliated Gymnasium teachers. This seems to stem from both their fears 
over deteriorating status and a general scepticism over the desirability and practicality of teaching 
in heterogeneous classrooms. Although this opposition was rarely openly mobilised within the 
party, SPÖ school reformers seemed very aware of the potential for resistance among social-
democratic Gymnasium teachers. These teachers’ opposition has not been matched by a pro-
comprehensive-schooling mobilisation among Hauptschul-teachers, who in theory would benefit 
from such schooling (and the unification of teacher training and status). Although the association 
representing social democratic teachers of the Hauptschule has itself a strong connection to the 
1920s school reforms, and its leaders have generally belonged to the circle of individuals 
advocating for comprehensive schooling in the SPÖ, in the interviews, the mass of Hauptschul-
teachers was perceived as being rather depoliticised and difficult to mobilise for comprehensive 
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schooling. In many other policy matters (and outside the party), Hauptschul-teachers and their 
unions have often followed the lead of the vocal, well-organised Gymnasium unions.  
Apart from the structural status divide between teachers, it seems that a lack of familiarity 
with, and ownership of, comprehensive schooling has prevented the emergence of a stronger 
lobby for this policy within the SPÖ. In addition, the rather rigid bureaucratic set-up of the 1970s 
comprehensive schooling experiments seems to have stifled innovation among participating 
teachers – and thereby a sense of policy ownership among them. The very low degree of teacher 
autonomy within the highly bureaucratic Austrian school system could be an additional reason 
for teachers’ rather limited involvement in education policy debates (beyond matters concerning 
their status interests). Compared to England and the Labour Party, there has not been a strong 
lobby for comprehensive schooling among educational researchers and academics, mostly owing 
to the long-underdeveloped nature of empirical educational research in Austria. In addition, the 
inability of research evidence to influence educational reform and overcome the hardened 
positions between parties in the 1980s appears to have disillusioned many education researchers, 
who have since disengaged from policy activism.  
6.2.1.3 New ideas and challenges to existing policy 
By the 1980s, comprehensive schooling had become much more crucial to the Labour Party’s 
‘ethos’ than to the SPÖ’s – but, by the 1990s, Labour’s commitment to such schooling also faced 
far more fundamental challenges than had the SPÖ’s. Since the 1970s, the main challenge to 
Labour’s commitment to comprehensive schooling has been external: a hostile political discourse 
(and later educational reform) inspired by New Right political thinking. Within the Labour Party, 
some doubts over school standards and uneasiness with curricular and pedagogical experiments 
emerged among the Labour leadership in the 1970s. The Labour Party leadership struggled to 
respond to the changing discursive and policy landscapes of the 1980s but officially held on to its 
commitment to comprehensive schooling and, largely, the ‘partnership’ approach to school 
governance. The fundamental challenge to comprehensive schooling, and the ideas it stood for, 
came during the mid-1990s from Labour’s broader ideological reorientation under Tony Blair. 
Apart from a new electoral strategy, this counter-project was underpinned by a fundamental 
reorientation of core values and doctrine, which went beyond pragmatically accepting the 
previous Conservative governments’ changes to education policy and public service governance. 
Within this reorientation, New Labour’s critique of comprehensive schooling went beyond 
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highlighting its limited success in overcoming educational segregation in England (which 
potentially could have been addressed by making the school system more comprehensive) but 
centred on the principle of the policy itself. Comprehensive schooling was associated with an 
‘outmoded’ approach to providing public services – and, particularly, with ‘Old’ Labour’s social 
project. It came to be seen as one aspect of an increasingly bureaucratic and paternalistic welfare 
state that did not account for citizens’ diverse needs and wants, thereby denying them crucial 
choices (Blair, 2010: 43). This ‘Old’ Labour project of egalitarian socialism became the target of 
‘New’ Labour’s modernisation counter-project, or the ‘Third Way’. In the case of the Labour Party, 
it therefore seems fair to say that comprehensive schooling had to change because the party’s 
overall social project was deemed in need of change. However, different streams of opinion were 
apparent within New Labour circles. For some, the modernisation of comprehensive schooling 
was primarily geared towards tackling school underperformance and reducing disadvantage. 
Elements of choice and competition were combined with attempts to foster collaboration 
between schools and with local authorities. Another stream of thinking focused on market 
principles in school governance, outright support for competition and choice between schools, 
school independence and the involvement of private-sector actors. Both streams shared the 
desire to change schools’ culture, from ‘low expectations’ to an ethos of excellence, which 
involved adopting certain attributes associated with grammar and private schools. The more 
moderate stream, with its concern for school improvement, found considerable support among 
the Parliamentary Labour Party (Blunkett was also an important bridge to wider sections of the 
party in the mid-1990s). However, in particular, Blair and Adonis’s more radical project of 
educational reform (which became more dominant in New Labour’s education policy towards the 
mid-2000s) alienated many previous supporters among the Parliamentary Labour Party.  
In the SPÖ, in contrast, the goal of comprehensive schooling has developed a much 
weaker internal party lobby but has also been spared outright criticism and challenge. The 1980s 
and 1990s were decades of limited and incremental education reform in Austria, and education 
policy had become even less embedded in the party’s overall project (which has also become 
less clearly defined). Compared to the Labour Party, the SPÖ saw neither strong ideological 
struggles and factionalism in the 1970s or 1980s nor a concerted attempt towards ideological 
renewal since then. The survival of the SPÖ’s demand for comprehensive schooling since the 
1980s and its return to the party agenda in the early 2000s was largely down to the effort of a 
small group of actors, clustered around the party’s education spokespeople and representatives 
from a few affiliated societies, which continued to draw inspiration from the 1920s school reforms. 
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Within the SPÖ, comprehensive schooling advocates have tried to use international debates to 
legitimise the policy to the public and renew its emphasis in party debates. In the 1990s, for 
example, they tried to capitalise on the renewed emphasis education in the emerging Third Way 
debate, both in Britain (despite Blair’s departure from comprehensive schooling) and among 
other European social-democratic parties, to place comprehensive schooling within a wider 
narrative of the knowledge society and social-investment state. In the early 2000s in particular, 
the PISA debate and OECD discourse were used to renew a discourse of comprehensive 
schooling as a prerequisite for ‘modernising’ Austria’s traditional school system. During this time, 
OECD agendas on school governance reform gained a strong bearing on the SPÖ school 
ministry’s work; interviews indicated that the OECD had become a major source of inspiration 
and reassurance for the work of the school minister and her staff. However, these new ideas, 
especially around school autonomy, have not been particularly related to the issue of 
comprehensive schooling in SPÖ debates about schooling. Overall, the party’s education 
programmes have ‘updated’ its commitment to comprehensive schooling with arguments from 
international reform discourses (e.g. the focus on individualisation or competencies), but the 
policy commitment has not received any major challenges as such.  
6.2.1.4 The nature of internal party struggles 
The shift in the Labour Party’s education policy provoked much internal resistance, particularly in 
1995–96 and 2005–06. The school modernisation agenda sparked discontent from teachers, as 
well as the party’s rank-and-file, which resulted in highly visible struggles; for example, at the 1995 
party conference, when New Labour’s education policy risked defeat. However, New Labour’s 
emphasis on education policy and promise of educational investment and school improvement, 
as well as its general desire to get back into power, also instigated significant support and hope 
among the wider party and educational community. In the early 1990s, the visibility of the wider 
party’s critique was also reduced by shifting the arena for policy deliberation from the party 
conference to the more fragmented – and less visible – National Policy Forum. Tony Blair’s large 
post-1997 electoral majorities further contributed to the strong position of the ‘party in 
government’ and the marginalisation of the influence of the party’s rank-and-file.  
Overall, Tony Blair and New Labour modernisers were highly successful in overcoming 
internal party opposition to their alternative school project. However, towards New Labour’s third 
term in government, rifts over the government's school policy again became more visible. The 
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policy agenda had become driven increasingly by Tony Blair and his key education adviser, 
Andrew Adonis, sidelining the education secretary and increasingly instigating disagreements – 
even from former allies in the modernisation project. Towards the end of Blair’s leadership, these 
disagreements over education policy flourished within a climate of increasing personal rivalries 
between Blair and Brown, as well as the Parliamentary Labour Party’s growing discontent over 
the radical nature of the modernisation project. The government’s reluctance to regulate school 
admissions, the increasing marginalisation of local authorities and the involvement of private-
sector actors raised concerns even among previous supporters of New Labour’s school reform 
agenda. In 2005–06, the proposal of ‘trust schools’, which signified the expansion of independent 
state schools across the school sector, served for many as a sort of litmus test for the overall 
direction of travel in public-sector reform. The 2006 Education and Inspections Act sparked one 
of the largest parliamentary rebellions by Labour backbenchers and could only be adopted with 
the votes of the Conservative Party. This episode indicates that a general attachment to 
comprehensive schooling (as non-selective schooling under local government control) within the 
Labour Party had survived the ‘modernisation’ of comprehensive schooling in Labour’s 
educational thinking.  
In the SPÖ, internal party struggles over school policy have been less visible on the 
surface; they have generally taken place not between different factions or groups but between 
individuals, clustered around the party’s parliamentary education spokesperson, who have tried 
to commit the school minister and party leader to pro-comprehensive-school action. However, 
spokespeople’s involvement in inter-party negotiations – particularly with the ÖVP – also made 
them highly aware of the political constraints involved in education policy. Since the 1980s, there 
have been numerous accounts of feelings of resignation (as well as actual resignations) among 
this group, due to tensions between personal attachment to the policy and the worn-out nature 
of political negotiations and compromises. While constraining the SPÖ’s ability to introduce 
comprehensive schooling, this political environment also helped the party to justify inaction while 
upholding the policy as a long-term aspiration. Overall, the inability to introduce comprehensive 
schooling enabled, to some degree, the policy to survive as a ‘utopian’ aspiration in the party’s 
programme. Yet, while this ‘utopian’ nature of this commitment has muted potential internal 
party opposition to comprehensive schooling, it seems fair to say that it has also stifled more 
fundamental debates about goals and means of social-democratic school reform.  
Studying internal party dynamics in both parties has contributed to a fuller understanding 
of the evolution of attitudes towards, and the development and contestation of party policy on, 
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comprehensive schooling. However, as this section has frequently indicated, these developments 
occurred in a dialectical relationship as the parties engaged with their external environments.  
6.2.2 Parties’ external interactions 
Political parties are often understood in their function of aggregating societal demands and 
translating these demands into public policy. There are different views in the literature regarding 
whether parties mainly compete for public office to further the interests of their constituencies 
through policy or mainly devise a policy to gain popular support and thereby access to public 
office (Gingrich and Häusermann, 2015). Either way, fighting elections and participating in 
government are generally seen as key goals for political parties, which can pose dilemmas for 
their ‘policy-seeking’ strategies (Helboe Pedersen, 2012). Parties’ policy on a particular issue – 
their programmatic commitments and strategic choices – is therefore not only shaped by long-
standing ideological convictions and the ideas and interests of their ‘internal’ constituencies  (as 
discussed above) but also influenced by the opportunities and constraints they face in the 
electoral arena and policy-making process.  
The particular political system and discursive context produced rather different conditions 
in each country for the parties’ engagement with education policy. While the main challenge to 
Labour’s education policy agenda came from the electoral arena, the main challenge for the SPÖ 
came from the need to form a coalition government and overcome numerous barriers in the 
policy-making process. While this general opportunity structure can indicate the main locus of 
constraints on parties’ policy endeavours, its implications for policy are not straightforward; 
rather, they depend on the particular constellations and perceptions of the actors involved.  
This section discusses how the comprehensive schooling policies of the Labour Party and 
the SPÖ have been influenced by the two parties’ quests to gain popular support, their 
engagement with other political actors and their constraints in policy-making. In this ‘external’ 
sphere, activities include decisions over agenda setting (priorities for electoral campaigns or 
government agendas), electoral discourses, forming coalitions and/or bargaining compromises 
with other political actors. While the main actors in this sphere – ‘the party in public office’ (Katz 
and Mair, 1993) (i.e. the party’s leadership), its elected representatives and, frequently, policy 
advisers – enjoy some autonomy from the wider party to carry out these activities, their mandate 




6.2.2.1 Gaining political support  
Political constraints in accessing government power, as well as on education policy-making as 
such had a major impact on the SPÖ and its school policy strategy. The requirement for a two-
thirds majority for school reforms in parliament, and the continuing opposition of the ÖVP, 
prevented the introduction of comprehensive schooling even when the SPÖ enjoyed absolute 
majorities in the 1970s. Since then, the SPÖ’s de facto dependency on the ÖVP as a coalition 
partner made comprehensive schooling a recurring political risk for the SPÖ to participate in 
government. Two other important veto players that hampered the prospect of introducing 
comprehensive schooling were the teaching unions and the Länder governments. As a crucial 
feedback effect of the segregated nature of secondary schooling and teacher education in 
Austria, Gymnasium teachers had developed important vested interests in the status quo. The 
influence of their highly organised unions on the politics of education reform mainly stemmed 
from their influence on ÖVP school policy. Another potential veto player for comprehensive 
schooling reforms were the sub-national Länder governments, which share constitutional 
responsibilities for the administration of secondary schooling with the federal government. 
Comprehensive schooling, and the integration of the two school tracks in lower-secondary 
schooling, therefore required the support of the Länder governments, making reform attempts a 
battle over influence and resources.  
In this highly fragmented system of political power, school reforms require negotiations 
and compromises in multiple sites, as well as a degree of pragmatism, and SPÖ school policy has 
clearly been marked by these requirements. Although the party leadership and its school 
ministers have remained supportive of comprehensive schooling, they were either hesitant to 
place this policy on the party’ agenda or dropped this demand during coalition negotiations. 
Even school-reform advocates anticipated these constraints, and policy commitments were 
moderated to some degree. However, this political setting also allowed the party to share power 
and secure political influence (however constrained) on school policy. Not only has the party 
remained in power at the federal (and some Länder) levels over sustained periods of time, but 
the two-thirds majority requirement has also allowed it to remain a veto player for school reforms 
in times of political opposition – even if this has come at the cost of comprehensive schooling. 
The political context for the Labour Party has been very different. Having won three 
general elections after 1997, Labour governments faced few constraints on their ability to 
introduce school reforms. In the majoritarian electoral system, winning electoral majorities tends 
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to produce single-party governments without the need to form coalitions. Apart from the ability 
to govern without a coalition partner, Labour governments faced limited constraints by local 
governments. Local authorities’ considerable power and influence over schooling in the post-war 
school governance system had already been drastically reduced during the Conservative 
governments of the 1980s – with teaching unions having become even more marginalised by 
Conservative reforms. By the time the Labour Party returned to power in 1997, it appears that 
apart from the need to secure electoral majorities, the only political constraint for executing its 
new education policy agenda arose from the need to maintain cohesion among its own 
parliamentarians (as discussed in the previous section). While the Labour Party faced few formal 
constraints on carrying out school reforms when it was in government, the majoritarian electoral 
system also contributed to its de facto exclusion from influencing school policy during its 18 years 
in political opposition, during which the Conservative governments fundamentally overhauled 
the educational landscape. This long period of political powerlessness produced a sustained 
ideological crisis in the party, which was seized by political actors who drove the reorientation of 
its programmatic outlook. The key political requisite for the Labour Party, and potential constraint 
on its school policy agenda, thus came from the need to win popular support. 
6.2.2.2 Gaining popular support: electoral dilemmas and opportunities 
Both case studies have revealed that electoral considerations influenced the development of both 
parties’ educational policies, but this has particularly been the case for Labour. However, there is 
considerable difficulty involved in assessing the direction and nature of the relationship between 
education policy and electoral considerations. At times, parties have moderated their policy 
demands in light of a perceived lack of popular support; at other times, they have continued to 
promote their desired policy but downplayed its salience, or have gone to great lengths to try to 
convince the public of the merits of the policy. In both case studies, there was considerable 
diversity in views on the nature of public attitudes to comprehensive schooling (and their 
relevance to voting decisions); policy actors perceived a popular concern with selection (stronger 
in England than in Austria) but also a rather ambiguous support for comprehensive schooling. 
The perception of comprehensive schooling as lacking popular appeal led in the case of the SPÖ 
to attempts to increase its appeal, and was used by policymakers in case of New Labour to 
reinforce such doubts and justify alternative policies. In both cases, increasing the popular appeal 
of particular policies was also used to overcome political resistance within the party or among 
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other political actors. Parties’ engagement with what they perceive to be popular support and 
prevalent images about schooling in the public, and the influence this has on their policies, is 
therefore not a straightforward relationship.  
This research has not directly studied the nature of public attitudes per se such; nor has 
it undertaken an in-depth analysis of parties’ electoral tactics and the role of education policy 
therein. However, several common themes have emerged from party actors’ statements on their 
perception of public attitudes, as well as their strategies to increase popular support for the policy 
solutions they favoured, which will be discussed in this section.  
In the 1980s and 1990s, both parties experienced a decline in electoral support, as well as 
a general ideological-discursive challenge to the welfare state and Keynesian economic strategy 
that had been core components of their ‘social projects’ in the 1960s and 1970s. During Labour’s 
time in opposition, the shift in the overall discursive climate (influenced by New Right thinking) 
severely challenged Labour’s ideological and policy profile. From the late 1980s on, the party 
attempted to modernise its programmatic profile in order to increase its ‘electability’ among 
‘aspirational’ groups. Although this ‘policy review’ did not affect the party’s commitment to 
comprehensive schooling, which was still seen as generally popular, Labour’s discourse became 
increasingly focused on presenting itself as sensitive to parental concerns and educational 
standards. Being in opposition, the party increasingly perceived school policy as an asset through 
which it could blame the government; but at the same time, a gradual change in emphasis in its 
policy took place. The political Right’s sustained discursive and material attacks on core features 
of Labour’s traditional policy, as well as consecutive electoral defeats, led to a more fundamental 
ideological crisis in the party, which was seized in the 1990s by proponents who wished to 
fundamentally change the party’s ideological profile and electoral appeal. As discussed in the 
previous section, the policy of comprehensive schooling became entangled in struggles over the 
party’s reorientation to New Labour. New Labour policymakers presented comprehensive 
schooling as a symbol of ‘what was wrong’ with the traditional approach to public-sector 
governance – a view they perceived to be (and justified as) shared among the public.  
Following Tony Blair’s announcement that ‘education, education, education’ would be his 
three priorities for a Labour government, education policy served as a device to signal this 
transformation, and the party’s new project of public-sector reform, to the public. Education was 
chosen as a key policy area through which to signal ‘how we saw the role of the state: enabling 
the fulfilment of potential, not controlling lives or business’ (Blair 2010, p. 103). It thus became ‘a 
symbol of reform and modernisation’, for ‘in the minds of the electorate, in the minds of parents, 
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what you say about education gives them an impression of what you stand for overall, what your 
general political offer is’ (Blunkett, interview 2016). Within this use of education policy to ‘sell’ the 
party, ‘modernising’ comprehensive schooling played a particular symbolic role; in New Labour’s 
public discourse, the ‘bog-standard comprehensive school’ epitomised the ‘uniformity’ and 
‘unresponsiveness’ of public services to consumer demands. The change in the party’s education 
policy served to not only highlight the party as a ‘champion’ of parents or the ‘consumers’ of 
education but also undermine the teachers or the ‘producers’ of education. In the latter years of 
Blair’s premiership (around the 2005 election), it appears that the electorate’s support of him was 
even more necessary in his quest for radical public-sector reform, as even the party’s former pro-
modernisation circle increasingly opposed him.  
In the case of the SPÖ, the situation has been rather different; its previous ‘project’ of the 
welfare state had not become so discredited, and nor had education policy been particularly 
relevant therein. Although the SPÖ has consistently decreased its electoral share since its absolute 
majorities of the 1970s, the party has faced less-severe electoral challenges than the Labour Party; 
it remained the strongest political party throughout the 1980s and 1990s, and remained in 
government until 2000. After the early 1980s, the party saw some attempts to ‘modernise’ its 
public image and programmatic orientation. Although this included a reduced role for state 
regulation, the SPÖ’s transformation has overall been a rather gradual process of de-ideologising 
an already rather pragmatic centre-left party (Pelinka, 2013; Ucakar, 2006; Seeleib-Kaiser et al., 
2005). In contrast to England, the discursive climate in Austria has remained much more stable 
and within traditional Left–Right parameters. Although the ÖVP recently shifted towards a more 
neoliberal agenda (Tálos, 2006), compared to the British Conservative Party of the 1980s, this has 
involved a less-severe attack on the welfare state (which the ÖVP has participated in building 
since 1945). In school policy, the ÖVP’s position largely continued to emphasise a differentiated 
school system within the traditional bureaucratic model of school governance, with limited 
initiatives for introducing quasi-markets. Since the mid-1980s, the main discursive and electoral 
challenge to the SPÖ has come from the right-wing FPÖ, which has shaped public debate around 
migration.  
Compared to the Labour Party, education policy received little attention in SPÖ electoral 
campaigns until the early 2000s, when the party’s unfamiliar position in political opposition and 
a burgeoning debate about Austria’s PISA results opened a window of opportunity for 
comprehensive schooling advocates to convince the party’s leadership of the electoral 
opportunities involved in focusing on education policy. In contrast to New Labour, the SPÖ 
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framed comprehensive schooling as a requirement for both a ‘modern’ education system and a 
competitive economy. Developing a new education policy programme in the early 2000s, and 
the many events associated with it, were seen as useful to position the party to the public as 
‘competent’ on education policy – despite it no longer controlling the school ministry. The 
interviews reflected a general belief that the party’s ownership of education policy was crucial to 
it winning the 2006 elections.  
Discursive contexts and electoral dynamics are important for understanding the extent to 
which parties have undergone programmatic transformation and whether they viewed education 
policy as a risk or an opportunity to ‘sell’ the party. In terms of the parties’ perceptions of public 
support for, or opposition to, comprehensive schooling in particular, the two cases exhibit both 
commonalities and differences. 
Labour Party policymakers were concerned about the potential electoral risks of 
introducing comprehensive schooling as early as the 1960s. By then, selection had become widely 
unpopular among the middle classes because of restricted access to grammar school places. 
Abolishing the 11-plus examination was therefore perceived as in line with public opinion. But key 
actors, such as Antony Crosland, remained nervous about the potential resistance to abolishing 
grammar schools as such (Lawton, 2005: 11; Francis, 2006). Labour therefore sold comprehensive 
schooling in the 1960s as ‘grammar school education for all’, thereby also alluding to the 
educational aspirations of the working class, for whom grammar schools represented a ‘ladder 
of opportunity’ – an alternative means of social advancement to the prestigious private schools 
(Lawton, 2005: 11). By the 1980s, comprehensive schooling had become the shared educational 
experience of the majority of children and parents, and Labour perceived it to be generally 
popular. However, there were some concerns that comprehensive schooling had not established 
its own ‘image’ as similar to grammar schools and distinct from secondary-modern schools 
(Lawton, 2005; Mandler, 2014). Since the 1970s, comprehensive schools had also come under 
considerable attack from the right-wing media, which portrayed them as lacking discipline and 
order. In contrast, although only a few grammar schools had survived the comprehensive 
reorganisation in the 1970s, this school type continued to be seen as an influential, ‘symbolic and 
visible alternative to comprehensive schools in the 1980s and 1990s’ (Phillips, 2003: 5). 
In the mid-1990s, New Labour actively mobilised perceived parental anxieties over 
comprehensive schooling and the presumed lack of educational standards therein. Selection was 
still perceived as unpopular in the public, but perceptions of public nostalgia for grammar schools 
were strongly mobilised by New Labour to legitimise the ‘modernisation’ of comprehensive 
187 
 
schooling. New Labour politicians justified not closing down the remaining grammar schools by 
referring to the potential resistance among voters in areas where such schools remained as well 
as with their concern that abolishing these schools would send a negative signal to the wider 
electorate, where grammar schools were believed to be admired as strongholds of excellence, 
standards and opportunity while comprehensive schools were believed to be lacking such an 
‘ethos of excellence’ in the eyes of the public. Labour therefore emphasised the development of 
schools’ mission, or ‘ethos’, in its specialist school programme and (in particular) its academies 
programme, which entailed emulating the characteristics of grammar (and private) schools by 
focusing on traditional knowledge and learning, discipline, uniforms and so on.  
In general, New Labour’s education discourse was geared towards mobilising and 
constructing parental concerns over school standards and their wish to choose the ‘right’ kind of 
schools; through this approach, the party attempted to transcend potential distributional conflicts 
between different groups or social classes. However, during its term in government, tensions 
regarding this stress on parental choice and the reluctance to regulate school admissions became 
more visible. Labour voters’ concerns regarding school selection and (some groups of) parents’ 
limited choice seems to have been an issue, at least for the Labour MPs who criticised government 
policy around 2005–06.  
Popular support for comprehensive schooling was also mixed in 1970s Austria. A key 
difference in Austria compared to England was that the Gymnasiums were not subsequently 
abolished; instead, they became more accessible and (to some degree) lost their status as elite 
institutions. In the 1960s, similarly to England, there was a perception of broad public support for 
educational reform and expansion (Schnell, 1993); but Austria lacked the strong, grassroots 
movement for abolishing selection that had developed in England. Subsequently, SPÖ school 
policymakers perceived comprehensive schooling as potentially electorally risky, as the public 
lacked familiarity with and understanding of what these schools would entail. During the 1970s, 
the issue of comprehensive schooling was de-emphasised in the party’s electoral campaigns, 
which instead focused on more popular policies such as investing in educational infrastructure 
and resources. Supporters of comprehensive schooling hoped that the school experiments 
introduced in 1971 and their scientific evaluation would increase public acceptance, but 
comprehensive schooling continued to be discursively attacked by the Catholic–Conservative 
political spectrum (the ÖVP, the Gymnasium teaching union and Catholic associations). By the 
early 1980s, SPÖ advocates for comprehensive schooling generally perceived themselves to have 
lost the public argument (Schnell, 1993: 300).  
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Following its failure to introduce comprehensive schooling, the SPÖ resorted to driving 
educational expansion within the differentiated system. The expansion of Gymnasium school 
places turned these schools into an increasingly accessible target of educational aspirations for 
many previously excluded groups (most notably working-class children, girls and children in rural 
areas). Although sorting children at the age of ten remained (based, de facto, on selection by 
ability), the switch from examinations to primary school grades and teacher recommendations 
made this selection criterion more amenable to parental influences. In addition to expanding the 
number of Gymnasium school places, post-14 vocational pathways were upgraded. VET colleges, 
in particular – which gave access to the Matura qualification (and thereby higher education) – 
have become an increasingly popular route for upward mobility, which, to some degree, 
compensates for the continuing practice of early selection (Lassnigg, 2011: 421–2). However, while 
the Hauptschule taught the same curriculum as the Gymnasiums, and thereby ceased to be a 
formal barrier to continuing to (upper level) secondary and higher education, interviewees 
thought that the public still perceived the Gymnasium as a ‘guarantee’ to obtain the Matura. 
In the 2000s, SPÖ comprehensive schooling advocates tried to overcome such popular 
views and to build a case for such schooling through referencing other countries’ experiences 
and OECD research. They were aware of the public’s lack of familiarity and latent scepticism to 
non-selective schooling but were generally optimistic that the public could be persuaded of the 
merits of comprehensive schooling by ensuring the quality of teaching and learning in these 
schools (or through the ‘new learning culture’ proposed for the NMS). In hindsight, some actors 
conceded that they had not been successful in constructing and mobilising a successful counter-
image to the Gymnasium, nor in mobilising support for abolishing selection. Although they 
perceived a considerable degree of popular dissatisfaction with selection and access to 
Gymnasium places (particularly in cities), the party’s previous strategy of expanding educational 
opportunities within the differentiated system had in the long run reduced the public pressure 
and mobilisation required to introduce comprehensive schooling. Furthermore, the expansion of 
Gymnasium school places (again, particularly in cities) depopulated the Hauptschule, increasing 
parental fears of their child mixing with low-achieving students – and, as some interviewees 
indicated, immigrant children with limited German language skills. Several interviewees indicated 
that in Austria’s current discursive climate, which is strongly shaped by negative discourse over 




Electoral considerations have influenced both parties’ engagement with school policy, 
but this relationship between parties’ policy preferences and gaining popular support has not 
been clear-cut. In both parties, there were instances where policy proposals were modified or 
downplayed due to perceived lack of popular support, electoral risks or (in particular) difficulties 
attracting middle-class votes. In both cases, however, there were many instances where actors 
went to great lengths to frame discourses such that they would persuade the public and gain 
popular support for a policy (or even used policy to ‘sell’ the party as a whole). Crucial questions 
included how education fits into the wider discursive climate at a certain moment, and how it can 
be used to allude to wider aspirations among voters and the public. An emerging theme during 
the empirical investigation related to the potential of education policy (perhaps more than other 
public policies) to construct and convey narratives about parties’ wider social projects, tying in 
hopes and aspirations and painting pictures about social change and the future. In both countries, 
it appears that popular images of and attachments to selective schools, or the type of education 
they stand for, put limits to the popular image of comprehensive schooling. This has created 
considerable challenges for the parties’ wish to promote comprehensive schooling. However, as 
the two case studies and comparison over time have indicated, actors have approached this 
dilemma in very different ways. Overall, actors’ perceptions of electoral opportunities and risks, 
as well as the discursive strategies they devise for mobilising opportunities and overcoming 
barriers, remain crucial for understanding the interactions between electoral considerations and 








Chapter 7. Conclusion 
This research has aimed to contribute to a more nuanced and contextualised 
understanding of political parties and their engagement with education policy. First of all, rather 
than starting from a narrow definition of comprehensive schooling as the absence of selection, 
the research aimed to investigate the particular meanings that the long-standing goal of 
‘comprehensive schooling’ has come to embody in each context and the shifts in these 
connotations that have taken place over the period from the 1980s to the 2010 which have 
sparked and were shaped by political struggles. Secondly, this research also aimed to contribute 
to a more holistic understanding of political parties. Although parties are (often) strategic actors, 
whose policy preferences are influenced by the parties’ need to navigate the obstacles of political 
arenas in their quest for political power, political parties are also internally differentiated coalitions 
often exhibiting a pluralism of ideas and interests in education policy; and therefore political 
organisations with their own internal life. The processes through which shared attitudes and party 
policy are shaped and contested are complex and therefore require empirical investigation. 
Building on a dialectic understanding of political parties, this research has investigated how the 
interplay between internal party dynamics and parties’ engagement with their external 
environment has contributed to shaping the formation of party policy on comprehensive 
schooling.  
Summary of findings 
Empirically, this research has focused on two political parties which had previously been key 
political supporters of comprehensive schooling. Since the 1960s and 1970s, and comprehensive 
schooling has assumed a central position in Labour’s and the SPÖ’s educational programmes. 
However, within the particular educational and political contexts in which the demands for 
comprehensive schooling reform were developed, both parties developed different 
understandings of this policy. Since the 1980s, the attitudes and policies of the two parties seem 
to have diverged even more clearly; while Labour appears to have abandoned its traditional 
approach to comprehensive schooling in the mid-1990s, the SPÖ appears to have rediscovered 
its traditional commitment in the early 2000s.  
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Apart from opposition to academic selection, Labour’s commitment to comprehensive 
schooling has since the 1960s rested on the principles of local authority control over schooling 
and a high degree of teacher autonomy in terms of internal differentiation practices, the 
curriculum and teaching methods. Since then, the Labour Party’s proposals for comprehensive 
schooling have not extended much further, in terms of either formulating particular aims for such 
schooling or specifying its practices and contents. Since the late 1980s (and particularly since the 
mid-1990s), struggles over comprehensive schooling within the party largely focused on issues of 
school governance – not only the role of market mechanisms (such as choice and competition) 
in governance but also the increasing role of the central government and individual schools’ 
freedom at the cost of local authority control and teachers’ autonomy, which were seen as key 
pillars underpinning the comprehensive principle. In contrast, the SPÖ’s programmatic 
commitment to comprehensive schooling has since the 1920s built on an encompassing 
educational doctrine, which included reflections on both the structure of schooling and the 
curricular and pedagogical practices required for a ‘common middle school’. Symbolic references 
to this current of educational thought, and many individual aspects of it, remain in the party’s 
contemporary programmes today – but the SPÖ’s policy proposals for comprehensive schooling 
now focus on postponing selection from ages 10–14 and emulating the Gymnasium’s curricular 
practices in order to secure post-14 educational transitions. Due to its failure to introduce 
comprehensive schooling in the 1970s, the party’s policy strategy when in government has 
focused on expanding opportunities and transitions within the differentiated system by 
simultaneously expanding access to selective schooling and upgrading vocational pathways (as 
alternatives to academic tracks).  
Despite clear changes in Labour’s policy and the apparent resignation in the SPÖ’s reform 
agenda, a general commitment to non-selective schooling remains largely shared by both parties. 
This commitment has often included a strong symbolic and emotive dimension. However, in both 
parties there is considerable ambiguity regarding both what comprehensive schooling actually 
means (beyond non-selection) and the measures and political strategy required to bring it about.  
Struggles over comprehensive schooling have been underpinned by unique dynamics 
within each party. During Labour’s mid-1990s programmatic transformation, comprehensive 
schooling became entangled with wider struggles over what the party stood for and what its 
goals were. Considerable ownership over comprehensive schooling emerged among teachers 
(who had a strong presence in the party) during the implementation of comprehensive schooling 
in the 1960s and 1970s. Ideologically, comprehensive schooling became embedded in the party’s 
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wider ‘egalitarian project’ of welfare-state expansion during that time. Indeed, it seems that the 
principle of comprehensive schooling became a key ingredient of both this egalitarian project 
and the party’s ‘ethos’ for not only teachers but a large section of the party. New Labour 
politicians, and their ideas about the role of the state in education and the goals of educational 
reform, challenged what they saw as ‘Old Labour’ policy. Within this struggle to redefine Labour’s 
project for social reform, education policy and the ‘modernisation’ of comprehensive schooling 
were used to ‘sell’ the new perspective to the public. However, towards the end of Blair’s 
leadership, internal party contestation among New Labour modernisers revealed not only 
disagreements over policy and ideas but also uncertainties over the popular support of some 
measures. Today, the Labour Party has tacitly accepted much of New Labour’s educational 
agenda, but there seems to be considerable uneasiness with this legacy. 
In the SPÖ, comprehensive schooling remained torn between programmatic aspiration 
and pragmatic political strategy in a political context that constrained the potential for far-
reaching school reforms. While comprehensive schooling remained a symbolic goal within the 
party’s education programme, it has never become firmly embedded in the party’s overall 
programme for social change, and there has been little internal party debate over the goals and 
means of educational reform. That comprehensive schooling has remained a programmatic 
aspiration appears to be the result of the persistence of a few individual supporters, who used 
international educational discourses (recently PISA) to legitimise the project to both the party and 
the public. The party’s recent failure to introduce comprehensive schooling was largely due to 
external political constraints, but it appears that its previous policy of expanding educational 
opportunities within the differentiated system has, in the long run, reduced both popular pressure 
and internal party mobilisation to abolish selection. Today, comprehensive schooling remains as 
a symbolic goal in the party’s programmes, but has largely disappeared from the party’s agenda.  
The two case studies revealed not only different (and changing) understandings of the 
idea of comprehensive schooling, and the goals and policy measures associated with it, but also 
very unique dynamics through which party policy was formed. These dynamics emerged from 
the interplays between different actors, motivations and strategies, which played out very 
differently in particular historical and political contexts. Although the two case studies therefore 
do not lend themselves easily to comparative discussion, the joint discussion of some of the 
observations made in each case highlighted a range of dimensions, which have contributed to 
shaping attitudes towards and policies on comprehensive schooling in both parties. 
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Important aspects and dynamics regarding the parties’ engagement with their external 
environment were: 
 The party’s need for popular support: Its engagement with the electorate; the nature of 
electoral competition; the overall discursive climate; whether school policy was perceived 
as a potential cause of electoral dilemmas or as a resource to create cross-class 
coalitions; patterns of educational demands and competition over school places; and the 
possibilities of mobilising or overcoming prevalent societal imaginaries of ‘the good 
school’ or ‘legitimate’ selection. 
 The party’s need for political support: Its engagement with other political actors; 
constraints on accessing and exercising government power; and strategies to overcome, 
or contribute towards, resistance to reform. 
Important aspects underpinning internal party dynamics were: 
 the role of programmatic legacies of educational reform and their embeddedness in (or 
detachedness from) wider party projects; 
 the emergence of a collective attachment to comprehensive schooling as a value within 
the wider party, creating support for this policy as a ‘logic of appropriateness’, or even 
part of the ‘ethos’, of the party; 
 the strength of internal party lobby groups (such as teachers), their vested interests in 
the existing system and the degree of ownership over past educational reforms among 
them; and 
 the incorporation of new ideas, discourses and ideological projects and their fit with or 
challenge to existing commitments. 
 
The joint discussion of findings from the two case studies indicated how the dynamics 
underpinning policy formation were stimulated by the specific educational and political context, 
as well as by the wider political-discursive climate. First of all, the political-institutional setting in 
which education policy-making took place provided particular opportunities for, or constraints 
in, bringing about educational change. The degree to which power is concentrated in the 
government, as well as the power of veto players, affects how much (and whose) support political 
parties wishing to change the status quo require, and the likely strategies they will employ. The 
particularly constrained nature of education policy-making in Austria (the need for a two-thirds 
majority, the veto-player status of teaching unions and the entangled constitutional 
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competencies of different levels of government in education policy) contributes to the need to 
seek broad political support for policy reforms. In contrast, the concentrated nature of 
government power in England and the absence of strong veto points for school policy-making 
create fewer constraints on governments wishing to change policy – but also prevents opposition 
parties from influencing the policy agenda. While the political-institutional setting of education 
policy-making does not determine political parties’ actions, it can influence the ‘locus’ of potential 
challenges for parties wishing to introduce policy. While electoral considerations played a role in 
both parties’ school policy projects, the need to win general elections, and therefore the influence 
of electoral considerations on education policy proposals, appears to have been particularly 
strong for the Labour Party. Conversely, the SPÖ has not perceived school policy to be a major 
electoral risk – but it has seen it as a considerable risk for forming coalition governments.  
Second, parties are not only unitary actors that strategically navigate electoral and 
political arenas but also internally differentiated coalitions in which potentially diverging attitudes 
exist. In addition, this research has also found that parties themselves can become institutions in 
which ideas or values become embodied in a shared sense of purpose or identity. As such, 
institutions not only provide an external ‘opportunity structure’ or external incentives for political 
parties but also affect their internal life, creating a ‘logic of appropriateness’ (March and Olsen, 
1984; March and Olsen, 2006). In this sense, institutions embody social norms, cognitive scripts 
and cultural symbols that ‘affect the very identities, self-images and preferences of actors’ (Hall 
and Taylor, 1996: 939). Support for comprehensive schooling has been seen as ‘appropriate’ for 
members or policymakers of both parties; but it seems that in the Labour Party, attachments to 
comprehensive schooling have extended beyond such ‘appropriateness’ to become part of the 
party’s ‘ethos’ (Drucker, 1979). In both cases, this general support did not necessarily imply in-
depth knowledge – or even interest – in the intricate matters of school policy. Nor are such shared 
norms or attitudes entirely stable; as the case of the Labour Party shows, these can become 
challenged by new ideas and the actors who push them. However, this sense of ‘appropriateness’ 
or ‘ethos’ limited the ability of New Labour modernisers to achieve their goals, and may have  
even outlived some of the changes they introduced in party policy.  
Finally, key to understanding parties’ comprehensive schooling policy is not only political 
institutions but also the educational context. The historical perspective this research adopted has 
highlighted the role of policy legacies, or feedback effects, of various sorts. Policy-making rarely 
starts from scratch; rather, it is shaped by the outcomes of past policies and the power relations 
they created. Policies can become institutions themselves, and their legacies affect both policy 
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preferences and the opportunities of, and constraints on, future policy-making (Pierson, 1993; 
Pierson, 2006; Béland, 2010; Jordan, 2013). Policies can, over time, create group identities and 
resources, as well as vested interests among beneficiaries, who mobilise to maintain their 
privileges and thus become powerful actors who oppose policy changes (Campbell, 2012). A key 
policy legacy that emerged from the case studies was ‘group effects’, or past policy’s creation of 
vested interests – particularly among the teaching force. In Austria, the two-tiered nature of 
schooling and teacher qualifications has, over time, created a powerful vested interest in 
maintaining the status quo among Gymnasium school teachers, who therefore oppose the 
introduction of comprehensive schooling. In England, teachers’ involvement (which had not been 
formally differentiated by school type) in implementing comprehensive schooling created a 
strong sense of ownership for such schooling among them. The strength of such lobby groups 
and their involvement in and influence on party policy has varied, but the feedback effect of past 
policy on group identities and vested interests was an important factor for understanding the 
politics of education policy in both countries. The general institutional nature of education 
systems, as well as particular school policies, can also contribute to shaping societal expectations 
for education and patterns of educational demand. Often called ‘regime effects’ or ‘mass 
behaviour effects’ (Pierson, 2006; Campbell, 2012), these can create (more or less visible) pressure 
for, or resistance to, reform; this, in turn, provides reform-oriented actors with opportunities or 
constraints when developing and advocating reform proposals. This research has not studied 
societal expectations or public opinion as such, but interviewees’ statements indicated that actors 
have reflected on (and puzzled over) the nature of societal demands, and that these perceptions 
influenced actors’ policy strategies for mobilising support or trying to overcome barriers.  
Past policies, and the educational institutions they have created, can also have 
‘interpretive’ feedback effects, which shape attitudes regarding desirable policy among both the 
wider public and policy actors. Traditions and ideas embodied in educational institutions – or 
‘definition institutions’ (Steedman, 1987), such as England’s grammar schools and private schools 
– can have a powerful effect on public attitudes and expectations about what constitutes ‘good’ 
education. Both countries’ parties have perceived the image of selective educational institutions 
to have challenged popular perceptions of comprehensive schools (either the existing such 
schools in England or the proposed ones in Austria). However, national educational traditions 
and policy legacies also act as ‘repositories of ideologies’ (Paterson, 2003a: 5), which actors can 
mobilise to gain (or deny) legitimacy for education reforms. In both parties, actors have tried to 
frame policies in line with what they perceived to be popular images of selective schools (e.g. by 
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stressing notions of ‘ethos’, ‘security’ and/or ‘transitions’). A clear difference, though, is that SPÖ 
policymakers tried to gain support for comprehensive schooling, while New Labour mobilised 
(and constructed) such images to undermine Labour’s traditional policy of comprehensive 
schooling.  
The two parties’ education policies were influenced by the particular political-institutional, 
discursive and educational contexts in which they evolved, which not only created particular 
opportunities for (and constraints on) actors to pursue different policy strategies but also, to some 
degree, influenced actors’ attitudes and identities in the first place. However, actors are both 
shaped by and ‘architects’ of their institutional context (Hay, 2008: 62), and this research has 
found that (as Hay argues) actors are not ‘analytically substitutable’; indeed, their preferences or 
rationales cannot be deducted from the particular context in which they engage (Hay, 2008: 64). 
The political environments in which parties operate are highly complex, lending themselves to 
various interpretations and alternatives for action. Political and educational settings can include 
‘real’ constraints on actors’ successes in realising their ambitions – but these conditions do not 
predetermine actors’ aspirations or strategies. It is through the interpretation of party actors that 
institutional constraints and opportunities become meaningful in political processes, influencing 
what parties want and do in education policy. This empirical investigation therefore focused on 
actors’ ‘assumptive worlds’ (Young, 1977), exploring the structure of actors’ environments through 
their perceptions and interpretations of it. The two cases also illustrated the significance of (often 
only a handful of) individuals whose opinions and beliefs about ‘desirable’ education, 
interpretations of political constraints and opportunities, and strategies to advocate for their 
policies – both within and outside the party – strongly influenced their party’s approach to school 
policy. These ‘change agents’, or ‘policy entrepreneurs’ (Mintrom and Norman, 2009; Little, 2017), 
were motivated by a range of rationales; they were rarely pure ‘instrumentalists’ driven by the 
pragmatic pursuit of power, nor pure ‘idealists’ driven by commitments to higher educational 
ideals and ideologies. Actors’ beliefs, values and long-term visions of the ‘good’ society 
interplayed with their strategic calculations of material gains, pragmatism and power. How these 
party actors not only perceived, but also constructed and mobilised, what is ‘possible’ and 
‘desirable’ in education policy remained crucial for understanding the evolution of parties’ 





In the literature on the partisan politics of education policy, such policy has been largely 
conceptualised as a distributive issue between social classes, the preferences of which depend on 
the particular benefits and losses they stand to gain from the policy. Indeed, political struggles 
over comprehensive schooling in the two cases studied here have also revolved around questions 
of educational opportunities and privileges for different groups. However, neither the 
redistributive implications of school policy nor popular attitudes towards it are clear-cut. Not only 
has comprehensive schooling come to mean different things in different countries, and therefore 
related to different policy dimensions, but also wider notions of educational and social change 
which have underpinned political debates about comprehensive schooling have differed over 
time. Yet, through these different meanings and debates, another dimension to the politics of 
education policy has emerged. Apart from (and intertwined with) distributive conflicts in 
education policy, conflicts in values, worldviews and beliefs – particularly regarding the idea of the 
‘good school’ and the role of education in producing social change and social order. Debates 
over comprehensive schooling revealed not only shared concerns and ambitions across countries 
but also the importance of particular local or national meanings and the existence of prevalent 
images of ‘the good school’.  
Political parties’ policy preferences tend to be portrayed as either ‘ideologically based’ or 
shaped by electoral considerations, thereby reflecting the political interests of the key 
constituencies that the parties aim to represent or attract (White, 2006). By tracing the processes 
through which policies were formed, this research has highlighted that both dimensions – 
ideology and strategy – play an important role. However, it is impossible to assess the relative 
weight of these categories; nor are they clear-cut. Party policy is, to some degree, shaped by 
internal party dynamics in which programmatic legacies, shared norms and practices, input from 
educational theory and practice, and the interests and attitudes of particular groups or lobbies 
interplay in creating a temporary consensus, which can be modified or challenged by the rise of 
new actors and ideas. Party policy is also influenced by the strategies that parties adopt to engage 
with their external environment and to win popular support, as well as by them forming political 
coalitions to implement policy. As this research has demonstrated, it is through the dialectic 
interplay between these internal and external dimensions that we can gain a better understanding 
of the shape of, and changes in, party policy. The in-depth investigation of both cases of policy 
formation has highlighted that party ‘policy’ tends to manifest in different ‘sites’ – widely shared 
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attitudes within the party, its collectively sanctioned preferences in party programmes, and the 
strategic choices its elected representatives make in electoral and legislative arenas are closely 
linked – yet often strained. Party ‘policy’ is therefore not a stable category but rather a temporary, 
often-uneasy compromise.  
This research linked two distinct questions: 1) What does comprehensive education mean, 
in different contexts and at different points in time?, and 2) How can we understand the formation 
of political parties’ policy on this issue? The research therefore aimed to evidence the shifting 
meanings of comprehensive schooling across time and space, and to gain insights into the 
processes through which parties’ positions on this policy issue evolved. Despite numerous 
attempts to limit the analysis to only one of the two questions, it is perhaps the difficulty of 
separating the analysis of the meaning of policy from the analysis of the processes through which 
policy is created that is the main finding of this research. It seems that this interplay – between 
meaning and process; between ideas and action – is key to understanding the trajectory of these 
two parties’ education policies since the 1980s. Observing the changing meanings of 
comprehensive schooling also indicates the processes that make a party what it is: a product of 
its specific history, which it uses as a point of reference for what should either be done or avoided 
in the future. Such observation also reveals that a party is a thing that continuously tries to make 
sense of itself – and, through this process, reproduces itself. While the external environment is 
important, the influence of that environment depends on how it is reconstructed and interpreted 
internally. Researching ‘meanings’ thereby leads to findings about ‘processes’, and vice versa. 
More research on the engagement of political parties with comprehensive schooling in other 
cultural and political contexts would further contribute to a more nuanced understanding of the 
interdependency between policy meanings and processes of preference formation of political 
actors.  
Despite significant differences between the two cases in this study, this research also 
revealed a considerable ambivalence and ambiguity of social democratic parties in the area of 
education policy. While this is partly related to the complex nature of distributive and value 
dimensions of education policy as such as well as the political constraints facing the parties in 
realising their goals, this finding also raises question to more fundamental role of ambiguity in 
the life of political parties. The frequent difficulty of even identifying party ‘policy’ on a particular 
issue at any point in time has been commented on in other research, which has resorted to 
operationalise particular manifestations of party policy; that is either a party’s collectively 
sanctioned preferences (expressed in official programmes), the strategic choices its leaders have 
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made in particular policy processes, or less commonly the widely shared attitudes among the 
party’s rank-and-file. However, this fragmentation of party policy in different ‘sites’, and the 
interplay between them, is in itself a characteristic of a party. What Brunsson (1993) called 
‘organised hypocrisy’ might not only be a part of the everyday life of a political party but also a 
crucial function for its survival as a political organisation. Indeterminacy and ambiguity might be 
crucial for a party to simultaneously convey different meanings to different audiences. More 
research on internal struggles regarding different policy issues and the role of ambiguity and 
fluidity of party policy would contribute to more holistic understanding the nature political parties 
and the formation of their policy preferences in other areas. 
The research presented in this thesis has suggested the importance of studying the 
motivations and struggles of different actors within processes of policy formation. These 
processes take place not in a vacuum but in the particular political and educational contexts in 
which parties engage, which are (to some degree) structured by institutions – from formal rules 
and informal policy-making conventions to shared practices, norms and policy feedback effects. 
This investigation of two case studies was not aimed at uncovering one single type of institution 
that influences these attitude- and preference-formation processes but rather the contingent 
interplay of a range of types of institutional factors. The structure of the political system has, to 
some degree, affected the source of possible constraints on parties’ reform ambitions; the need 
to gain electoral majorities (particularly in majoritarian systems) and the need for coalition-
building and consensus orientation (particularly in proportional electoral systems with a high 
number of veto players for education reforms). The structure of the political arena and the degree 
of power concentration provides a general perspective on the opportunities and constraints 
parties face, which can affect their educational strategies. In addition, attention to policy legacies, 
or the various feedback effects arising from previous education policies, has enabled more 
nuanced insights into the nature of parties’ attitudes and education policies: the emergence of 
group identities and vested interests from previous policies (within and outside parties); patterns 
of educational demand within the public (which parties perceive and respond to when devising 
new policies); and the interpretive feedback effects of previous policies, or educational 
institutions, in terms of creating popular images of what constitutes a ‘proper’ education (among 
both the public and policymakers).  
In this sense, institutions can provide resources for, or erect barriers to, actors’ reform 
ambitions – and can influence these ambitions in the first place. However, institutions do not 
determine actors’ perceptions, preferences or strategies; the complexity and unpredictability of 
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the contexts in which political actors engage leave much room for agency. The importance of 
particular individuals, or small groups of actors, who aim for policy change has emerged from 
the two case studies as crucial for understanding the evolution of party attitudes towards, and 
policies on, schools. These actors were rarely pure instrumentalists, driven by the pursuit of power; 
nor were they pure idealists, driven by only higher educational ideals. Beliefs, values and visions 
of the ‘good’ society interplayed with strategic considerations of gaining political power – both 
for its own sake and to bring about educational change. At times, actors’ beliefs and motivations, 
and the successes or failures of their strategies for mobilising (and even constructing) 
opportunities for reform and constraints for alternatives, have enormously influenced the 
direction and nature of change in party policy. This research indicates the fruitfulness of studying 
the interplay between institutions and actors’ ‘assumptive worlds’ to better understand the 
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